Preventing terrorism? conflict resolution and nationalist violence in the Basque Country by Tellidis, Ioannis
PREVENTING TERRORISM? CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
NATIONALIST VIOLENCE IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY
Ioannis Tellidis
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews
2008
Full metadata for this item is available in the St Andrews
Digital Research Repository
at:
https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/426
This item is protected by original copyright
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License
 
 
 
 
 
Preventing Terrorism? Conflict Resolution and 
Nationalist Violence in the Basque Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ioannis Tellidis 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
In the School of International Relations, 
UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS 
 
September 2007 
 i
Abstract 
 
 
 
This study examines the debates on nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution, 
and intends to identify, on the one hand, the reasons why and the instances in which 
nationalist discourses usurp the notions of political violence and present it as a legitimate 
option for opposing a State, and on the other, whether there exist circumstances where 
conflict resolution techniques and approaches can be useful in isolating terrorist 
discourses from the nationalist ones, without necessarily criminalising the latter. The 
study employs a critical and discourse analysis approach to explaining ethno-nationalist 
and terrorist phenomena, arguing that a contextualisation of the nationalist and terrorist 
objects of study is necessary in order to comprehensively analyse the relationship 
between the two, and the instances where the former gives rise to the latter. The purpose 
of the study is to develop a theoretical framework for the understanding of nationalism 
and terrorism as interconnected practices, and looks into ways in which conflict 
resolution can intervene and prevent the infusion of the two.  
In order to test this framework, the thesis examines the Basque conflict and 
discusses how the discriminatory practices of the Francoist dictatorship towards the 
Basques played a catalytic role in their acceptance of violence as a legitimate vehicle of 
pursuit of the nationalist aim of independence, and how the radicalisation of counter-
terrorist practices after the democratic transition further distanced the civil society from 
both the State and the militant group. The study analyses the role of the Basque civil 
society, and how it became the primary actor in the transformation of the conflict by 
rejecting violent practices from both the State and ETA, while at the same time 
promoting a more civic aspect of the Basque nationalist discourse. This attitude allows 
the thesis to conclude that, contrary to theories of conflict resolution, the State can 
combat terrorism most effectively when it allies with civil society in the alteration of 
perceptions that perpetuate violence, but instead favour a strictly political approach to the 
pursuit of political objectives, like self-determination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When I first set the point of departure of this thesis, violence was the only 
dimension of the Basque conflict that interested me. I wanted to understand how is it 
possible for a liberal democratic state, as well as a minority extremist group to be violent, 
especially towards innocent people, in a country, a setting, that provides them all the 
necessary institutions to raise their grievance(s). There were many case studies which 
could have been selected, especially European, where liberal democracy is the norm, but 
the Basque case was the more provocative because, while researching, I realised there are 
so many instances where it deviates from existing theories of orthodox terrorism theories, 
as well as theories of conflict resolution. First and foremost, I realised that the liberal 
democratic state of Spain did not reflect the liberal qualities it claimed to endorse, when it 
found refuge in illegal activities that were branded ‘counter-terrorist’ in order to eliminate 
what it perceived to be a threat to its own survival. What is more, it seemed to follow the 
prescriptions of orthodox theories of terrorism according to which a liberal democratic 
setting must combat such minority groups because any grievances they might have may 
be communicated through the existing institutionalised channels that every liberal 
democratic state puts at the disposal of its citizens.1 This, as I saw in the examination of 
the Basque case, did not take into consideration ‘permanent’ minorities that were 
engaged in a futile battle against the wishes and the agendas of a ‘permanent’ majority. 
Second, my understanding of theories of conflict resolution according to which, any 
attempts to resolve the conflict reside mostly in the political will of official and semi-
official actors, ran contrary to the phenomenon of Basque civil society taking control of 
the conflict resolution process, through the participation of social initiatives and with the 
aid of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that were set up precisely for the 
                                                 
1 Paul Wilkinson, 1990. “Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom” in Martin 
Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), Terrorism, Protest and Power, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 44-53; Conor 
Cruise O’Brien, 1983. “Terrorism under democratic conditions: the case of the IRA” in Martha Crenshaw 
(ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence, Scranton: Wesleyan 
University Press, p. 93. 
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purpose to educate and inform both the minority and the majority that the violence 
exhibited from both conflictive sides is detrimental not only to them as conflictive 
parties, but also to the very society they both claim to represent and/or work for.  
The Basques have their own language and customs that differ from other Indo-
european clans and the conflict with the central authorities goes as far back as the late 
19th Century, when the Basque region formed part of the Spanish state for the first time, 
albeit with some degree of autonomy.2 The Basques’ cultural signs of difference were 
used in the manifestations of violence both in the early days of Basque nationalism (late 
19th-early 20th century), as well as in its revival during Franco’s dictatorship. Therefore in 
order to understand the perpetuation of violence and the devotion of some segments of 
the Basque society to it, one has to first understand who the Basques are and what makes 
them different from the Spanish. In other words, it is necessary to understand Basque 
identity in order to be able to explain the dynamics and development of Basque 
nationalism – its history, its aspirations, its perceptions. This type of analysis is greatly 
aided by post-modernist approaches on issues of nationalism that view nations and 
ethnies as ‘imagined communities’,3 and recognise the fact that conceptions of 
‘otherness’ are very much rooted in the conceptions that we have about ourselves.4 In 
that sense, therefore, and contrary to theories that maintain that nations and cultural ties 
between individuals are based on cultural givens (for instance, blood, race, language, 
locality),5 the nation is deconstructed to reveal an artificial image which, in turn, makes 
evident the elasticity, not only of the notions, but also of the boundaries that set the 
ingroup apart from the outgroup.6
This, in turn, contributes to an understanding of the Basque extremists’ selection 
of violence per se, as well as the reasons behind that. Only when that understanding is 
achieved can one look for ways in which ethno-nationalist violence will become too 
                                                 
2 Javier Corcuera, 1979. Orígenes, Ideología y Organización del Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876-1904, Madrid: 
Siglo XXI; Marianne Heiberg, 1989. The Making of Basque Nation, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 20-38; Daniele Conversi, 1997.The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 
45-46 
3 Benedict Anderson, 1991. Imagined Communities, London: Verso, p. 15. 
4 Homi Bhabha, 1990. “Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation” in Homi 
Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, London; New York: Routledge 
5 Clifford Geertz, 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana, p. 259. 
6 Andrew Linklater and John MacMillan, 1995. Boundaries in Question, London: Pinter. 
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costly to favour and utilise. On the other hand, an analysis into the workings of the State 
as well as its perceptions about its foundations, conceptions and, ultimately, survival 
must be examined under the prism of the Westphalian standards of statehood, prominent 
until nowadays, that brought forward an understanding that the State’s borders are 
inviolable, except in a war with another State, and within these borders the legitimacy of 
violence rested with the State structures. As Richmond claims, the Westphalian system is 
incapable of addressing conflicts that fall under intra-state (rather than inter-state) 
categories.7
The influence of the Westphalian system, however, is not limited to the 
understanding and analysis of terrorist activity, but extends to the understanding of 
conflict in general, and, as such, it respects the ontology of the State even where that is 
clearly at fault, not only when its nature is oppressive and undemocratic, but also – if not, 
particularly – when the State structure is seemingly liberal democratic and as such any 
violence directed against it is condemned. Orthodox theories of terrorism view terrorist 
attacks against liberal democracies as “a perversion of pluralism and democratic 
freedoms”,8 an attack to the human rights principle.9 As such, they believe that domestic 
and international law and counter-terrorist policies should focus principally on the 
infringement of human rights by it, if the battle against terrorism is to be won.10 Conflict 
resolution approaches, on the other hand, rely on the structures of the state for the 
transformation or elimination of conflicts, primarily because of the theorema of territorial 
integrity and inviolability of borders as understood under the Westphalian system, but 
also because the state is seen as the only actor with the necessary resources that need to 
be mobilized for the desired end. As such, until the 1960s and the conception that the 
system is also to blame for the intractability of conflicts,11 the State was virtually a holy 
entity which decided both the beginning as well as the cessation of conflict. As a result, 
the very roots of conflict, when this concerned hostilities that took place within the 
borders of a State, were left unaccounted for and unidentified.  
                                                 
7 Oliver Richmond, 2002. Maintaining Order, Making Peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 4.  
8 Wilkinson, 1990, op.cit., p. 47. 
9 Irwin Cotler, 1998. “Towards a counter-terrorist law and policy”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 
10, No. 2, pp. 3-23. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Johan Galtung, 1964. Editorial, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 1-4. 
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From the 1960s onwards, however, approaches to conflict resolution became 
more and more critical, disputing the role of the State in, and its contribution to, the 
cessation of conflict and the establishment of sustainable peace.12 The end of the Cold 
War brought forward an understanding of intra-state conflicts that until then was left to 
be dealt with almost exclusively by the prescriptions offered within the Westphalian 
framework. The idea that there exist universal human needs,13 even though it was 
conceived before the end of the bi-polar world, was catalytic to the study of conflict 
resolution. This gave rise to studies of ‘protracted conflicts’14, that is, social conflicts, in 
which the marginalisation of one of the parties took place along the lines of the 
communal and/or regional spheres. In turn, the role of culture15 and identity also began to 
be examined to identify reasons and circumstances that, until then, were claimed to be of 
little or no importance, since conflict was only identified in materialistic terms as an 
incompatibility of goals and wishes between the conflictive parties.16 It is these critical 
approaches that have formed the base of my critical understanding of the Basque conflict, 
in which the two main protagonists, the State and the terrorist organization ETA, seemed 
to be engaged in a war of attrition,17 each for their own reasons, that marginalized any 
resolution attempts for the conflict and, at times, radicalized both the terrorists and their 
circle of support as well as the counter-terrorist initiatives and strategies the State was 
deploying. 
 
 
Methodology 
This study engages in a critical understanding of the three schools it sets out to 
explain (nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution studies) in the light of the Basque 
                                                 
12 John Paul Lederach, 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington 
D. C.: United States Institute for Peace. 
13 John Burton, 1979. Deviance, Terrorism and War, Oxford: Martin Robertson 
14 Edward Azar, 1986. “Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions”, in Edward Azar and John 
Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, Brighton: Whitesheaf 
15 Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, 1991. “The Culture Question and Intercultural Conflict Resolution”, 
Peace and Change, Vol. 16, pp. 22-45. See also Kevin Avruch, 1998. Culture and Conflict Resolution, 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. 
16 Jacob Berkovitch, 1984. Social Conflict and Third Parties, Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
17 Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001. ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo, Barcelona: 
Tusquets 
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case. Critical theories are a valuable tool that allow researchers to deconstruct all theories 
that have been brought forward and question their assumptions in order to show that the 
truth which they claim to present is but the result of a specific manner of analysis 
elaborated under a specific framework. According to Cox, “critical theory asks how the 
order came about and calls into question the nature of the existing structures”.18 
Essentially, it does away with the rigidity of normative theories by focusing its analysis, 
not on facts, but on particular social and historical frameworks.19 Crucially, according to 
Bleiker, critical theory questions the power relationships under examination and intends 
to offer an understanding as to their emergence,20 the reasons behind the specific 
interpretation of the ‘facts’,21 and seeks to determine which elements are universal and 
which are “historically contingent”.22
According to “orthodox terrorism” approaches,23 as I have claimed, a liberal 
democratic state carries greater legitimacy, than the terrorists who are but a minority. The 
reason for that is that in a democracy there are sufficient manners and opportunities to 
communicate your grievances through a non-violent process.24 But such approaches fail 
to question the power relationship between the State and the terrorists, and thus account 
for the views of the latter who themselves have rejected the State’s legitimacy. 
Approaching terrorist phenomena critically allows researchers to comprehend how 
terrorism is understood by the very actors that use it, and why and how it comes to be 
justified. On the other hand, it deconstructs the idea that the State, especially a liberal 
democratic State, is always and invariably fair and just towards the minorities 
encountered within its borders by taking into account and remedying their grievances. Far 
from taking the terrorist’s side, this approach allows researchers to identify the root 
                                                 
18 Robert W Cox, 1996. Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.88. 
19 Steve Smith, 1999 (5th ed.). “New Approaches to International Theory”, in Baylis and Smith, The 
Globalisation of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 176. 
20 Roland Bleiker, 2000. Popular Dissent, Human Agent and Global Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 17. 
21 Cox, 1996, op.cit., p. 88. See also James Clifford, 1986. “Introduction: Partial Truths” in James Clifford 
and George Marcus (eds.), Writing Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
22 Stanley Hoffmann, 1987. Janus and Minerva: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International 
Relations, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, p. 237. 
23 Jason Franks 2006. Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. See 
also Jenny Hocking, 1984. “Orthodox theories of terrorism: The power of politicised terminology”, 
Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 103-110. 
24 Conor Cruise O’Brien, 1983 op.cit., p. 93 
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causes of terrorism’s emergence by questioning the very legitimacy that the State claims 
automatically, and therefore to apply conflict resolution techniques that instead of 
concentrating unilaterally towards the elimination of terrorist violence, can instead shed 
light on the violent aspects of the State, particularly when that treats the entire minority 
group as potential terrorists and refusing to satisfy their grievance with the excuse that 
they undermine the State’s security and survival. 
While critical theory is the methodological pillar of my research, my thesis is also 
influenced by discourse analysis. According to Kitschelt,25 discourse analysis is a useful 
tool that helps identify a) the actors and their perception(s) of the conflict; b) the 
institutional structures (state or movement) of which they are members; and c) the greater 
social context, critical theory is often coupled with discourse analysis in this thesis. 
Bleiker, on the other hand, purports that it “facilitates an exploration of the close linkages 
that exist between theory and practice”.26 In other words, theory and practice are 
mutually constituted and do co-exist,27 or, as Walker puts it, appeals for objectivity 
should not obscure the fact that discourse and practice are very much linked and, 
therefore, any examination of policy analysis should take that link into consideration.28 It 
is at this point that critical theory and discourse analysis are most useful because they 
allow researchers to break down and study separately each of the actors’ truth(s). In the 
Basque case, for instance, the terrorist’s truth is that he is fighting an oppressive regime 
that denies him his full rights to self-determination; for a state official, on the other hand, 
the truth is that he is protecting the state and its citizens, a state that cannot be oppressive 
at the moment when it has granted the Basques extensive autonomy. In a similar way, of 
course, this very study could be subjected to an equally critical analysis, of which it 
might emerge that it is but one more truth in the total prism of truths surrounding this 
conflict. Nonetheless, even in those instances, it is more useful in providing insights and 
accounting for factors that all three schools consider irrelevant or indeed inconceivable as 
to their relationship with the conflict’s dynamics and development.  
                                                 
25 Herbert Kitschelt, 1991. “Critique of the resource mobilisation approach”, in Dieter Rucht (ed.), 
Research on Social Moviements: The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA, Western Press, p. 
338 
26 Bleiker, 2000, op.cit., p. 17. 
27 Jenny Edkins, 1999. Poststructuralism and International Relations, London: Lynne Rienner, p.48 
28 Rob Walker, 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 29. 
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Based on the aforementioned insights offered by critical theory and influenced by 
discourse analysis, this thesis aims to question the understanding that positivist 
approaches offer in the analysis of nationalism, terrorism and conflict resolution. With 
the exception of Smith’s ethno-symbolic paradigm29 in the study of nationalism, which is 
itself a critical approach to modernist theories examining the formation of nations and the 
emergence and spread of nationalism, this thesis intends to question the understandings 
of reality in the Basque case and critically examine: a) the defence by the nationalist 
minority of its historic truth that brings forward its violent demands for self-
determination as a protection from the usurpation of the State; b) the defence by the State 
that the nationalist grievances have been solved with the Statue of Autonomy and 
therefore the only problem in question is that of violence, and; c) the efforts for an end to 
the problem of violence that, until recently, have only centred around the two principal 
actors, that is, the State and ETA, without taking into consideration the role that the 
Basque civil society can play in the resolution of the conflict and the elimination of 
violence.  
During my fieldwork, I engaged in informal conversations not only with 
individuals that, in terms of the conflict, identified either with the Spanish State or with 
the militant nationalist circles, but also with citizens who distanced themselves from 
either actors, yet, at the same time, were affected by it either as victims of such violence 
(a direct and personal experience), or because they could not distance themselves from it 
as citizens of the country within whose borders said violence took place. Such an 
approach was advantageous because it allowed me to, first, identify the perceptions of 
truth(s) as well as the different spectra of truths that corresponded to said perceptions 
and, second, analyse them in a way that took into consideration the change of attitude of 
the civil society, local and national, with respect to the behaviour of the two main actors – 
the State and the terrorists. My status as a researcher, which was known to my 
interlocutors, certainly contributed to the establishment and conduct of unhindered 
communication. Nevertheless, merely noting perceptions and attitudes, as well as the 
ambit in which they originated from, is not very useful in providing insights that can be 
used for an in-depth analysis. It is by critically analysing said notes that an extraction of 
                                                 
29 Anthony D. Smith, 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell. 
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findings and their correct interpretation from a researcher’s point of view can become 
possible. The nationalist fervour of the State, for example, in the implementation – and 
the reasons for such implementation – of anti-terrorist policies becomes visible only after 
engaging in conversations with members of the minority who described how they 
perceived of the violence of the State towards them. On the other hand, using the same 
means in places outside the Basque Country revealed that many citizens have began 
taking into account the recent differentiation of the Basque civil society from the 
significance of violence and, as such, do not always side with or approve of the adoption 
of radicalised policies of the State against the Basques. In other words, these informal 
interviews manifested to me the lack of importance that should have been ascribed by 
both the State and the terrorists towards the local and national civil society, which, as I 
argue, is one of the reasons why the State and the terrorists were locked into a discourse 
and strategy stalemate. 
 
Thesis Outline 
The first chapter offers an analysis of the historical background of Basque 
nationalism, its emergence and development that came to incorporate violence as its 
constitutive part in the 20th Century. Such analysis is necessary in order to highlight the 
‘truths’ of the Basque nation and clarify their role in the promotion of violence. The 
second chapter offers an analysis of the major theories that contributed to the explanation 
and understanding of nationalism. As a phenomenon, it has been approached by many 
different schools and fields. Their conclusions are often disparate, but this thesis will 
divide them in five categories: the primordialists,30 the instrumentalists,31 the 
perennialists,32 the modernists33 and the post-modernists. As the chapter will explain, all 
these theories have offered significant insight to the study of nationalism, yet they all 
seem inadequate to explain why nationalism can adopt so many different forms and be as 
diverse in terms of strategies. As is explained in the chapter, the ethno-symbolic model of 
nationalism has utilised the contributions of the aforementioned approaches and is the 
                                                 
30 Anthony D. Smith, 1998. Nationalism and Modernism, London; New York: Routledge, pp. 145-160. 
31 Ibid., pp. 153-159. 
32 Ibid., pp. 160-169. 
33 Ibid., pp. 18-24. 
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most appropriate guide in the Basque case because it takes into account and explains all 
those cultural elements that, for example, the primordialists or the perennialists accept as 
ineffable.34
The third chapter reviews the literature that concerns the manifestation of political 
violence and concentrates on the sub-category of terrorism – political violence can be 
expressed in a variety of ways, some quite violent, like mass terrorism, others no more 
violent than civil disobedience. What the chapter highlights is the great variety of 
subjects that have studied and analysed ‘terrorism’. As such, and taking into 
consideration the fact that there is no commonly agreed definition of ‘terrorism’ there is 
no common base from which to start and conduct organised research. As a result, some 
studies are ahistorical and fail to see the broader environment in which terrorist actions 
take place.35 Furthermore, one feels that some studies are not in fact studies but 
prescriptions that concentrate solely on the alleviation of ‘terrorist’ symptoms36 without 
engaging in an examination of the root causes of terrorism itself. This, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that we have not enhanced our understanding of terrorism. There are 
many studies that have provided valuable insights but Crenshaw’s37 incitement to 
contextualise our studies of terrorism is the one that is more valuable. As my thesis 
supports, terrorism cannot be fully understood when isolated from its very environment 
that generated it. The analysis of a terrorist’s behaviour, patterns or psyche tells us more 
about the terrorist rather than the reasons that made him choose this particular method. In 
other words, it is an analysis that focuses more on how the individual chose to oppose the 
state rather than why. Besides, terrorism itself is so variedly used – by Islamic 
fundamentalists, militant nationalists, state structures, animal right supporters, Marxist 
groups –38 that cannot be separated into one independent school. The reason why the 
Basque case becomes relevant to the theory is because, even when the latter dictate 
                                                 
34 Geertz, 1973, op.cit 
35 Michel Wieviorka, 1993. The Making of Terrorism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-8. 
36 Andrew Silke, 2001. “Continuing problems with research on terrorism”, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol.13, No.4, pp. 1-14. Quote at p. 12. See also David Brannan, Philip Esler and Anders 
Strindberg, 2001. “Talking to “terrorists”: towards an independent analytical framework for the study of 
violent substate activism”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.24, No.1, pp. 3-24 . Quote at p.4. 
37 Martha Crenshaw, 1995. Terrorism in Context, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
38 Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjolberg, 2004. Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the 
Literature, Norway: Kjeller (FFI/Rapport-2004/04307), p. 8. Available at 
http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf 
 9
alleviation of grievances39 and careful counter-terrorist measures so as not to incite spiral 
violence,40 the Basque conflict is still very much alive. Theoretically, that is, the Basque 
country should now be a region that negotiates its possible independence in every 
political level available to them since the transition to democracy, and in the absence of 
violence. Yet, the existence of ETA to our days and the continuation of its terrorist 
practices despite the efficacy of French41 and Spanish42 police forces and intelligence, 
show that there are still nationalist circles for whom violence is still considered a way to 
conduct politics. If anything has changed, that is the public perception of the significance 
of violence and its justifications, which, since the Transition have been falling steadily 
amid the Spanish population and for the last decade have also been massively rejected by 
the greatest majority of Basque society itself.43
The fourth chapter offers the necessary analysis of the major theories of conflict 
resolution and transformation. It will assess them critically vis-à-vis the Basque case and 
will highlight those that have shifted our understanding of conflict beyond the boundaries 
of the state. In a post-Cold war world, asymmetric conflicts have become the standard 
and the dynamics of the conflicts have changed. As the Basque case shows, the grassroots 
level is not as passive as the literature presents them to be.44 This thesis takes into 
consideration Burton’s theory of human needs and provention,45 and claims that the 
transformation of the Basque society was brought about not only by the manifestation of 
ethno-nationalist violence, which, by the year 2000 expanded its selection of targets to 
include Basque entrepreneurs, local and national politicians,46 but also by the mistrust 
and the arrogance of the governments in Madrid that denied any nationalist links to the 
nature of the violence and even undermined the non-violent political demands and 
                                                 
39 John Burton, 1979. Deviance, Terrorism and War, Oxford: Martin Robertson, p. 60. 
40 Grant Wardlaw, 1990 (2nd ed.). Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 68-70. 
41 Florencio Domínguez Irribarren, 1998, De la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?, Madrid: 
Taurus, pp. 258-300. 
42 Daniele Conversi, 2006. “Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-spoilers 
perspective” in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing 
Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.173-199 
43 Ibid., p. 183. 
44 Lederach, 1997, op.cit., p. 52. 
45 John Burton, 1990. Conflict: Resolution and Provention, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
46 Conversi, 2006, op.cit., pp. 182-183.  
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initiatives brought forward by local political parties and platforms.47 In essence then, the 
Basque civil society’s stand concerns a set of demands for the respect of human rights 
and the development of self-determination in non-violent ways that is directed to both 
ETA and the Spanish State. 
Chapter Five develops the theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. 
Using the ethno-symbolic model, I argue that nationalism is neither good nor bad.48 On 
the contrary, as the Basque case shows, any nationalism can adopt any facet depending 
on its moment of history, the economic and socio-political circumstances that surround it, 
and the cultural strength of the symbols it utilises. I argue that the Basque case is 
primarily a nationalist conflict, in which violence only constitutes a method for the 
achievement of the nationalist goals and without this necessary contextualisation, every 
fight against the manifestation of violence will be almost futile. What is necessary for a 
comprehensive analysis of the Basque conflict is the isolation of violence from the 
nationalist discourse. The very symbolism that is utilised by nationalist ideology in the 
Basque conflict is again used in ETA’s discourse. This is not a coincidental usurpation, as 
I argue, but one that is in tandem with the broader orientation of the Basque nationalist 
movement. The violence that the Francoist regime has exercised on the Basques, their 
cultural persecutions and physical humiliations, along with a cultural heritage of fighters 
and warriors, have made easy the justification of violence against the Spanish state. The 
critical position of this argument is that the exaltation of ETA’s fighting image, which 
started in the Francoist era, has not been shaken off. On the contrary, it is still a powerful 
concept,49 whose spirit of struggle50 seems to generate a culture of violence in its 
immediate social surroundings.51
Yet, after forty years of violence, the conflict has been costly for both sides. 
Citizens outside the Basque country began rejecting ETA almost immediately after 
                                                 
47 Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, pp. 114-
115. 
48 David Brown, 1990. “Are there good and bad Nationalisms?”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, No.2, 
pp. 281-302. 
49 William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, “On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the 
Basque political process”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.32, No.2, p.254;  
50 Juan José Echave, in Daniele Conversi, 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes 
to Nationalist Mobilisation, London: Hurst & Co, p. 226. 
51 Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 187. 
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Franco’s fall. In the Basque country, that did not happen as quickly, primarily because 
the transition was not reflected in the re-formation of state agencies like the security 
forces and the police stationed in the Basque country.52 How are things different if the 
torturers of the dictatorship are now the police officers of the democracy? However, 
when the relationship between the central state and the majority of the Basque society 
was restored, particularly through the incremental delegation of autonomy and its 
safeguard, there began a change of attitude towards violence, one which rejected it not 
only because of its social consequences but also because of the strategic costs. Violence 
was hampering the same thing that moderate and extremist nationalists wanted: Basque 
independence. This change is the key moment in the development of my theoretical 
framework, which claims that in a violent nationalist conflict, any conflict resolution 
attempts must focus on the dynamics of nationalism behind the manifestation of violence. 
Police efficiency – not only the numbers of arrests, but also the way these are made, 
without violation of human rights – is obviously useful in combating terrorism. But 
transforming this culture of violence into a culture that has developed the necessary 
reflexes to reject it is a more efficient strategy, particularly when a liberal democracy is at 
the receiving end of the terrorist violence. Such transformation, as I argue, is only 
possible through the increased provision of guarantees by the liberal democratic state that 
self-determination claims can be satisfied through political dialogue and bargaining, void 
of radicalised and excessive measures that increase the perception that what is targeted is 
not the violence used by some circles of the minority, but rather, the minority in its 
totality, simply because by advocating their right to self-determination pose a great threat 
to the stability and survival of the State. 
The last three chapters follow the aforementioned pattern of nationalism, 
terrorism and conflict resolution, but this time they are focused on the analysis of the case 
study and how it affects theories already brought forward. Thus, chapter Six looks at the 
critical moments in the formation and development of Basque nationalism where 
violence is advocated as the most strategic option, as well as the cultural elements that 
                                                 
52 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. The Basques: The Franco Years and 
Beyond, Reno: University of Nevada Press, pp. 269-271; Paul Preston, 1986. The Triumph of Democracy in 
Spain, London: Methuen, pp. 82-83; Ludger Mees, 2003, op.cit., p.35. 
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allowed it to become the established form of political communication. It highlights those 
instances where the Spanish state has had a catalytic role in fomenting violence’s image 
in the Basque population as a means of defence and it assesses the political culture of 
both the regional as well as the state-wide parties vis-à-vis the resolution of the conflict. 
Finally, chapter Seven will describe the transformation of attitudes in both the political 
and social level in the Basque country that facilitated the erosion of support for terrorist 
organisations and activities. Unavoidably, the role of the political parties in both the 
region and the centre will be examined to highlight their inactivity, a direct result of 
which is the popular indignation not only against violence but against the constant lack of 
initiatives and progress.  
My examination of the literatures of all three schools of study (nationalism, 
terrorism and conflict resolution) aims to highlight, on the one hand, the contributions of 
the theories towards the improvement of the understanding of nationalism, terrorism and 
conflict resolution but, on the other hand, underline the inefficiencies of all three schools 
when it comes to their application in the Basque case. My thesis develops this argument 
by employing a critical approach that manifests those instances in the conflict that 
contradict the theories. What is more, by employing the Basque conflict as a case study, 
my thesis aims for an explanation of ethno-nationalist violence that brings together, and 
is bound by, the critical formulations of all three fields under consideration. While I 
recognise that joining three seemingly different and separate fields of study is a very 
optimistic undertaking, nevertheless I maintain that in the Basque case any advancement 
in the resolution of the conflict must necessarily involve an examination of the links 
between the nationalist discourse and the violent activity of both the local militant 
fractions as well as the central policies of the State that are directed against them. As 
such, my thesis contributes to the explanation and understanding of ethno-nationalist 
movements by highlighting the circumstances in which violence is justified by both 
actors and the way in which they both become locked in a discourse that regards 
‘freedom’, albeit with a different understanding by either actors. Finally, even though it 
recognises the fact that liberal democratic states rely on their existing political institutions 
for the examination of ethno-nationalist conflicts, and as such they tend to ignore the 
catalytic role that civil society can play in its resolution, my thesis establishes the idea 
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that if similar circumstances are experienced in similar conflicts, the Basque case points 
to the fact that there is plenty of scope for the civil society to become involved in the 
transformation of the perceptions of the conflict, and as such, side-stepping or ignoring it 
will prove detrimental not only to the society in question, but also to the actors who, 
ultimately, seek the same end as the society itself: that is, the resolution of the conflict. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Basque Tales of Nationalism 
 
 
 
This chapter offers a historical account of the emergence and development of 
Basque nationalism, and the crucial stages in which it transformed in order to 
incorporate violence as a legitimate means of self-defence, as perceived by the 
Basques, against the central state. It describes the political and social behaviour of the 
principal actors that were involved in promoting, on the one hand, and fighting, on the 
other, Basque nationalism and its association with, and consecration of, violence. 
Such a historical analysis is necessary in order to understand the reasons why Basque 
nationalism developed as an exclusionary movement, and how it was led to a 
transformation that involved the de-legitimisation of violence and its dissociation by 
the local civil society with regards to the nationalist ideology. It is necessary because 
it is a manifestation that the very same means used for the emancipation or defence of 
an aggrieved minority can, under altered circumstances, hamper and undermine not 
only the basic objective of self-determination but also the nationalist ideology itself. 
The foundations of Basque nationalism were laid out by Sabino de Arana y 
Goiri (1865-1903). He was the first to make systematic use of cultural characteristics 
of Basque life, in order to demonstrate the Basque identity, and the first who fiercely 
opposed the centralising policies of the Spanish capital, Madrid. His work is of major 
importance to the comprehension of Basque nationalism, not because of its scope and 
depth but because of its influence on the establishment and development of Basque 
claims. Broadly speaking, there are three very important historical moments for 
Basque nationalism: the medieval, pre-Aranist apparition of nationalist claims; the 
end of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, when Arana and his ideas came to the 
fore, and; finally, from the 1950s onwards, when ETA made its first appearance.  
The Basque country consists of seven regions, four of which 
(Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa, Bizkaia/Vizcaya, Araba/Álava and Nafaroa/Navarra) are in 
Spain and the remaining three (Lapurdi/Labourd, Benafaroa/Basse Navarre and 
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Zuberoa/Soule) are on the French side of the Pyrenees. It must be explained here that 
Navarre is not currently part of the Basque Country but rather an autonomous 
community in its own context. This administrative separation was not a vice of the 
bureaucrats but rather it reflects the distance between the Navarrese and the rest of the 
Basques. Only a small percentage of the Navarrese define themselves as Basques (15-
20%), whereas Navarra was and is always included in the Basque plans for 
independence. This essay will focus on those regions in Spanish soil because they 
represent 85% of the Basque country and, more importantly, because they developed 
a stronger national feeling. “In total contrast to the prominent role of Basques in 
Spanish affairs, their northern kinsmen were inconspicuous in the national affairs of 
France”, as Payne describes.1 Other commentators also suggest that the centralising 
machine of the French government was more efficient in carrying out its task than the 
Spanish one.2 Although not exhibiting a passive nationalistic posture, it is not until 
after the appearance of ETA in the 1960s that French Basques actively contributed to, 
and became involved in the Basque cause. 
 
Once upon a time…  
Two things the Basques are proud of are the belief that they are an ancient 
people and the fact that they have never been conquered. Strabo, the Greek 
geographer, was the first to record the existence of ‘Vasconians’3 in what is nowadays 
identified as the Basque Country. After the Romans came the Visigoths, the Muslims, 
the Franks and the Normans but none succeeded in subduing them. Historically the 
four regions were never united under a form of state or kingdom. By 1200, they were 
all associated to the kingdom of Castile, except Navarra, which was an independent 
kingdom.4 The regions’ legal system was based on foralism and the so-called fueros 
were a substantial characteristic of Basque life. As Clark explains, under the fueros 
“each province (and indeed, each township) was granted substantial powers of self 
government by the reigning monarch”.5 The fueros were customary or traditional 
                                                 
1 Stanley Payne, 1975. Basque Nationalism, Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 28. 
2 James Jacob, 1994. Hills of Conflict: Basque Nationalism in France, Reno: University of Nevada 
Press, p. 388. 
3 Roman geographers and historians later termed them ‘Vascones’. See Roger Collins, 1986. The 
Basques, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 30-31. 
4 Marianne Heiberg, 1989. The Making of Basque Nation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 
20. 
5 Robert Clark, 1984. The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, p. 12; author’s parenthesis.  
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laws that governed the private as well as the public sphere, and were codified in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as agreements between Madrid and the Basque 
provinces.6 But the most important aspect of the fueros was that it exempted the local 
population from state military conscription and state taxation. The former meant that 
any military threat would be dealt with by the Basques themselves, which in turn 
implied the formation and organisation of some kind of Basque military machine – 
albeit for defence purposes. The right, known as hidalguía de sangre (nobility by 
blood) or hidalguía colectiva (collective nobility), was granted to the Basques by the 
Spanish Crown Kings, who saw in it the alternative of an efficient border-defence 
system. The role of the Basque ‘army’ was to strengthen the controls in the Franco-
Spanish borders and limit the intrusions of the French.7 On the other hand, the 
exemption from the state taxation system hinted to a secured economic development 
of the provinces, especially when these are compared to the rest of the Spanish 
regions.  
The Basque country is quite rich in resources, with abundant iron reserves, 
lumber and natural harbours located north, at the Bay of Biscay. The discovery of the 
Americas and the intensification of trade attracted people from the traditional rural 
life to the more hispanicised urban centres. The influx of people from the country 
meant that the existing rural aristocracy was about to be confronted by a new 
bourgeoisie developed in the cities. The two élites coexisted until the abolition of 
foralism in 1876. As Heiberg explains, the two had achieved to push aside the 
peasantry from the decision-making process.8 For that reason, property qualifications 
and literacy in Spanish were introduced as a method of exclusion. The first meant that 
a candidate for a public place should possess a certain amount of wealth – which, of 
course, was analogous to the prestige of the position – before being nominated; and 
the second, “became an instrument wielded by the hispanicised Basque notables to 
exclude and control the Basque-speaking [tumultuous peasantry]”.9
The emergence of nobility in the towns and, more concretely, their objective 
of further social ascendance and broader concentration of wealth and privileges, 
provoked the reaction of intellectuals who re-introduced the concept of hidalguía de 
                                                 
6 Daniele Conversi, 1997.The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, London: Hurst & Co., p. 45. 
7 Davydd Greenwood, 1977. “Continuity in Change: Spanish Basque Ethnicity as an Historical 
Process” in Milton Esman (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, New York: Cornell University 
Press, pp. 81-102. Quote at p. 92. 
8 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit, pp. 31-32. 
9 Ibid., p. 31. 
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sangre (nobility by blood), only this time with a somewhat twisted meaning. Heiberg 
refers to two early Basque essayists, Zaldibia who “equated Basque nobility with the 
purity of Basque blood ‘unmixed with that of foreign peoples’”10 and Lope de Isasti, 
who claimed that “since all Basques are [noble by blood] they could never lose their 
nobility by manual work or poverty”.11 A Jesuit priest called Manuel de Larramendi 
was among the first who highlighted the difference between the old and the new 
meaning of the concept.  
In his writings, Larramendi attacked those members of the peasant aristocracy 
and the urban bourgeoisie because they were rich and powerful, which for him was 
synonymous to moral tarnishing.12 Larramendi became thus “the ideologue of small 
landholder and the tenant farmer”, while the traditional, rural, Basque life, “governed 
by the values of austerity, social harmony and egalitarianism in social relations was, 
for Larramendi, the original Basque in a state of grace”.13 Evidently, the élites’ social 
behaviour was all but respectful to the Basque customs: modern clothes and modern 
ways of life that substituted austerity, and the pursuit and possession of wealth and 
social ascendance slowly erasing social harmony and egalitarianism. 
This type of social behaviour did not change, as the country was heading 
towards industrialisation. The aristocracy were becoming fervent supporters of 
liberalism and, in order to protect their privileges, they had established an ever-closer 
relationship with Madrid. The increasing social antithesis in the Basque society was 
the most fundamental manifestation of the first Carlist war (1833-1839), which was a 
result of the persistent centralising attempts of Madrid to abolish the foral regime14. 
The Carlist wars were described as Basque civil wars because they were fought 
almost exclusively in the territory of the four provinces.15 Corcuera explains that 
Carlism’s supporters had their stronghold in the Basque country, for it offered higher 
levels of mass mobilisation against modernisation and industrialisation than other 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 33. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 34. 
13 Ibid., p. 33. 
14 The war was named ‘Carlist’ due to a controversy that broke out in the Spanish crown. King 
Ferdinand VII wanted to be succeeded by his daughter Isabel, even though succession in Spain could 
only take place by a male heir to the throne. Don Carlos, Isabel’s brother, counted with the support of 
the traditionalists whereas his sister had attracted the attention of the liberals as well as that of France 
and Britain.  
15 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 37. 
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Spanish regions.16 The members of both nobilities aligned with the forces of 
liberalism. According to Heiberg, the Carlists’ losses in this first war included the 
transference of executive and legislative powers from the local authorities to the 
Spanish Parliament and a situation under which the fueros were upheld only in so far 
as they did not threaten “the constitutional unity of the monarchy”.17  
This first war saw the peasantry, Carlism’s core supporter, financially 
decimated, while the bourgeoisies were struggling to maintain their privileged social 
status. The end of the second Carlist War (1872-1876) brought with it the abolition of 
the statute of fueros – except in the Kingdom of Navarra. The economic and social 
impact of the second war was poignant for the basses-classes. As Shafir points out, 
the integration of the regions into the Spanish market, with the abolition of customs 
between the two, carried with it an increase on the price of imported food and 
privatisation, which entailed loss of effective control of the resources of the region 
exercised by the rural nobility.18 The abolition of the fueros is a key event in the 
development of Basque nationalism for two reasons: (a) although it was a necessary 
step for the creation of the modern Spanish state, it was also rough because it deprived 
the Basques from a centuries-old tradition, if not basic way of life; and (b) it signalled 
the first Basque sentiments of frustration and anger against Madrid which, from this 
moment onwards, was to be eternally accused of attempting to conquer the Basque 
country. 
The pro-capitalist urban aristocracy lined up with the central liberal 
bureaucracy, and showed their quick reflexes in attempting to secure their privileges. 
In 1878 a new fiscal and economic arrangement took place, known as concierto 
económico that allowed the Basque Provinces to negotiate their tax contribution to 
Madrid.  The direct beneficiaries of this agreement: 
 
“were the big industrialists who bore a very low share of the tax burden. The rural 
areas and small towns were penalized, as local merchants, professional sectors and 
the peasants suffered most of the hardships brought by new industries and taxes”.19  
  
                                                 
16 Javier Corcuera, 1979. Orígenes, Ideología y Organización del Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876-1904, 
Madrid: Siglo XXI, p. 31. 
17 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p.38. 
18 Gershon Shafir, 1995. Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 
91. 
19 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 47. 
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If the first Carlist war manifested, for the first time, the economic and social contrasts 
of the Basque population, the second Carlist war made evident that the division had 
grown bigger, with still more antithesis to come. For, the second Carlist war also 
marked the beginning of the industrialisation in the Basque region, which, along with 
Catalonia, became the principal motor of the Spanish economy.20  
The Basques had taken great advantage of their geographical position and 
their natural resources, by trading with Spain, France and the new markets in 
America. But the end of the second Carlist war, and with it the apogee of 
industrialisation, hinted at more development and further changes, economic as well 
as social. For example, the export of iron ore to the British and the Flemish, the 
establishment of one of Europe’s most renowned shipbuilding industries and the 
intensification of trade in general, contributed to the increase of development and, 
ultimately, wealth in the region. The growth of the population, as a social indicator, 
also highlighted that affluence. The towns were transforming into cities. The fastest 
growing region was the birthplace itself of the Basque capitalists – and later 
nationalists – Vizcaya, and its capital Bilbao. In 1877, Bilbao had 35,505 inhabitants 
and twenty-three years later, in 1900, that number reached 83,306, more than half of 
which were immigrants from other Spanish regions.21
The pace of industrialisation and modernisation attracted immigrants who 
contributed to the booming of the population. Notably, it attracted more immigrants 
from outside the Basque region than Basque members of traditional rural families. 
“Less than 20% of Bilbao’s population had actually been born in the city and close to 
half were non-Basques by origin”, while “around one-third of Bilbao’s immigrants 
were recruited from the rural parts of the Basque country”.22 Immigrants from outside 
the Basque country worked in mines and steelworks, whereas the Basque workers 
were occupied in the smaller factories. The conditions of life of the former were tragic 
and pitiful. The long hours in the mines, the living conditions and the debasing wages 
were the beginning of the workers’ movement.23 The megalomaniac aristocracy, on 
the other hand, secured the foundations of such a movement, for it presented an ever-
expanding image of itself, at the same time that it oppressed the wage earners. Their 
                                                 
20 Stanley Payne, 1971. “Catalan and Basque nationalism”, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, pp. 15-51. Quote at p. 49. 
21 Corcuera, 1979, op.cit, pp. 73-75. 
22 Heiberg 1989, op.cit., p. 42. 
23 Shafir, 1995, op.cit., p. 95. 
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capital was crucial in developing related industry sectors (railways, chemicals, 
hydroelectric power, paper), while at the beginning of the twentieth century they had 
also entered the banking and insurance sectors.24  
The picture, for a local Basque of the time, is understandably one of discontent 
and frustration. The formation of a proletariat– which included those Basques 
occupied in the small factories and the craft industries – in the industrial cities and the 
transfer of local powers to the State’s capital signalled the end of egalitarianism, in 
the cities as well as in the country.  The traditional Basque modus vivendi was fading 
away as people moved to the cities in a search for better life.25 Furthermore, the cities 
had to face large numbers of non-Basque immigrants whose living conditions (filthy, 
anti-hygienic, and extremely poor) were aggravating the life of the whole of Bilbao. 
Finally, the abolition of the fueros was perceived as a move against the Basque 
customs and traditions, as well as privileges. This is possibly how Sabino Arana 
viewed Bilbao and the situation in the Basque country. The above elements, along 
with his religious education, were the pillars of his nationalistic effusions.  
 
Sabino Arana, the founder 
Sabino Arana was born in 1865 in an outskirt of Bilbao from a Spanish-
speaking Carlist family, while his education took place in a Jesuit college. According 
to Heiberg this was an explosive combination because he “inherited […] an adherence 
to religious fundamentalism and a total aversion to modern, liberal Spain”.26 In 1882 
he moved to Barcelona where he completed his studies. Despite his contact with 
Catalan nationalism – whose claims were the projection of Catalonia’s contribution to 
the rest of Spain and the autonomy that Catalonia should enjoy within the Spanish 
State –, Arana built a more rigid and exclusivist nationalism. His philosophy, as it is 
synthesised through his writings, resembles strikingly the ideas of German 
nationalism and Romanticism. That, according to Smith, meant “an interest in ethnic 
customs, an attachment to vernaculars, nostalgia for tribal and medieval pageantry 
and society, [and] religious yearnings”.27 More concretely, Arana’s nationalist 
discourse depicted a cultural, rather than political, approach by adopting racial 
                                                 
24 Ibid., p. 93. 
25 Interestingly, according to Shafir (1995: 95), “a process of land concentration [by the nobles] sent an 
unwilling wave of Basque peasants to the industrial cities”. 
26 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 49. 
27 Anthony Smith, 1979. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co., p. 7. 
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elements of the Fichtean philosophy and promoting ideas about language, similar to 
those found in Herder’s writings.  
It must be stressed at this point that Arana’s discourse, no matter how vile or 
poignant or even symbolic it was, it would have never reaped if it were not for the 
weakness and feebleness of the central State of Madrid. For, the nineteenth century 
was catastrophic for the Crown in terms of wealth, prestige and influence. By 1824 
most of the Latin American colonies were lost and, even though the Carlist wars had 
an unusually Basque flavour, they were nothing but civil wars, pointing to the 
inability of the crown to promote national integration and cohesion. Instead, 
corruption was omnipresent and omnipotent, from the local mayor to the higher 
Ministers. As Mees points out, “[u]ntil 1898 there was no external enemy and there 
was no national symbols to create and represent the imaginary community of the 
Spanish nation”.28 In other words, when other countries of similar size to that of 
Spain had begun transforming their states into nation-states, Spain carried a medieval 
mentality of royal division of rule: not only did it not attempt to assimilate these local 
particularisms but it relied upon their own systems of governance in order to 
guarantee policy continuity. The eighteenth century marked the “degeneration” of 
Spain, with the Castilian intelligentsia criticising the Crown and lamenting the losses 
that resulted from its rule. It would not be too inaccurate to claim that it is this phase 
of broad disenchantment that permitted representatives of local particularisms, like 
Arana, to use such sharp and over toned discourses. 
Arana focused on Basque racial characteristics and a fierce anti-Spanish 
discourse in order to accentuate and promote his nationalist cause. He referred to the 
immigrants as maketos (a derogatory word for ‘immigrants’) and, more often than not, 
he pointed to their terrible and pitiful conditions of life to juxtapose it with Basque 
purity and nobility. For him, as for Larramendi and other intellectuals, hidalguía de 
sangre symbolised Basque racial superiority when compared to Spanish. Everything 
that was part of or linked to Spain was a demoralising factor for the Basque identity. 
As Sullivan describes “Arana’s belief that the maketos constituted a danger to the 
moral health and social purity of the Basques led him to call for measures which 
                                                 
28 Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7. 
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would make life uncomfortable for the maketos”.29 Although his racist crones might 
recall Hitler, commentators argue that there were no biological strings attached to his 
racism.30 His intention was to separate the Basques from the newcomers by 
preserving their traditional values and, at the same time, point indirectly at the 
traditional egalitarianism.  
Language was another characteristic that would help distinguish the Basque 
identity, even though its importance was always second to that of race. While in 
Barcelona, Arana commenced working on the Basque language, euskera, which he 
intended to use as an instrument of political mobilisation.31 The fact that euskera was 
not spoken at home, even though his parents did command it, made Sabino Arana 
obsessed with learning it and ‘purifying’ it from hispanicisms.32 During the process of 
standardisation, he manipulated the language by inventing several words.33 
Nevertheless, Arana was conscious of the fact that euskera was scarcely spoken not 
only in urban but even in rural areas. It is for this reason that race was placed above 
language when it came to assert Basque distinctiveness.34 Furthermore, even though 
he wished for the language to take the place it deserved in Basque culture, Arana 
could only target the Basque middle classes for its transfusion. The upper classes had 
not only imbibed Spanish, but they also regarded anything Basque as backward and 
un-modern; an attitude that was incrementally adopted by the middle classes too. As 
for the immigrants, Arana considered that if they were to learn the language, then 
moral contamination would spread even faster in Euskadi. Along these lines, Conversi 
explains that Arana failed to see how a different language might have resulted in a 
different state of mind, as well as a different value scale.35 That is why Arana 
concentrated on what he used to call “God and the Old Law”. The latter was 
synonymous with the values, traditions and customs of the Basques, in other words 
the fueros. The former reflected his Jesuit education and the high-levels of 
religiousness of Basque society. 
                                                 
29 John Sullivan, 1988. ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986, London; New 
York: Routledge, p. 5. 
30 Payne, 1975, op.cit., p. 74; Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 60. 
31 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 174. 
32 Ortzi, 1975. Historia de Esukadi: El Nacionalismo Vasco y ETA, Paris: Ruedo Iberico, p. 124. 
33 Euzkadi (Basque Country) and ikurriña (flag) are two of his most famous linguistic inventions, still 
in use today (although in the modern standardization Euskadi replaces the ‘z’ with ‘s’) 
34 Corcuera, 1979, op.cit., p. 395. 
35 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 65. 
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Arana’s nationalist discourse promoted social harmony and economic equality 
– always within an independent Basque country – and espoused Catholicism. “For 
Arana, the supremacy of Roman Catholicism was essential for sacred and, hence, 
moral order upon which all social order ultimately rested”.36 Arana believed that 
independence could only be achieved through faith. And faith, as Arana understood it 
in its traditionalist sense, was only manifested among the lower strata of the Basque 
society, the farmers and small-factory workers. The elites, having been usurped by the 
more secularised and morally relaxed Spanish culture, had no place in an independent 
Euskadi, since they not only lost every sense of equality by amassing wealth, but also 
lost a sense of moral order by not assisting their compatriots in need, and instead 
accept the services of a filthy and impure nation like the Spanish. In 1892, shortly 
after the publication of his Bizkaya por su Independencia, Arana and his brother Luis 
held a meeting in Larazabal with admirers and friends, the majority of which were 
liberal fuerists, where he announced that independence would be much better 
happening sooner rather than later. The members of the audience in that meeting later 
figured in the lists of Arana’s party. 
While some commentators37 hold that this was the moment when the Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque Nationalist Party) was essentially created, Arana 
did not announce its official birth until 1898. The coalition with the liberal 
bourgeoisies widened the audience of the party, and later in that year, it earned him a 
seat in the Spanish national parliament. But, the merging venture was also costly in 
that Arana had to tone down his separatist calls. His proposals for autonomy as a 
deputy radically departed from the initial phases of his discourse. His investments in 
various local enterprises were completely the opposite of what Roman Catholicism 
and Basque egalitarianism endorsed. Yet more changes were still to come. For Sabino 
Arana had fallen ill with Addison’s disease and by 1902 he had already been 
imprisoned twice.38 Moreover, the party did not seem to be doing very well: a very 
limited number of supporters meant very limited revenues, and the lack of both made 
the political evolution of the party extremely difficult.  
                                                 
36 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 53. 
37 Antonio Elorza, 1978. Ideologías den Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876-1937, San Sebastian: Aranburu, p. 
148; Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 58. 
38 The first time was in 1895, after he lost a trial to a Basque liberal, and the second, in 1902, when the 
letter he sent to President Roosevelt congratulating him for liberating Cuba from slavery (i.e. Spanish 
occupation), was intercepted. 
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After he was released from prison, Sabino Arana had decided to reconcile with 
the liberalist forces of Madrid, as well as Euskadi, and more importantly he accepted 
that a united and prosperous Euskadi could exist within Spain. He realised that 
nationalists, instead of being hostile to the development of the industry and the 
economy, they could put both in the service of Basque language and culture.39 There 
seem to be different opinions on the reasons why such a change took place. Conversi 
refers to it as Arana’s “second conversion” and points to the political failure of the 
party as the cause of Arana’ s political reorientation.40  Payne asserts, “Arana’ s 
change of direction was but a temporary ruse to gain power”41 and Granja goes so far 
as to say that Arana’s conversion has been influenced by the movements siblings in 
Galicia and Catalonia,42 even though Arana refused to see them as separatist 
movements.43 Heiberg, on the other hand, presents one ideological and one economic 
reason: the moderating influence of the middle bourgeoisie over Arana and PNV’ s 
growing need for money.44 The same commentator gives a very characteristic 
description of the change in Arana’ s dogma:  
 
“Whereas industrialisation was the source of spiritual indifference and fanaticism, the 
destroyer of nature and the corrupter of moral beauty, it was also a product of Basque 
race. Bilbao was simultaneously the focus of a contagious virus and an example of 
‘the energy of our race’”.45
 
Sabino Arana died in 1903 without explaining what had caused that sudden change. 
Following his death at that same year, the party had its biggest political success, 
winning two seats in the national elections. The legacy of his incoherency, 
nevertheless, accounted for the conflictive relationship between the liberals and the 
nationalists in the party. His change of posture through the years had attracted 
different sectors of the Basque community, with diverse interests and objectives. 
What is more, he was the only one “able to keep all the different political, social and 
ideological interests united as well as loyal to PNV”.46
                                                 
39 Mees, 2003., op.cit., p. 11. 
40 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 69. 
41 Payne, 1975, op.cit., p. 81. 
42 José Luis Granja, 1986. Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco, Madrid: Siglo XXI, p. 18. 
43 Corcuera, 1979, op.cit., p. 188. 
44 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 65. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 11. 
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 The end of the civil war (1933-1939) marked the beginning of General 
Franco’s dictatorship, during which, all nationalistic movements were considered 
separatist and their political leadership operated from the exile. The regime had 
achieved to suppress ‘successfully’ all nationalist movements in Spain for its first 
twenty years. The economy was shattered and the economic policies of the regime 
were making sure that there is plenty more room for deterioration, at least until the 
mid-1960s.47 The shining exception was again the Basque country, where the 
aristocracy had achieved the protection of its industrial establishments from the fury 
of the civil war, contrary to the rest of the country.48 This allowed for further 
development of the region and of course more waves of immigrants, this time far 
larger than those of the previous century. During Franco’s first years of rule, the 
Basque region seemed to have abandoned the nationalist discourse. This, though, 
lasted only until the 1950s, which saw the emergence of nationalist youth in the 
Basque region. This youth would lay the foundations of extremism, terrorism and 
political violence not only in Euskadi but also in the whole of the country. 
 
ETA & the emergence of political violence 
The weakness and the general apathy of the nationalist sectors of the Basque 
society during Franco’s dictatorship, made evident the laxity of the nationalist cause. 
Besides, Franco’s oppression was hard to beat. In the 1950s, the nationalist discourse 
revived once again, this time under the auspices of a magazine, Ekin, founded by 
some upper middle class young university students. Their objective was their 
familiarisation with the Basque tradition through the writings of Basque intellectuals 
(including Arana). At the same time, the PNV’ s youth, EGI, also begun to develop a 
nationalist action, albeit a more radical one: graffiti and pro-nationalist slogans 
painted in the walls of the cities and the smaller towns. They lacked the intellectual 
capacity and depth of the members of Ekin because they came from the smaller 
industrial towns, where euskera was spoken and where access to higher education was 
not easy, mainly because of their economic situation. In 1956, Ekin merged with EGI 
and its representatives asked PNV – which was then in exile in Paris – for recognition 
                                                 
47 For a detailed analysis on the regime’s economic policy see Stanley Payne, 2000. The Franco 
Regime: 1936-1975, London: Sage, pp. 384-396. 
48 According to Heiberg (1989: 92), “[t]he mass destruction of industrial installations and infrastructure 
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of gudaris (soldiers) posted by the PNV to protect the Basque heavy industry from left-wing sabotage”. 
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and support, a demand that was declined by PNV’ s cadres. The party’s refusal was 
received by the nationalist youth as an unwillingness or inability to confront Franco’s 
authoritarian regime.49 Their immediate response to PNV’ s stance was the creation of 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basque Homeland and Freedom), whose immediate 
implication was that PNV would cease to be the only legitimate representative of 
Basque nationalism.50
ETA’s emergence brought with it a change in the basic assumptions of Basque 
nationalism, although its ideological foundations were not so distant from Arana’s 
racist and ethnic calls. A book titled Vasconia, written by Federico Krutwig, one of 
ETA’s most important intellectuals, was to mark the shift from Aranism to modern 
Basque nationalism. One main difference, espoused by Krutwig, was the 
subordination of ethnicity to language. As Clark puts it, “[t]he Basques were defined 
as unique by their ethnicity, which in turn was a product of their language. Were 
Euskera to disappear, the Basques would disappear as a nation”.51  
A second change concerned the supplanting of Arana’s racist cronies and the 
introduction of ideas on revolutionary or guerrilla war, as the only viable way that 
could lead to the much-desired independence. The concept of revolutionary war, as 
advocated by Krutwig, was closely linked with the anti-colonialist battles of third 
world countries of the time. Euskadi was presented as a Spanish colony and the resort 
to violence was, naturally, the only means of liberation. Krutwig’s theoretical 
influence came from Franz Fanon, while the struggle of the Algerians against the 
French and the determination of the Cubans against the Americans were, for Krutwig, 
examples of theory put into practice.52
A third deviation from the dogma of traditional Basque nationalism concerned 
the influence of Catholicism. In Vasconia, Arana’s assiduity in Catholicism “was 
replaced by the idea of politics as a vocation”.53 The main reason for this is that the 
regime espoused the ideals of ‘National Catholicism’ (nacionalcatolicismo). To put 
simply, the clergy adopted the same totalitarian practices as Franco’s political regime. 
As Carr and Aizpurua explain “[i]t was the blessing of the church […] that sanctioned 
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– almost sanctified – Franco’s rule to the average Spaniard in the 1940s and after”.54 
In return, the church was provided with the control of secondary education.55 It is 
under the principles of nacionalcatolicismo that the Church maintained its silence 
over the atrocities committed by the regime. “This stiff attitude on the part of the 
Church was another factor in encouraging many believers to join ETA or support its 
activists”.56
At the beginning, ETA enjoyed the support of the majority of the Spanish 
population all over the country, thanks mainly to one event: the Burgos trial. In 1968, 
the police killed one of ETA’s most renowned militants during a demonstration. In 
retaliation, ETA killed the head of the police forces in Guipúzcoa (August 2, 1968), 
well known for his ‘effective’ methods during interrogation. Sixteen of those involved 
in the assassination were tried in Burgos, in 1970. The verdict involved six death 
sentences and a total of over 700 years of imprisonment. ETA had become the symbol 
of resistance, not only of the Basques but also of all Spaniards against the regime.57 
Using the security forces as its targets, ETA appeared to be aiming at overthrowing 
the regime, rather than fighting for an independent Euskadi. The assassination of the 
regime’s Prime Minister, and Franco’s possible successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, in 
December 20 1973, enhanced the sympathy of the population for ETA’s cause, for it 
signified that the regime was not invincible.58  
After the death of Franco, however, and well into the period of 
democratisation ETA continued the violent confrontation with the Spanish state, 
without any concern for popular support. ETA was open to anyone who wanted to 
become a member. In fact, it was based on the Basques’ choice whether they would 
resist oppression or whether they would surrender. Although a discussion of cultural 
and political nationalism would follow, it must be noted that this was the first time 
elements of political nationalism appeared in a culture-based Basque nationalism. It is 
also the chief reason why ETA’s history is one of splits, schisms, and fragmentation. 
Its ranks cover all sorts of ideological spectra: culturalists, anti-colonialists, Marxists, 
                                                 
54 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurua, 1979. Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, London: 
Allen and Unwin, p. 28. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 95. 
57 Heiberg, 1989, op.cit., p. 107. 
58 Interestingly, one of ETA’s leading cadres of the time had stated that the assassination of the Prime 
Minister was not part of a plan that would lead to a change of the regime. See Florencio Domínguez 
Irribaren, 2000, “La Violencia nacionalista de ETA” in Santos Juliá (ed.), Violencia Política en la 
España del Siglo XX, Madrid: Taurus, pp. 327-364. Quote at p. 338. 
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militarists. The region’s proximity to France and the fact that most Basques spoke 
French also meant that most ideological influences came through France. Many 
distinguished Left-wing French intellectuals, with Jean-Paul Sartre being the leading 
figure, had expressed their respect and support for the Basque cause.59
In 1974, ETA suffered its last partition, into those who supported the 
continuation of violence, ETAm (military), and those who advocated an abandonment 
of violence and the turn to a more political mobilisation and confrontation, ETApm 
(political-military). After democratisation, the latter progressed into a political party 
(Euzkadiko Ezkerra, EE – Basque Left), thus paving the way for the extremists to 
dominate both the organisation and Spanish political life. ETA’s list targets no longer 
consisted only of members of the security forces: Basque industrialists, politicians, 
journalists, as well as military and police personnel, were now under threat. It was 
particularly after Franco’s death and during the transition to democracy that ETA 
stepped-up its campaign. Half of ETA’s 91 victims in 1980 were civilians. In an effort 
to oblige the new Socialist government to negotiate, throughout the 1980s, ETA 
maintained its momentum. It was not until 1993, that is, after the amelioration in the 
professional relationships of the Spanish with the French Security Forces and 
agencies, that ETA’s number of strikes and victims registered a fall. 
In its forty-year long campaign, ETA has ceased fire four times. The first took 
place in January 1989 and was announced it would last 15 days. It was prolonged, 
however, until April of the same year because its declaration led to the first 
negotiations in Algiers between the Spanish government and members of the 
organisation. These ended unsuccessfully and ETA resumed its activities until 1996, 
when it declared a week-long ceasefire as a gesture of invitation to the new centre-
right government of José Maria Aznar to take the political initiative to re-commence 
negotiations. The government did not respond until after ETA, in September 1998, 
declared an indefinite ceasefire and its then political wing Herri Batasuna (HB) signed 
an accord (The Pact of Lizarra) of national unity with the remaining regional parties 
of the Basque Country, aiming at the construction of the Basque nation. Government 
representatives and ETA members met in the Spanish city of Burgos in January 1999, 
and five months later in Zurich. This round also failed and, fourteen months after its 
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initiation, the ceasefire came to an end with ETA claiming that the remaining parties 
repeatedly failed to comply with the terms of the Pact of Lizarra.  
Since the recommencement of its activities, ETA has carried out one hundred 
and six attacks, seventy-six of which involved deaths and/or injuries. Its strength has 
been undoubtedly limited, a fact attributed mainly to the increased collaboration 
between French and Spanish authorities but also because of a more systematic 
approach to the subject by the Spanish security forces. In 2001 alone, 135 of its 
members were arrested and an enormous amount of invaluable information was 
confiscated from their bases, which produced a domino effect of arrests that led to the 
capture of 131 more members in 2004, among them some of its principal ideologues 
and strategists. The government’s response was also fierce on the political level where 
in 2002 ETA’s political wing Batasuna (formerly HB) was banned from political 
participation.60 As recently as January 2005, the Spanish National Parliament rejected 
a proposal of the Basque Premier Ibarretxe, upheld by the regional Parliament and 
aimed at the provision of semi-independence for Euskadi. The reappearance of the 
Socialists in government that followed the traumatic experience of Al Qaeda’s attack 
on March 11, 2004, in conjunction with the reduced capacity of the organisation 
(there have been only five attacks from May 2003 until May 2005, none of which has 
been deadly) have made many believe that the violent overdrives of Basque 
nationalism might soon vanish. However, despite the more orchestrated efforts 
recently deployed by the security forces as well as the political parties, ETA and those 
sectors that offer support have still to show signs of commitment to a purely political 
process, even though the government declares its wish to initiate a new round of 
negotiations if violence ceases (May 2005).  
The following chapter critically examines the literature of nationalism and 
offers an analysis into both the contributions of the most significant, yet quite 
disparate, understandings of nationalism. It also highlights the inefficiencies of these 
theories and brings forward a critical understanding of the mechanisms that, on the 
one hand, are common to all nationalisms and nations through the use of symbols and 
cultural diachritica, and, on the other, employs that critical thinking in order to explain 
the particular dynamics of Basque nationalism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Theories of Nationalism: 
Culture, Identity and Symbolism 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses and explains the formulations of the major theories of 
nationalism. It looks at the diverse explanations for the emergence of nationalism and 
critically assesses and evaluates them in an attempt to find where is it that these 
theories have been successful and what are their drawbacks. This will help the thesis 
bring forward the definitions it will adopt throughout the text. 
The field of nationalism has been the subject of extensive research since the 
1960s, and new ideas and challenges to the already existing theories were put forward 
during the last two decades of the twentieth century. As a result, the student is faced 
with a plethora of definitions for the nature of the phenomenon. ‘Nationalism’, as well 
as ‘nation’, could be classified as ‘essentially contested concepts’, which, according to 
W. B. Gallie, are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless 
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users”1 – a condition which might 
well be proved to render every research flawed from the very beginning of its 
undertaking. As Alter argues, “nationalism does not exist as such, but a multitude of 
manifestations of nationalism do”.2 This implies that there are cases of nationalisms 
that share common characteristics and elements, which help build a theory that 
renders nationalism instantly recognisable from other forms of ideology, social action 
or manifestations of popular will. As we shall see, the process of identifying those 
common characteristics has given birth to a number of different interpretations of 
nationalism. In order for one to reach a comprehensive definition of nationalism, one 
has to look at the different schools of thought in the field of nationalism. Although the 
number of definitions equals the number of scholars in the field, a broad 
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generalisation can be made that distinguishes four main schools of theory: the 
primordialists, the instrumentalists, the modernists and the perennialists. For years, 
the debate in the field of nationalism consisted of primordialist and instrumentalist3 
theories. In fact, modernists could be classified as instrumentalists, and “perennialists 
were always primordialists of one kind or another”.4 As the study of nationalism 
progressed, however, new themes and alternative proposals emerged that cannot be 
entirely classified as either primordialist or instrumentalist. The modernist and the 
perennialist approaches complete the works of scholars undertaken so far by looking 
at nations and nationalism from a different perspective. This categorisation does not 
follow a strict rule nor is it an exhaustive list of schools of thought. Rather, it is based 
on certain elements and beliefs that are common and recurrent in the thought of many 
scholars. 
 
Ethnic/Cultural vs. Civic/Political  
At this point, it has to be stressed that despite the number of theories or 
analyses of nationalism, most authors distinguish between cultural and political 
nationalism. Although the two always intertwine in their relationship with 
nationalism5, it is a normative distinction in the field, which helps indicate the origins 
of nationalism in a particular case study. Cultural or ethnic nationalism is the type of 
ideology adopted by a community, which employs its cultural links (language, 
history, origins, traditions) to designate its limits. In cases where the national identity 
is eliminated, or in the process of, Hutchinson explains, cultural nationalism operates 
as “a movement of moral regeneration”, whose aim is to re-unite the different aspects 
of the nation and, thus, re-introduce the national identity.6 It is for this reason, 
continues Hutchinson, that its proponents were members of cultural and academic 
societies. These intellectuals concentrated on the detailed study of history in order to 
establish the origins of their ancestors and their patterns of life, a process also known 
as ‘historicism’.7 The romantics of the late eighteenth century are considered to be 
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cultural nationalism’s earliest advocacies, with the German philosophers occupying a 
high post in the diffusion of its cultural ideals and values.   
In fact, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was the first to use the term 
‘nationalism’. Herder saw nature as the driving force behind the shaping of every 
nation. The formation of a nation is primarily based on the natural environment. 
Every nation is different from each other because every nation is located in a different 
geographical environment. It is the environment that shapes the cultural 
characteristics of a nation, its language or customs. As Llobera puts it, the existence 
of different nations is, for Herder, “a God-willed natural phenomenon”.8 Thus, any 
attempt to eliminate the differences between nations was an act directed against nature 
and the will of God. 
“Nothing seems more obviously opposed to the purposes of government than the 
unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing together of different human species and 
nations under one sceptre.”9  
 
It is this line of logic that made Herder view humanity under a different prism. 
Unlike other philosophers, principally the French ideologues of the Enlightenment, 
Herder could not see the global dimension of humanity. In other words, he could not 
see the individuals forming one large and encompassing entity. Neither could he see 
the individuals as entities separate from each other and unique in themselves. Instead, 
he viewed individuals as part of communities, each of which was based on different 
cultures and traditions and whose aim was to preserve those markers that helped 
distinguish the group from other groups. 
 
“Humanity was not composed of atomised individuals, whose essence was a universal 
reason and whose spatially and temporarily specific traits were irrelevant, but, on the 
contrary, that it was composed of nations/cultures, and their essence and value lay 
precisely in their specificity.”10  
 
Language was the primary tool for the preservation of diversity in a world of nations, 
for “without its own language, a Volk is an absurdity (Unding), a contradiction of 
terms”.11 Language, for Herder, equals with thought, thus, each community has its 
own mode of thought. That is why it can only be learnt in the community and it is a 
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form of defence of the diversity that surrounds the world.12 Herder focuses on cultural 
characteristics and lends them a primordial significance by asserting that these 
characteristics belong to the natural sphere, and “human intervention could only 
enhance this process, but in no way could it be in a position to impose change from 
the outside”.13  
Herder’s views were echoed in the thoughts of another German philosopher, 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Herder and Fichte are two of Romanticism’s 
leading thinkers.  Fichte followed the post-Kantian doctrine of the state, according to 
which, 
  
“[t]he end of man is freedom, freedom is self-realization, and self-realization is 
complete absorption in the universal consciousness. [...] It is only when he and the state 
are one that the individual realizes his freedom.”14  
 
Notwithstanding, Fichte adopted a more radical stand on the significance of 
language than Herder. As Reiss puts it, Fichte “begun as a Radical, as a Jacobin, as a 
champion of the rights of the individual, and ended as an advocate of Nationalism, 
who placed the interests of the community above those of the individual”.15 Fichte 
argued that the original and pure languages are superior to the synthesised languages 
and, also, the means to “allow a nation to realize itself and attain its freedom”.16 
‘Nation’, as Fichte understands it, is defined by language: a group that shares the 
same language is a nation (ibid.). As for the political dimension that Fichte gives to 
the nation, it resembles United States President Wilson’s authority of “every nation, a 
state”, in the latter’s Fourteen Points Speech.17 Kedourie explains that, for Fichte, the 
nation will lose its language if it fails to develop into a state; and, what is more, the 
disruption of the cohesion of such a group by political frontiers is unnatural and 
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unjust.18 Ethnicity, therefore, should be congruent with the formation of a state. And 
the only way, for Fichte, to recognise or establish a unified culture was through 
primordial criteria. But historicism is prone to manipulations, for example by 
traditionalists19 or the intelligentsia itself.20 Herder writes that where the cultural links 
and traditions are relaxed or extinct, they should be “rediscovered”.21
Political or civic nationalism, on the other hand, rests upon the will of the 
individual. As Hutchinson puts it, “political nationalists have as their objective the 
achievement of a representative national state that will guarantee to its members 
uniform citizenship rights”.22 The origins of political nationalism are as old as those 
of cultural nationalism, that is, they developed during the middle or late eighteenth 
century. Abbé Emmanuel Sieyès is considered to be one of the first political 
nationalists. In his Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat?, Abbé Sieyès (1748-1836) calls the 
people of France to unite against those that have been denying their freedoms. The 
true nation is the Third Estate for Abbé Sieyès, whereas the first two represent the 
castes of the ancien régime. “Thus, what is the Third [Estate]? It is everything, but it 
is hindered and oppressed. What would it be without the privileged order? Everything, 
but it would be free and blooming”.23 He viewed nation as “a body of associates 
living under common law and represented by the same legislative assembly.24 It is 
evident that there is no space for language or ethnicity or indeed any other cultural 
trait in the process of nation formation.  
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), too, is considered to have identified the 
nation as a political association. For Rousseau, language, wealth and laws were the 
three basic standards for human beings with laws being more significant than either 
language or wealth.25 The judicial system was, for Rousseau, nothing but an invention 
of the rich to steal more from the poor and thus maintain, if not raise, their elevated 
social status.26 Rousseau was convinced that inequality was the cause of all social 
troubles. Thus, men needed to consent to the creation of a civil government whose 
                                                 
18 Kedourie, op. cit., p. 62. 
19 Smith, 1981, op. cit., p. 125. 
20 Anthony D. Smith, 1979. Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Martin Robertson & Co. 
Ltd, p. 27. See also John Breuilly, op. cit. 
21 Herder quoted in Anthony Smith, 1991, National Identity, London; Reno: University of Nevada 
Press, p. 75. 
22 Hutchinson and Smith, op. cit., 124. 
23 Emmanuel Sieyès, 1970. Qu’ est-ce que le Tiers Etat?, Geneve: Librairie Droz, p. 124. 
24 Ibid.: 126 
25 A. M. Cohler, 1970. Rousseau and Nationalism, New York: Basic Books, p. 128. 
26 Llobera, op. cit., p. 159. 
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natural objective is to maintain the equality of its members.27 Though Rousseau 
recognised the insufficiency of the political will of the individuals in the nation-
building process, he was a fervent advocate of patriotism. He did not rule out 
language, culture or identity as unnecessary for a nation to be formed but he identified 
nationalism with patriotism because all that mattered was the relationship between the 
state and its members.28 As he wrote in 1772, “every true republican has drunk in love 
of country, that is to say love of law and liberty, along with his mother’s milk. This 
love is his whole existence”.29
Ernest Renan’s (1823–1892) writings of the nineteenth century are of equal 
importance. Indeed, one might say that Renan was one of the earliest modernists since 
he acknowledged nations as creations of modernity.30 In a speech he gave to 
Sorbonne in 1882, Renan dismissed many theories – some of which are still quite 
prominent in the contemporary debate – that attempted to explain the nature of the 
nation. Renan rejects theories according to which nations were formed because of the 
wars and the interests of dynasties, and refers to the United States and Switzerland as 
an example of political association. Race should also be avoided as a criterion because 
“the noblest countries, England, France, and Italy, are those where the blood is the 
most mixed”.31 Renan dismisses the romantics’ claims of the importance of language 
by saying that it only acquires political significance because it is perceived as a sign 
of race. But, Renan points out, one should bear in mind that prior to any personal or 
national culture there is a human culture that should be respected.  Furthermore, 
religious affinities and material interest are also insufficient to create a “spiritual 
principle” like the nation. For Renan,  
 
“[a] nation is a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that 
one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make for the future. It 
presupposes a past; it is summarised, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, 
consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation’s existence is 
[…] a daily plebiscite, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of 
life”.32
 
                                                 
27 Ibid.: 160 
28 Ibid.: 164 
29 Quoted in Nira Yuval-Davis, 2001. “Nationalism, Feminism and Gender Relations”, in Monserrat 
Guibernau and John Hutchinson (eds.), Understanding Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 128. 
30 Homi Bhabha, 1990. “Introduction” in Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, London ; New 
York : Routledge, p. 9. 
31 Ibid.: 14. 
32 Ibid.: 19. My emphasis. 
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There exists a tendency, among the scholars of the field, to identify civic or 
political nationalism as ‘liberal’, whereas cultural or ethnic nationalism is perceived 
as ‘regressive’ and ‘reactionary’. For example Friedrich Meinecke, an early twentieth 
century historian, juxtaposes the voluntarist, freedom-led character of political 
nationalism with the coercion of the cultural type,33 and Hans Kohn distinguishes 
between a voluntarist Western nationalism and an excessive and militant Eastern 
nationalism.34 It has been suggested that this is so because the former projects 
sovereignty as the main motive for the formation of a nation, whereas the latter must 
necessarily refer to the uniqueness of the people’s culture or descent.35 This project 
recognises the validity of the distinction, insofar as it refers to two ideal types the 
nationalist phenomenon can adopt, but cannot accept any connotations of either virtue 
or meanness, as it were, for it recognises that the purpose of all nationalisms, whether 
cultural or political, is more self-determination. Furthermore, as the description of the 
Basque case will show, nationalism is a social movement and as such it depends very 
much on the broader political, economic, and social circumstances. Its manifestation, 
therefore, is susceptible to many changes that cross over the divide between the 
political and the cultural.  
 
Primordialism: Culture and Genes 
The primordialist school is founded on the belief that nations predated 
modernity and nationalism as we experience it, or have experienced it in the recent 
past. One approach sees it as an organic phenomenon, that is, a nation is live enough 
to be considered part of the natural order. This approach focuses on the cultural 
aspects of a community: its customs, language, history. It was initiated as a notion by 
the German Romantics who called upon such characteristics in order to help people 
                                                 
33 David Brown, 1990. “Are there good and bad Nationalisms?”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, 
No.2, pp. 281-302. 
34 Hans Kohn, 1967 [1944]. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background, New 
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and providing thereby a platform for later modernist political nationalist movements” (ibid.: 128). 
35 See Liah Greenfeld, 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
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realise which nation they belonged to. In more contemporary times, the first academic 
to use the term “primordial” in order to describe the strength of ties in societies was 
Edward Shils. In an article published in 1957, Shils observed that the primordial ties 
of families and religions not only had survived industrialisation and modernity, but 
were also very significant during those periods, strongly characterised by 
individualism and secularism.36 In 1973, Clifford Geertz took Shils’ study one-step 
further and published his findings on the primordiality of ethnic ties.37 In his study on 
new states in Africa and Asia, Geertz observed that there were two different sets of 
links that held the societies together. The first set focused on the civil ties of the entire 
nation-state, which guaranteed stability and security and which reflected the political 
mentality of the West; the second set consisted of cultural ties that shaped and 
dictated the sense of belonging of the individual. Geertz asserted that the existence of 
primordial ties of a community is based on cultural ‘givens’ like blood, race, 
language, locality, religion or tradition.38 It is these cultural givens that make an 
individual feel strongly for his/her fellows, and it is according to these givens that an 
outside observer can differentiate between communities.39 For Geertz, these elements 
can be either natural or given and they are coercive for the individual. That is, the 
individual has no other choice but to obey the feelings that these givens generate. 
Nonetheless, Geertz concludes that theories of social interaction cannot explain the 
way in which these primordial ties work, precisely because they are based on 
emotions and feelings. In other words, the effect of these feelings can be seen, but 
what makes them surface remains “ineffable”. 
Geertz’s theory fails to recognise the symptoms or to define the cause. What is 
more, it accepts that the sociological field is incapable of producing a logical 
explanation of the nationalist phenomenon, because the latter emanates from emotions 
and not from social interaction. This very argument lies at the heart of a critique 
                                                 
36 Smith, op. cit., p. 151. 
37 Clifford Geertz, 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana. 
38 Ibid., p. 259.  
39 The ‘primordialist/instrumentalist’ debate of the late 1960s and 1970s, draws from an earlier socio-
anthropological debate that started off by Edmund Leach’s study. Leach argued that “social units are 
produced by subjective processes of categorical ascription that have no necessary relationship to 
observers’ perceptions of cultural discontinuities” (Carter G. Bentley, p. 24, 1987. “Ethnicity and 
practice”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.29, No.1, pp. 24-55), which departed from 
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formulated by Eller and Coughlan.40 In their article, the two scholars have launched a 
ferocious attack on Shils and Geertz for their failure to perceive kin or ethnic 
attachments as produced by the interaction of the members of any, and indeed every, 
society. These ties are socially constructed and their existence always serves 
objectives and ends. In other words, ethnic identity is manipulable and socially 
constructed, and in order to become that, the meaning and significance of ethnic ties 
must also be manipulated or constructed. The remedy offered by Eller and Coughlan 
is “a social-constructionist approach (to affect and attachment) set within a cultural-
reproduction paradigm (to ethnic identity)”.41  
Their argument provoked other scholars from the primordialist camp to 
answer back, which made some authors talk about the revival of the debate between 
instrumentalists and primordialists. Steven Grosby wrote his article a year after Eller 
and Coughlan published their study, and his argument was no less ferocious than the 
one he was trying to dismiss. According to Grosby, Eller and Coughlan had missed 
the basic point of primordialism according to which, human beings classify 
themselves and others according to primordial criteria, like the family, the homeland, 
the language, the religion, etc. Humans use these criteria, according to Grosby, to 
identify the group in which they participate and differentiate it from other groups. It is 
the perception that all people of the nation share the same origins, and not the real 
history, that cannot be subjected to sociological research. But why do we give so 
much importance to those criteria? The answer, according to Grosby, is because  
 
“the family, the locality, and one’s own ‘people’ bear, transmit and protect life. 
[…] the national state has the power to protect one’s life and all that which is familiar to 
one. To some extent, the power over life can be manipulated […] to some extent these 
powers remain beyond our manipulation; that is one of the reasons why human beings 
stand in awe of them: they remain ineffable and coercive […] this is one of the reasons 
why human beings have sacrificed their lives and continue to sacrifice their lives for their 
own family and for their own nation”.42  
 
A second version of primordialism is based on socio-biological theories. 
Sociobiology seems more useful than ‘pure’ primordialist theories because it attempts 
to explain the importance of ethnic attachments and ties by locating them in the 
                                                 
40 Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, 1993. “The poverty of primordialism: demystification of 
ethnic attachments”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.16, No.2 (April), pp. 183-202. 
41 Ibid.: 197. 
42 Steven Grosby, 1994. “The verdict of history: the inexpungeable tie of primordiality – a response to 
Eller and Coughlan”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.17, No.1 (January), pp. 164-171; original 
emphasis. Quote at p. 169 
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human genes. The foundational tenet of these theories rests on the assumption that 
nations and ethnic groups are an extension of families and kinship. Pierre van den 
Berghe is the main proponent of this approach.43 Van den Berghe looks at the 
mechanisms of animal sociality in order to explain the process which gives 
prominence to such feelings of belonging and inclusion. For van den Berghe, 
“animals are social to the extent that co-operation is mutually beneficial. What 
sociobiology does is supply the main genetic mechanism for animal sociality, namely 
kin selection to maximize inclusive fitness”.44 Inclusive fitness is a theory according 
to which,  
 
“genes will spread if their carriers act to increase not only their own fitness or 
reproductive success but also that of other individuals carrying the same genes. A 
person’s inclusive fitness is his or her personal fitness plus the increased fitness of 
relatives that he or she has in some way caused by his or her actions “.45
 
The relationship between kin selection and inclusive fitness is dual. Animals prefer 
kin over non-kin, or close kin over distant kin, in order to increase co-operation and 
thus maximise their benefits. By reproducing with members of the same species, 
animals automatically achieve the enhancement of the group’s fitness because the 
new members of the group will co-operate with each other in order to maximise the 
benefits, and so on. But inclusive fitness cannot be achieved unless the reproduction 
process takes place within the group’s limits.  
Human sociality, for Van den Berghe, is not that different from animal 
sociality. Ethnic groups, from the very first moment they appeared, were “in-breeding 
superfamilies”.46 They were different from neighbouring populations, and what is 
more, they used cultural and physical boundaries in order to differentiate themselves 
and, therefore, maximise inclusive fitness. This form of nepotism is viewed by 
sociobiology as a basic genetic function of the human species. And it is this nepotistic 
behaviour that, over the years, helped evolve the process of kin selection into 
ethnocentricisim. But, as van den Berghe argues, common descent and the sharing of 
a common identity needs to be, to a certain extent, fictive. It would be naïve to claim 
                                                 
43 Pierre Louis Van den Berghe, 1981. The Ethnic Phenomenon, New York; London: Elsevier. 
44 Pierre Louis Van den Berghe,  1978. “Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol.21, No.4 (July), pp. 401-411. Quote at p. 402 
45 Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Falger and Ian Vine (eds.), 1987. The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: 
evolutionary dimensions of xenophobia, discrimination, racism and nationalism, London: Croom 
Helm, p. xvii. 
46 Pierre Van den Berghe, 1978, op.cit., p. 404. 
 40
that all French people have the same descent, or that the Maltese all share the same 
blood. Similarly, in the ancient times, the process of endogamy of a group and the 
‘purity’ of its identity was inevitably broken down and blurred by conquest and 
migration. Cultural traits, therefore, are necessary for the preservation of the identity.  
At this point, the reader might find van den Berghe’s argument confusing. It is 
claimed that these sentiments are rooted in the human genetic code (real), but cannot 
come into effect unless there is a cultural (fictitious) stimulation. Van den Berghe’s 
theory is that fantasy alone cannot help sustain a group’s identity. The myth of 
common descent “has to be rooted in historical reality to be accepted. Ethnicity can be 
manipulated but not manufactured”.47 Unlike animals, however, humans do not use 
physical characteristics in order to distinguish kin from non-kin. Rather, they turn to 
cultural marks, like language, religion, tradition, in order to differentiate themselves 
from the ‘others’. That is something to be expected for van den Berghe, since small 
groups needed to distinguish themselves from neighbouring populations, rather than 
from people whom they have never contacted before.48 Van den Berghe’s theory of 
human sociality rests on three pillars, with kin selection being only one of them. 
Reciprocity is another characteristic of human sociality and refers to the co-operation 
between members of one or more communities for the mutual and equal exploitation 
of scarce resources. This form of co-operation enhances the inclusive fitness of the 
groups. Coercion is the third basic element of human sociality and takes the form of 
an imbalance of power between two or more communities. The dominant community 
is also the one that sees its inclusive fitness maximised. 
Both the sociobiological perspective and Geertz’s theory reflect upon ethnicity 
and ethnic identities rather than nationalism. This, of course, does not constitute a 
criticism in itself, since, in order to explain nationalism, one has to understand the 
dynamics of ethnic identity and ethnicity and the way in which these affect human 
behaviour. But my understanding of Geertz’s theory is that it can only recognise the 
constitutive parts of ethnicity, without being able to justify how these come about. 
Even if one accepts Grosby’s explanation, that it is the “perception on the part of the 
group members that such things as kinship, language and religious practice are 
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primordial”,49 one can see that it too is flawed because it does not deliver a tool that 
explains how are these perceptions shaped and what is it that shapes them. It is flawed 
because it fails to consider, for example, the children and grand children of 
immigrants who would still give their life for the nation of their predecessors, even 
though they themselves have grown up in a different locality, with different traditions, 
different language, and so on. It is flawed because it fails to explain how people give 
their lives for an ethnic community other than the one they belong to, as was the case 
with the philhellenes in the Greek War of Independence (19th C.) and the British 
volunteers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Primordialism “naturalises ethnic 
groups and justifies ethnic sentiments”50 because, by failing to explain how or why do 
people perceive these ties as primordial, it merely accepts the claims made by 
nationalists about the (usually, very long) history of the group, its language and its 
age-old traditions. Finally it is flawed because, as Nagata has argued, those 
characteristics described as ‘givens’ and perceived to be ineffable and coercive may, 
or may not, be stressed as part of the ethnic identity.51 For example, religion is 
considered as an important marker of the Jewish ethnic identity, whereas it makes no 
sense in the case of German ethnic identity.52  
Furthermore, and despite the fact that both Geertz and van den Berghe take 
migration and/or conquest into consideration, primordialist approaches attempt to lend 
a sense of rigidity and eternality in the notion of ‘culture’. In the case of the 
Romantics, culture is what determines a nation and if a nation loses its culture, or vital 
elements of it, a nation ceases to be one. On the other hand, Geertz claims that the 
‘cultural givens’ are natural and van den Berghe insists that culture must, to a certain 
extent, reflect reality. The fallacy committed in the first instance is that it presents 
culture to be dictating an individual’s behaviour. An individual develops such 
‘ineffable’ and ‘coercive’ feelings because of the cultural givens that he received. The 
fallacy committed by sociobiological theories, on the other hand, is that certain 
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cultural elements (if not the entire culture) that we experience are actually the same as 
those of our forefathers. Clearly, culture is one aspect of communities that is shaped 
under constant change. Language, in particular, is one trait that changes continuously 
and more often than others, say tradition or religion. Furthermore, an individual’s 
culture is shaped according to the environment that surrounds him. And in the days of 
globalisation, although differences exist and are maintained constantly, one can see 
that a kind of global culture emerges, most notably in sport and entertainment. It is 
along these lines of change and culture, as well as the constraining effect ethnic 
identities presumably have on human behaviour, that Fredrik Barth based his 
criticisms and developed his thoughts on the relationship between ethnic borders and 
ethnic contents.53 Barth was the first to develop an instrumentalist approach to the 
explanation of ethnic ties and preservation of ethnic identities.  
Despite the lack of a strong theoretical and epistemological foundation that 
would allow for further research and provide empirical evidence, which might explain 
the ineffability of such sentiments and emotions, the primordialist approach is quite 
significant in the study of nationalism. Thompson refuses to dismiss it as 
“unscientific” or “unsociological”.54 Gil-White emphasises the fact that by stressing 
the cognitive perception of individuals, primordialism does not claim that nations are 
a feature of eternity, or that new ethnic identities cannot emerge.55 And Jenkins 
admits, that “crude primordialism is essentially a common-sense view with enormous 
power in the world”.56 The latter comment is perhaps the one that reflects the greatest 
truth about primordialism, one which should guard us from dismissing it as an old-
fashioned theory. For, its identification of the past through the analyses and 
explanation of culture and genes, is useful in identifying the processes by which these 
elements become constitutive parts of the greater phenomenon that is called 
Nationalism. In other words, these theories offer an insight into the existence 
(perceived or otherwise) of links between the past and the present. From that point of 
view, the ethno-symbolic framework employed in this study takes primordialist 
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contributions into account, in order to explain how the (proto-nationalist) past leads to 
a nationalist present. But it also employs contributions brought forward by 
instrumentalist theories, whose studies showed that ethnicity and identity are socially 
constructed notions, and as such, they can be manipulated and changed.  
 
Instrumentalism: ethnic borders vs. ethnic content 
Barth’s study fundamentally departs from the, until then, established method 
of looking at the cultural characteristics of a group in order to determine its nature and 
identity. Instead, it focuses on the way members of the group interact, both with each 
other and with members of distinct groups, and how this interaction shapes the 
perceptions of the members with regards to their identity. Barth argues that humans 
use ethnic diachritica, that is, they ascribe ethnic characteristics to an individual, in 
order to classify him “in terms of his basic, more general identity, presumptively 
determined by his origin and background”.57 In other words, it is a process by which 
group members define themselves (internal definition) and others (external 
definition).58 Ascription, according to Barth, makes the existence of social boundaries 
evident; those who share culture A are different from those who are of culture B. 
Culture is the ethnic content that the boundaries enclose, and as such, it marks the 
limits of the boundaries.  
Nonetheless, one cannot neglect the transactional processes that take place 
between different communities. Such transactions, Barth argues, require shared codes 
and values, which facilitate communication and promote further interaction. Despite 
the fact that the differences between two or more groups are reduced, however, 
ascription still takes place, thus making ethnic boundaries persistent. Ethnic groups, 
then, are formed when the members of the group use ascription for the purposes of 
interaction59 and ethnic identity emerges from the formation, and maintenance, of 
boundaries. The conclusion of this line of thought is that it is the boundaries, rather 
than the content, that have the primary role in shaping ethnic identity. And those 
boundaries are created by the members’ perceptions.  
Barth and his collaborators have studied ethnic groups that have undergone a 
change of ethnic identity because they were forced to by circumstances that were 
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affecting their material or socio-political interests, vital for the subsistence of the 
group. In order to enjoy equal status with the other members of the new group, or to 
become fully assimilated, those individuals also underwent a change of culture. This 
argument, of course, is in sharp contrast with the primordialist claims that ethnic 
identity is part of the human genome and has constraining effects on human 
behaviour. Barth and his colleagues have demonstrated that individuals can choose 
how to define their identity depending on where their interests lie. When this change 
takes place, culture appears to be fairly elastic and not as a constrain to the 
individuals’ behaviour. Whereas primordialists attempted to explain ethnic conflicts 
by projecting the incompatibility of interests and/or goals between two different 
ethnic groups, the instrumentalist approach views ethnic conflict as a product of the 
way in which society is organised. Social organisation is based on cultural 
differences, which, in turn, serve as pillars in the construction and maintenance of 
social boundaries, whose purpose is to contrast ethnic groups so as to differentiate one 
group from another. Barth’s study allows us to see cultural differentiation as an effect 
of boundaries, rather than a cause, since, the stronger the boundary, the greater the 
variation of culture will be between two or more ethnic groups. In fact, Barth’s 
findings are foreshadowed in Robert Park’s work, a prominent figure of the Chicago 
School, who were the first to observe the elasticity and manipulation of ethnic 
identities.60  
Barth’s study, although reflecting on a pre-existing debate within the socio-
anthropological field, it has formed the basis for further study and the prism under 
which many scholars were to examine ethnicity and ethnic identities. Jenkins 
accepts61 the correctness of the theory and only highlights the importance of external 
categorisation, which he believes should be looked at with more detail by future 
scholars who embrace the Barthian approach. Jenkins believes that the internal 
definition does not suffice for an ethnic identity to be formed. The way others see us 
and the way we see others, is equally important.62 The same could be said for Stephen 
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Cornell, although his view is that the flaw in the formation of the theory lies with the 
nature of circumstance.63 For Cornell, Barth and his collaborators have not paid 
sufficient attention to the fact that the circumstance plays an equally important role in 
the formation of ethnic groups, as does the interaction between circumstance and 
content, implying, thus, that the individual actor is not as free to choose whether to 
change an ethnic identity or not, as it is assumed by Barth.  
The majority of criticisms Barth’s work has received focus on his failure to 
take into consideration the role of history in the shaping of ethnic identities.64 In later 
studies, Barth recognised that history is a chain of events constitutive of the present 
and as such it cannot leave people’s perceptions unaffected.65 Scholars, however, 
have identified more problems with the Barthian approach, implying that it is no 
better in explaining ethnic identity formation than primordialism. One such criticism 
comes from Bentley who argues that neither of the two schools can account 
effectively on how the individuals come to recognise the commonalities of culture 
that bring them together. More concretely, they fail to account “for the sense of 
compulsion that attaches to ethnic identities”.66 Bentley bases his work on Pierre 
Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’, according to which the products of collective history 
(language, economy, culture, etc.) are founded on the ‘habitus’, that is, “systems of 
durable transposable dispositions”.67 Following the theory of practice, Bentley shows 
that ethnic identities are “[r]ooted in preconscious patterns of practice that are not 
susceptible to conscious apprehension or alteration”,68 but rather emanate from the 
social environment in which the individuals are placed. In other words, people act and 
react according to the perceptions that have been shaped under the ‘habitus’ in which 
they found themselves, and this does not necessarily points to a rational, interest-
seeking behaviour. 
On the other hand, Francisco Gil-White has criticised the Barthian model 
because it confuses the nature of ethnic groups with their mobilisation. For example, 
it might be true that some groups do indeed shift and alter their ethnic ascriptions but 
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this does not necessarily guarantee that all ethnic groups follow this pattern.69 
Moreover, the justification that this change takes place because of the pursuit of 
personal interest cannot stand because in many cases, as Gil-White explains, personal 
economic interest has been sacrificed for the good of the community. Gil-White 
explicitly doubts the empirical evidence given by Barth himself on instances of ethnic 
identity alteration, and argues that such changes cannot happen in the first generation, 
thus indicating an “active primordialist model”.70 In a similar critique, Paine asserts 
that Barth concentrates excessively on the instrumentality of ethnic identities, thus 
rendering himself incapable of explaining why actors develop strong feelings for their 
communities. Paine also criticises Barth for confusing values with strategy.71 
Contrary to Barth’s claims, that values are implicit in every transaction and every 
transaction can be translated as a strategic way of maximizing value, Paine responds 
by identifying intrinsic and extrinsic values.72 The former connotes faith and belief 
whereas the second indicates strategy and transaction. Interestingly, Bourne and 
Sivanandan claim that Barth can be easily misunderstood because, by highlighting the 
behaviour of the actors, as it is shaped by the pursuit of their interests, he seems to 
blame the actors themselves for their cultural difference that has proved to be a 
disadvantage.73 Furthermore, Handelman also focuses on culture and says that Barth 
overlooked the dual relationship between culture and boundaries: the culture serves to 
designate what its limits are, whereas the boundaries indicate what they enclose.74 
Other commentators have supported that the primordialist and the instrumentalist 
approaches should not be viewed as opposites but rather as accommodating.75
One must indicate at this point, that ethnicity is often confused or presented as 
synonymous to ‘race’, partly because certain ethnic groups highlight the importance 
of ‘race’ as a factor of the group’s cohesiveness. Here too, however, scholars are 
divided as to what the exact meaning of race is and its role in social relations. 
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Wallman characterises the debate between the two notions as a ‘quibble’,76 while, at 
later writings, she stressed that phenotype or ‘race’ is only one of the ethnic boundary 
markers.77 Banton, whose contribution to the study of race and racism is enormous, 
has argued that ‘ethnicity’ differs from ‘race’ because the former denotes the in-group 
by highlighting cultural differences, whereas the latter denotes the out-group by 
stressing phenotypical or physical characteristics.78 Furthermore, Jenkins argues that, 
“while ‘ethnic’ social relations are not necessarily hierarchical, exploitative and 
conflictual, ‘race relations’ would certainly appear to be”.79  
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the effect that Barth’s study had on the 
development of the studies of nationalism. First of all because its basic premises are 
widely accepted by social anthropologists and the criticisms it received concerned 
mainly a disagreement on which aspects should be emphasised more.80 Second, 
because it implied that ethnic identities are not always conflictual, thus, inciting 
researchers to look at the circumstances that draw ethnic groups into conflict. The 
majority of scholars who explained nationalism as a modern phenomenon have 
accepted the instrumental element that comes along with ethnic feelings, namely the 
establishment of an ethnic identity. As it has been noted in the beginning, the terms 
‘modernist’ and ‘instrumentalist’, in so far as they designated schools of thought in 
the field, were synonymous. But, as Benedict Anderson has indicated, since the early 
1980s the traditional literature has been qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, 
enriched, thus in need of reconsideration.81 The following section discusses the 
modernist literature, which is branded as such because opinions on the classification 
of the authors that are examined in the following lines, or rather their work, may vary 
because of the different aspects they highlight in their studies, for example modernity 
or instrumentality. However, since the 1960s, the majority of studies have considered 
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not only nations to be a modern phenomenon, but that modernity is the sole factor that 
allowed the emergence of nations’ elements.82  
 
Nationalism: the beast of modernity 
Elie Kedourie was one of the first scholars to give a historical account of 
nationalism, viewed trough the prism of modernity.83 The influence of the Romantic 
movement and the discourses of the German philosophers of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century is the point Kedourie highlights as a main cause of nationalism in 
Europe. As we saw earlier in the text, the German philosophers insisted on racial and 
linguistic purity as necessary ingredients for the survival of any state. The cultural 
characteristics of a nation, with language in particular, were considered to be what 
differentiated one community from another and they had to be preserved. Fichte 
differentiated between original and derived languages and, of course, supremacy was 
granted to the former.84 For, original languages are natural languages and they are the 
only ones that can point to a true nation. And such a nation should preserve its 
language and protect it form foreign borrowings or intrusions. Earlier in the text, we 
saw Herder’s incitement for the rediscovery of the nation. 
For Kedourie, nationalism is an essentially modern phenomenon because the 
Romantic movement surfaced out of the frustration of educated youth and ostracised 
intellectuals who where denied a role in the building of the German nation. As it is 
explained,85 these intellectuals belonged to the lower social classes. But when they 
completed their education, “they found that their knowledge opened no doors”86 and 
that the nobles and aristocrats had secured every access to the state apparatus for 
themselves and threw away the keys. The German philosophers, advocates of the 
Kantian philosophy of personal freedom87, followed an ideological style of politics 
that emerged from the French Revolution and which is “inherent” in nationalist 
movements.88 It is because of the importance of Europe and its ability to influence the 
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rest of the world that the doctrine spread.89 For Kedourie, it is these advocacies that 
resonated in the calls for birth of other nations in Europe, and which had an immense 
impact on ethnically mixed communities.  
Ernest Gellner is the scholar whose insights on the emergence and 
development of nationalism were original and influential enough to establish the 
modernist approach in the field. As early as 1964, when his Thought and Change was 
published, he argued that uneven modernisation was the driving force behind the rise 
of nationalism. Industrialisation favoured the urban centres and contributed to their 
growth by attracting workforce from the impoverished and undeveloped countryside. 
Language, for Gellner, was the only means for the immigrants to maintain their 
distinctiveness vis-à-vis the other newcomers and/or the urban population. This kind 
of population shift, according to Gellner, brought with it social and ethnic conflicts, 
between the immigrant population – which was uneducated, poor and often of distinct 
language and culture – and the urban and modernised population – the educated and 
property holders. These ethnic conflicts later developed into nationalist ones when the 
intelligentsia, of either side, began demanding the right to self-determination and 
secession. This is the most important point of Gellner’s argument, for it is nationalism 
that creates states and not the other way around. “Nationalism […] invents nations 
where they do not exist – but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to 
work on”.90  Where ethnic conflicts did not emerge and ethnic groups were 
assimilated, they were so because of the creation of a public and standardised 
education system that was working on the national language.  
In 1983, Gellner presented a fuller picture of his argument. In Nations and 
Nationalism he explains how the transition from an ‘agro-literate’ society to a 
modern, industrialised one is where scholars should focus in order to explain 
nationalism.91 A typical agro-literate society might have its own state but where it 
didn’t, nationalism did not emerge because society was stratified in such a way that 
the creation of a nation was impossible to seek. In an agro-literate society, Gellner 
argues, there are different strata, like the clergy, the military, the administrative and 
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commercial classes, and the agricultural populations of the countryside, which are, of 
course, at the very bottom of the social pyramid. The ruling classes are vertically 
differentiated by the ‘simple’ people and, not only there is not much contact between 
them, but the ruling classes refuse to share their culture with people from the lower 
strata. This is one reason why nationalism could not surface, but its emergence was 
debilitated by the fact that the ruling classes were also horizontally differentiated with 
each other. As Gellner explains, “the more differentiated in style of all kinds the 
various strata are, the less friction and ambiguity there will be between them”.92 
Implicitly, this quote gives only an impression of why the Third Estate thought they 
should do once and for all with the ancien régime.  
On the other hand, an industrial society is fluid and mobile because it is an 
ever-expanding one. Growth is what modern societies are after. That is why there is a 
great level of professional specialisation and a unique mode of production based on 
the division of labour. Industrialisation, thus, only functions in a society whose 
members can be mobile, able to interact and communicate with other people, outside 
their localities. This requires a standardised vernacular, which in turn requires 
universal literacy, which brings about the necessity for one standardised education 
system undertaken by the state, since it is the only actor that can provide the means 
for such a task. It is this “new form of social organisation, based on deeply 
internalised, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state” that 
causes nationalism to emerge.93 Gellner distinguishes between high or ‘garden’ 
cultures and low or ‘wild’ cultures. The high cultures are indicative of the modern era. 
They are based on education and literacy and they are pervasive, contrary to the low 
cultures that reflect the customs and traditions of only a small community of people 
and which need no special organisation. Many of the low cultures cannot survive the 
drive of modernisation, hence the dominance of the high culture. Others are taken up 
and become part of the latter. Quite often, nationalism invents itself cultures, which it 
presents as part of the main, national culture. Gellner explicitly refuses to identify 
nationalism as a phenomenon of will (political nationalism) or as one of culture 
(cultural nationalism). Rather, nationalism combines both aspects, in the sense that 
only when a society’s culture is pervasive, education-based, “homogeneous” and 
“centrally sustained”, then, and only then, the members of the society feel the need to 
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protect their culture politically and those who share it. That is why “nationalism is 
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent”.94 Modernity and modernisation create the only circumstances 
under which nationalism can emerge. Gellner accepts that nationalist intelligentsias 
interfere with the authenticity of the culture(s) they purport to defend, but he claims it 
is impossible for nationalism to be born out of their influence. “A high culture 
pervades the whole of society, defines it and needs to be sustained by the polity. That 
is the secret of nationalism”.95  
As far as modernisation is concerned, there are a few points that need to be 
made and that scholars have stressed since the text’s publication. Firstly, although 
Gellner’s theory is based on the fact that modernisation does not affect all places at 
the same time, it assumes, however, that it affects all places in the same way. Where 
modernisation is accepted or established, nationalism will surface because 
industrialisation, and therefore modernisation, depends upon the building of one 
single nation and of one homogeneous community in order to function properly. It is 
clear that modernisation, presented like this, does not leave much scope for the 
individual to act. The involvement of individuals – the elites or the intelligentsias – is 
seen as a consequence rather than a cause of nationalism. This claim, in turn, brings 
about another problem with Gellner’s theory, mainly that it fails to explain the 
emergence of nationalism in pre-industrial societies, thus rendering itself 
functionalist. Smith cites Japan, Ireland, Mexico, Finland, Serbia and Australia as 
such examples.96 Hall points at the cases of Britain and France, where nationalist 
sentiments emerged before the appearance of industry and were caused by the 
dissatisfaction with the ancien régime.97
Smith doubts the importance of a mass education system because, as he 
claims, it is a product of the nationalist elites themselves but only after they had come 
to power.98 Thus, the standardisation of language and the establishment of one 
national culture through mass public education could not have constituted a cause of 
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nationalism. Benedict Anderson, a scholar whose contribution to the explanations of 
the rise of nationalism is no less significant than Gellner’s, wrote: 
 
 “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that 
he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’ rather than to ‘imagining’ and 
‘creation’. In this way he implies that ‘true’ communities exist which can be 
advantageously juxtaposed to nations.”99
 
Furthermore, although Gellner gives an analytic account of the process that 
transforms high cultures into national ones, he fails to explain how these high cultures 
became high and why people are prepared to defend them so eagerly. Despite its 
profound and lasting impact, Conversi argues, Gellner’s theory on cultural 
homogenization was excessively centred on language and industrialisation, 
overlooking thus other circumstances that were both present before the 
industrialization and catalytic to the process of cultural homogenisation itself.100
Influenced by Gellner’s explanatory focus and theoretical approach, 
Hobsbawm’s work focused on the explanation of nations and nationalisms as 
artefacts, products of a modern era and under historically particular circumstances. In 
The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm and his collaborators present in their case 
studies precisely what the title suggests. For Hobsbawm, the nation and everything 
that is associated to it (nationalism, national symbols, traditions, etc.) is a 
“comparatively recent historical innovation” and the tradition serves as the platform 
that holds it together.101 By ‘invented tradition, Hobsbawm understands  
 
“a set of practices governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or 
symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where 
possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic 
past”.102
 
Hobsbawm does not claim that all traditions are invented, or that they are all a full 
product of someone’s fantasy. The national traditions of modernity can be either 
totally new or based on pre-existing traditions, as was the case of Switzerland, cited 
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by Hobsbawm.103 However, it must be recognised that, in both instances, the 
mechanisms that project tradition back to the people (flags, images, ceremonies and 
music) are new in history and to a large extent invented.104  
It was not until 1990 and the publication of Nations and Nationalism since 
1780 that Hobsbawm developed further his views on the emergence and evolution of 
nationalism.105 Nationalism, for Hobsbawm, must be viewed in conjunction with the 
nation-state, since all nationalisms aspire to the creation of an independent nation-
state in the territory occupied by their members. Hobsbawm stresses frequently the 
‘threshold principle’, according to which only large nations could aspire to building a 
nation-state for the reason that they were the only ones considered to be culturally 
and, more importantly, economically viable. Hobsbawm distinguishes two processes 
of nation building, civic and ethnic, and traces the emergence of nationalism and 
nation-states to the proto-national bonds, that is, the type of associations formed in 
pre-modern states.  
These are of two types: a) “supra-local forms of popular identification” and b) 
“political bonds and vocabularies of select groups more directly linked to states and 
institutions”.106 Language is one criterion of proto-nationalism, but the evidence we 
have left, Hobsbawm argues, are of literate people in an age where the majority were 
illiterate. Thus, although we cannot know precisely how and if the populus identified 
language as a criterion significant enough for the creation of their nation, it is hard to 
imagine language being high in their priorities, particularly because every locality 
spoke a different and distinct vernacular. 
 Ethnicity too, whether viewed as race or culture, was only significant insofar 
as it highlighted obvious physical characteristics between the in-group and the out-
group, thus, contributing to the process of identification of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. 
Hobsbawm considers religion to be ‘semi-significant’ for pre-national societies, 
because the majority of religions were of universalist nature. Where religion was 
given an elevated role as a ‘proto-national bond’, it was because it served as a strong 
cultural marker in the process of the group’s definition, internal as well as external. 
The fact that religious feelings come to be identified with nationalist feelings only 
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when nationalism adopts a mass form, rather than at its initial stages, shows the 
manipulation that took place. The only important criterion of proto-national identities, 
for Hobsbawm, that has contributed to the process of transformation from a ‘proto-
national’ society into a nation-state, was that of “the consciousness of belonging or 
having belonged to a lasting political entity”.107  
The influence of the romantics that swept Europe for much of the late 
eighteenth century was, for Hobsbawm, a crucial aid in the nationalist elites’ attempt 
to delineate their own nation states and one of the reasons why, from 1870 until 1914, 
nationalism began to shape and to gain ground all over Europe and elsewhere. The 
‘threshold principle’ was effectively supplanted, since any body of people considering 
themselves a nation had the right to self-determination. The change in the evolution of 
nationalism was brought forward by three significant social developments:  
 
“the resistance of traditional groups threatened by the onrush of modernity, the novel 
and quite non-traditional classes and strata now rapidly growing in the urbanising 
societies of developed countries, and the unprecedented migrations which distributed a 
multiple diaspora of peoples across the globe, each strangers to both natives and other 
migrant groups, none, as yet, with the habits and conventions of coexistence”.108  
 
This change became possible because nationalisms, with or without a nation-state, 
concentrated more on the cultural and ethnic characteristics, highlighted by the 
Romantic movement. Nationalisms and nationalist discourses began to move 
progressively to the right, projecting a national sentiment of fear against other nations. 
This fear, in turn, is what led to the rise in exclusionist policies and anti-Semitic 
feelings in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth 
century. 
Nonetheless, Hobsbawm delivers a historical account for the emergence of 
nationalism and, more concretely, the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth 
and twentieth century. But the picture he paints for the future is a quite different from 
the one he described in the rest of the book. The rise in intergovernmental relations, 
international and supranational organisations and the increase of interdependence 
between states make him reach the conclusion that nationalism is no longer strong 
enough to mobilise the masses for the creation of their own nation-state, because “it is 
historically less important” and not “a global political programme” as it used to be for 
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the last two centuries.109 It is unfortunate for Hobsbawm that shortly after the 
publication of his work, Europe was experiencing one of the bloodiest wars in its 
history since the Second World War.  
Even if Hobsbawm is acquitted for his error, on the grounds that history 
cannot be foretold or predicted, he commits other fallacies that debilitate his theory’s 
capacity to provide us with a complete account of how nationalism surfaced and 
established. First of all, he does not take into consideration the masses; the groups of 
people that get behind a nationalist ideology and for which nationalism claims to 
speak. He criticises Gellner for not having paid “adequate attention to the view from 
below”110 but himself fails to focus on the social strata that form the base of the social 
pyramid. Rather, Hobsbawm concentrates on the elites and the attempts they make in 
order to establish a state. The ‘low cultures’, to borrow Gellner’s terminology, have 
no role to play in the state-building process, although they will identify strongly with 
the state once it is constructed. Moreover, the distinction between ethnic and civic 
nationalisms is of questionable utility in the theory since any given nationalism 
employs both and the notions and concepts nationalism uses intertwine between the 
political and the cultural sphere.  
Invention and fabrication of history and identities was not the only insight 
Gellner’s work produced. His model, based on industrialisation and modernisation, 
has incited researchers to look further at the destabilising effects of development and 
capitalism. Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter have focused their work on precisely this 
theme, with Nairn noting frequently the importance of Gellner’s work and the extent 
to which it influenced Nairn’s study. Nairn argues that “nationalism is as a whole 
quite incomprehensible outside the context of that process’s uneven development”.111 
For Nairn, England and France are considered to be the centres out of which 
capitalism emerged, and the rest of Europe is considered to be the periphery. Nairn 
talks about the “nationalism-producing” dilemma, according to which eastern and 
central Europe’s middle classes had to choose between substituting the old dynastic 
regime with capitalism and progress imported by Westerners – and, thus, succumb to 
imperialist policies – or they could “beat progress into a shape that suits their own 
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needs and class ambitions”.112 In order to do that, the intelligentsias and the middle 
classes had to reconcile their agenda with the diversity of local cultures and traditions 
that existed throughout the territory. And for that, they turned to the advocacies of the 
Romantics.  
The spread of capitalism is inherently uneven and imperialism is a 
consequence of this inequality. The only defence against imperialism is mass 
mobilisation, which can only be successful if it is “still located culturally upon a far 
anterior level of development, […] upon a level of (almost literally) ‘pre-historic’ 
diversity in language, ethnic characteristics, social habits, and so on”.113 Nairn 
recognises the importance of the intelligentsia and the middle classes in the surfacing 
of nationalism, but argues logically that it is due to the masses that nationalism has 
transformed to such an overwhelming phenomenon. Nairn speaks of nationalism as a 
Janus-headed process, which is due to the constructions and inventions of the elites. 
That is, all nationalisms look to the past in order to be guided into the future. But, 
Nairn continues, nationalism is also essentially populist, for, without the populus, the 
calls made by nationalist advocates would have probably had no effect. “The new 
middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the 
invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood”.114  
Although he is correct in pointing out the populist spirit of nationalist 
ideologies, Nairn pays excessive attention and gives great significance to the romantic 
element that surrounds nationalist doctrines. Nairn’s implication that all nationalisms 
are romantic is problematic for two reasons. First, although all nationalisms require 
some form of culture that is used as a platform on which nationalism stands, not all 
nationalisms developed a radical discourse of racial and linguistic purity, as Fichte 
incited. The Swiss and the American cases spring to mind as an example – indeed 
those that could be classified as ‘political’ or ‘civic’. Second, the Romantic movement 
was born in Britain in the eighteenth century (a capitalist and imperialist centre of the 
West, in Nairn’s analysis) and was taken up by the French and the Germans towards 
the end of the same century.115 Thus, although it retained its basic assumptions for the 
pursuit of every thing ‘ideal’, it is logical to assume that it underwent a certain process 
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of transformation, necessary in order to reflect the aspirations and expectations of the 
different ethnic identities that called upon it.  
Furthermore, Scotland is for Nairn the only case which saw the establishment 
of capitalism without the extreme consequences of nationalism.116 This line of 
thought indicates that Nairn’s approach is problematic on another field, namely the 
difference between centre and periphery in the West. In Spain, for example, 
industrialisation and capitalism were by far the fields of supremacy for both the 
Basques and the Catalans, but none of them attempted to integrate the rest of the 
country into one single nation;117 rather nationalism developed because of the 
centralist policies of Madrid, which, in modernisation terms, was less developed than 
the two regions. At the same time, if one turns Nairn’s argument around, did all areas 
that experienced uneven development transform into nationalist movements? Smith 
answers negatively and cites the examples of southern Italy and southern Egypt, as 
well as those of northeast England and Crete.118 Orridge, on the other hand, criticises 
Nairn for having developed a theory that, although it gives a good understanding for 
the emergence of nationalism and the nation-states, fails to explain why the nation-
state is “so appropriate for a society to develop” and so attractive to the 
nationalists.119  Nonetheless, Nairn’s approach has left its mark on the field, leaving 
other authors to tag Nairn’s work as a “plausible and impressive argument”120 and 
“the most illuminating account of nationalism”121 coming from someone who is 
affiliated with Marxism. 
Following the principle of uneven development, Michael Hechter brought 
forward the argument that internal colonialism, a consequence of uneven 
development, generates nationalism under certain conditions.122 Hechter studied 
Britain and the rise of Celtic nationalism, from the Tudors to the 1960s, and his 
conclusion was that Ireland, Wales and Scotland were England’s internal colonies, 
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since England was always the politically dominant one. But one cannot speak of 
internal colonialism without the existence of modernisation, for it is the combination 
of dominance and development that lead to the exploitation of the peripheries by the 
dominant centre. Hechter’s argument is that where the peripheries consist of ethnic 
groups different from that of the core, the ethnic difference will play a major role in 
the stratification of the society. Since the core is always more developed than the 
peripheries, its dominance over the ethnically different peripheries will drive it to 
adopt a colonial behaviour towards the latter. This ‘internal colonialism’ is the cause 
for the emergence of nationalist discourses. 
In setting out the preconditions necessary for the apparition of internal 
colonialism, Hechter claims that one should distinguish “between development as a 
result of factors endogenous to a specific society” and development as a result of 
“basically exogenous forces”.123 The first was observed in the West, where cities and 
countries developed through the aspirations of its citizens. In the second case, where 
colonies started to develop, it was only to serve the metropolis’ interests. But even 
when the colonies did develop, economic dependence of the periphery, relative lack 
of services, lower standard of living, migration from the periphery and national 
discrimination on the basis of cultural elements were still the main ingredients of the 
relationship between the centre and the periphery.124 The reason for this was the 
“cultural division of labour; a system of stratification where objective cultural 
distinctions are superimposed upon class lines”.125 Those of metropolitan culture 
always occupied higher occupation posts and social status than the local population. It 
was simply another way for the metropolitan bourgeoisies to keep in control of the 
colonies, and according to Hechter’s point, it need not happen only with overseas 
colonies. The cultural division of labour contributes to the formation of ethnic 
identities because it “determines individual life-chances”.126 The greater this is, 
argues Hechter, the greater the individual will depend on his ethnic identity. Where 
cultural division of labour occurs in Europe, “ethnic identity will be the strongest 
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among those groups placed at the bottom of the stratification system”, because the 
poor have always fewer chances than the rich.127  
For Hechter, development differentiates between centre and periphery in 
another way too: the core is characterised by class solidarity, which “assumes an 
individual orientation towards the marketplace”, whereas the periphery enjoys status 
group solidarity, which involves a group.128 The question Hechter asks is why status 
group solidarity is stronger in the countryside than in the metropolis. The answer is 
that by applying a cultural division of labour in the periphery, the metropolis 
automatically denies assimilation of the local population to the core culture. Where 
the metropolis is to attempt to acculturate them later, it might be perceived by the 
periphery as an oppressive situation and, thus, lead to calls for independence or 
secessionist policies.  
The argument is, of course, in sharp contrast with Nairn’s illustration of the 
Scottish case, as well as the Basque and Catalan nationalisms. Scotland was quite 
developed and industrialised and it enjoyed its share of high occupational posts, 
especially in the fields of education and law. Hechter recognised the flaws of his 
argument and introduced a second mechanism of group formation, the “segmental 
division of labour”, that is, “the extent to which members interact wholly within the 
boundaries of their own group”.129 For Hechter, the above named institutions allowed 
the interaction of all strata of the local population with the periphery culture and, thus, 
more likely to identify with it. But, as Orridge points out, even if Hechter’s 
improvements are taken into consideration, it is naïve to argue that a national identity 
is sustained because of the occupational post someone holds.130 Hechter’s ‘segmental 
division of labour’ is falsified by the Basque case, as indeed happened with the 
‘cultural division’. As we shall see in the following chapters, the Basque aristocracy 
had identified itself with the kingdom of Castile and had adopted a Spanish ethnic 
identity long before Basque nationalism surfaced. And when it did emerge, it 
confronted not only the Spanish but also the Basque elites for having forgotten their 
traditions and language and had sided with the enemy. 
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 When the first nationalisms appeared in Europe in the late eighteenth century, 
almost all of them, invariably, claimed their right to a sovereign state. This might be 
an exception in the Catalan or Quebecois case, but it tends to be the norm in the 
majority of cases. And it is precisely this norm that has made scholars view at 
nationalism from an exclusively political angle. John Breuilly has worked on 
nationalism as an ideology and movement, and has stressed the significance of its 
political character.131 Nationalism can manifest in three different ways, reform, 
unification and separation, all of which are connected with the existence of a state. 
The state is what delineates the territory that belongs to the nation. The state is the 
only institution capable of protecting the nation. The state is also universal. “There 
should be no area or person that is not subject to the rule of a state”.132 Nationalism 
emerges from the split between the modern state and society. Where the two do not 
coincide, nationalism, as a form of politics, will claim to unify them.  
“A nationalist argument is a political doctrine built on three assertions: 
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and 
values. 
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires the 
attainment of at least political sovereignty”.133 
 
Breuilly accepts all previous explanations for the emergence of nationalism 
but makes it clear that they are nothing more but preconditions of nationalism. 
Nationalism is extremely potent when it comes to mobilising the masses and bringing 
them together irrespective of class or social status, something that industrialisation, or 
the establishment of a public mass education system, or even print capitalism cannot 
do. Even the role Kedourie has given to intellectuals cannot account for the 
emergence of nationalism, for, as Breuilly explains, “intellectuals who lead nationalist 
movements are not subject to the kinds of constraints from their supporters as apply to 
many other political leaders”.134 For Breuilly, historicist practices have an ultimately 
political end, that is, the creation of a sovereign state. Nationalist movements connect 
culture and politics by inventing symbols, myths and traditions of their ‘unique 
nation’ and present their uniqueness as a reason for their right to form a state, “a body 
of citizens – that is, a wholly political conception – and self-determination is justified 
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in terms of universal political principles”.135 The contradiction found in nationalist 
discourses between ‘universality’ and ‘uniqueness’, highlighted by Breuilly, seems to 
complement Nairn’s characterisation of nationalism as ‘Janus-faced’, albeit from a 
different perspective.  
Breuilly’s theory is significant in that it discusses exhaustively the role of 
nationalism in the construction of a state. It has shown that the political sphere of 
nationalism, as much as its manifestation is covered by a culture and a history that are 
most probably fabricated, it is the principal motor of nationalism. However, his theory 
is not clear of anomalies. For example, Breuilly focuses excessively on nationalist 
drives for the creation of a state, thus failing to connect nationalism with an already 
established nation-state. Furthermore, although he is correct in pointing out the 
political drives of the intellectuals, he fails to see that it is the intellectuals of the 
French Revolution that advocated the creation of states was the epitome of the 
people’s freedom. It is they who argued for a voluntary participation of people in the 
construction of a political entity that would guarantee their equality and freedoms in 
exchange for loyalty.  
The modernist camp has provided some of the most insightful thinking in the 
theory of nationalism. It was influential not only because it inspired more scholars to 
follow in the footsteps of authors like the above-named, and therefore contribute 
further to the understanding of the phenomenon, but also because its flaws inspired 
useful criticism leading to further theoretical dichotomisations and differentiations in 
the approaches. One such approach, termed perennialist136 and represented 
principally by the works of Walker Connor and Donald Horowitz, is one that 
combines the positions brought forward by both the primordialists as well as the 
instrumentalists/modernists. It does so by accepting the modern character of the 
nations but regards them as having emerged from the evolution of ethnic groups, 
which were always present. A second approach, which will be discussed in the 
following pages, is a post-modern understanding of the nation based on codes of 
historical imagination without which, ineffable feelings like those described by the 
primordialist school could not have emerged.  
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Perennialism: First, an ethnos; then, a nation. 
Walker Connor has expressed his ideas on the emergence of nations and 
nationalism in a series of articles, which have been put together in a single volume.137 
His approach borrows elements of the primordialist theories,138 that is, he regards 
ethnic communities to have existed since the early years of humanity. It has existed in 
the minds and hearts of its members and it is due to felt kinship ties. The ethnic group, 
like the nation, is perceived by its members to be an extended family. For Connor, 
what binds people together in ethnic groups is that the “members share an intuitive 
conviction of the group’s separate origin and evolution”.139 Connor recognises that 
this sense of common descent will not reflect the real history of the group. “It is not 
chronological or factual history that is the key to the nation, but sentient or felt 
history”.140  
Unlike primordialists, however, Connor recognises the modern character of 
the nations by arguing that one should deal cautiously with nationalist arguments 
claiming the antiquity of their nation. As was noted above, Connor argues that it is 
ethnic groups that form the nations. But the two are essentially different in that, ethnic 
groups are not self-conscious as such. Rather, they first experience what they are not, 
by comparing themselves to neighbouring populations, before they know what they 
are.141 And it is only when the members of a group realise that their coming together 
forms a group distinct and distinguishable from other groups, that a nation is formed. 
“While an ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self-
defined”.142  Although this sounds like an essentially modernist formulation, and 
despite the fact that other scholars consider him a “late modernist”,143 Connor rejects 
several theories brought forward by modernists and/or instrumentalists.144  
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The reason for that is because they cannot account for the passions that either 
nationalism or ethnicity stir. The feelings one has for his community/locality/country 
are perceived by the members of the modernist camp to be subdued to the dictates of 
rationality and interest, rather than those of the heart or soul. Paraphrasing 
Chateaubriand and reminding us of Grosby,145 Connor argues, “people do not 
voluntarily die for things that are rational”.146 On the other hand, Connor claims that 
economic explanations play the game of nationalists, since there are many cases in 
which, the ethno-national movements that emerged correspond to groups that are 
economically better off than the groups they oppose.147 Furthermore, it is more 
appropriate to speak for the catalytic, rather than causal, impact of modernisation on 
nationalism. “It has held greater import for the tempo of nationalism than for its 
substance”.148 It is with modernisation and the establishment of mass communications 
that the message of the French Revolution spread around the globe and led to the 
ebullience of ethno-nationalist movements in the 1960s and 1970s.   
Donald Horowitz, like Connor, recognises the importance of ethnic identities 
and nations and stresses the importance of perceived kinship for the members of a 
group.149 Horowitz’s study focuses on ethnic conflicts that take place in former 
colonial territories in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. His argument is that it is the 
perceived kinship and the myth of common ancestry that distinguishes ethnic groups 
from other social groups. It is also the mechanism that operates collective self-esteem 
and allows the group to compare and differentiate itself from other groups. “In the 
modern state”, Horowitz argues, “the sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in 
the struggle for relative group worth”.150 Horowitz distinguishes between advanced 
and backward groups and regions in order to reach a typology of secession in multi-
ethnic states. His study is focusing primarily on circumstances that can lead to the 
dismemberment of a multi-ethnic state, by secession or irredentism, and for this 
reason his work is examined with more details in the lines that follow.  
His contribution to the understanding of ethnic and national identity lies in his 
recognition that the arrival of the colonisers signalled the emergence of new ethnic 
identities. Due to administrational purposes, groups that have never contacted each 
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other now fell under the same ethnic categorisation. Boundaries changed and along 
with them, new ethnic identities were formed. Assimilation policies by the colonisers 
meant that a large number of distinct groups would be recognised as one single ethnie. 
It is for this reason that ethnic conflict only surfaced after the end of the colonisation. 
Assimilation meant that the ethnic and cultural diversity of a group could only be 
defended by returning to the past and searching the history, often invent it where it 
didn’t exist, in order to prove their distinctiveness. “These groups commonly result in 
an explosive and violent assertion of group separateness”.151 Thus, while ethnic 
identities are shown as artificial and constructed, their impact on the group members 
and, in particular, the stability of the region is of paramount importance. In this way, 
Horowitz combines the modern with the perennial. He shows how ethnic identities 
and bonds have developed where they were previously inexistent and he highlights 
the importance that felt kinship plays for the perception of the group’s members. This 
constant academic battle on whether certain elements, and which, of ethnic and 
nationalist importance are real or perceived gave rise to post-modern approaches that 
deconstructed the nation and have explained its dynamics by focusing on processes of 
homogenisation and assimilation, as well as nationalism’s narratives, imagery and 
symbolism, and the way in which these latter came to the fore. 
 
Post-Modernism & Ethno-symbolism 
Anderson views nationalism as an essentially modern phenomenon, but, on the 
other hand, attempts to explain its strong resonance to the masses. For Anderson, it is 
only very small communities that are not imagined. All other communities are too 
large to allow a ‘face-to-face’ contact and therefore are imagined. This is the main 
point Anderson makes in his book and the one that has contributed greatly to the 
study of nationalism: “[the nation] is an imagined political community”.152 And for 
this reason it cannot be claimed to be either genuine or false. Rather, what 
differentiates nations is the style in which they are imagined. Nonetheless, the 
emergence of all nations, according to the author, is based on two fatalities: human 
mortality and linguistic unification. In pre-modern societies, religions had the role of 
connecting mortality with eternity, or continuity as Anderson terms it. “[F]ew things 
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were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation”.153 Secondly, linguistic 
plurality in the world is an inescapable condition but, whereas in pre-modern societies 
one could find, say a million languages, with the arrival of print capitalism, the 
number of languages is far smaller. That’s because “these varied idiolects were 
capable of being assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages”.154
Anderson too looks at the cultural roots of nationalism and argues that 
nationalism has to be looked at in conjunction with the “cultural systems” that 
preceded it. He identifies three such systems, the first of which is “the idea that a 
particular script-language offered privileged access to ontological truth”.155 Latin was, 
until the early seventeenth century, the language in which the majority of books were 
written and probably the only language taught, since it was considered to be the only 
‘true’ language. The explorations of the world by Europeans, however, and the 
connection with the rest of the world proved quite the contrary. A second cultural 
system consists of “the belief that society was naturally organised around and under 
high centres”, monarchs who claimed their rule to be God’s law. The growing 
dissatisfaction of the elites and other segments of the population, so often depicted in 
the French Revolution, achieved the overthrowing of the ancien régime and its 
substitution by a national principle. As Anderson remarks, many states continued to 
be dynastic until 1914, but they had at least adopted a “national cachet”.156 The final 
cultural characteristic without which nationalism could not emerge is “a conception of 
temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the 
world and of men essentially identical”.157  
In pre-modern societies, people perceived of time as “a simultaneity of past 
and future in an instantaneous present”.158 It was impossible to conceive of history as 
the past, and the present as the making of history. In modern societies, however, 
Anderson argues that ‘simultaneity’ has adopted a meaning of “‘homogeneous, empty 
time’ […] marked by temporal coincidence and measured by clock and calendar”.159 
Anderson gives two examples in which a newspaper and a novel are to be considered 
the two major forms of imagining in the eighteenth century Europe. When reading a 
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novel, or a newspaper, the reader does not see what is described, but rather he pictures 
it in his mind. Moreover, they both allow the conception of different acts being 
carried out by different actors at exactly the same time. Consider, for example, a 
newspaper, which bears a date and a set of news. A reader can see that certain acts 
will take place in different places, by different actors but at the same time, or day for 
this purpose. But the reader can be sure they happened although he never witnessed 
them. Consequently, a man will most probably never meet all of his co-nationals. “He 
has no idea what they are up to at any time. But he has complete confidence in their 
steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity”.160 It must be underlined at this point that 
for Anderson no single fatality of those described above can be a pre-condition for the 
emergence of nationalism. Rather, it is the interconnection between the three that 
allows for nationalist discourses to surface. For Anderson, the French revolution 
would not have had such an impact if it was not put on a piece of paper and be read by 
millions of people. Only then did it transform into a ‘concept’ and a ‘model’.161
Yet, scholars have criticised Anderson for having concentrated excessively on 
print-capitalism and language. Smith, for example, argues that there is a variety of 
media through which a people can identify with their co-nationals.162 On the other 
hand, language as the sole criterion of the existence of a nation leaves little room for 
ethnicity, religion and/or race to play a role in the genesis of a nation. In a similar 
point, Kellas notes that it is not necessarily the case that nationalism will replace 
religion.163 In fact, there are many examples where religion and nationalism went 
hand-in-hand in establishing and delineating the nation. Nonetheless, Anderson’s 
analysis is considered as an exemplary work of the modernist approach in the field of 
nationalism and one, which, along with that of Gellner and Hobsbawm, has 
contributed greatly in the understanding of the rise of nationalism. 
In a similar approach, Bhabha dissects the idea and notional projection of 
nation and argues that the otherness and its perceptions are very significant for the 
way in which we perceive ourselves, or the nation.164 His post-colonial approach was 
a critique of the way in which the nation (indeed, any nation) was perceived to have 
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been continually existed since the beginning of time – a “linear narrative of the 
nation” as Bhabha calls it.165 That is reflected in the colonial practice of dividing (or 
grouping) populations and branding them “nations” in a way that totally failed to 
reflect any cultural homogeneity between them. Bhabha employs the notion of 
mimicry to contextualise the colonisers’ wish to assimilate the natives to their culture, 
but without necessarily integrating them fully. “Colonial mimicry is the desire for a 
reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but 
not quite”.166 Consequentially, this desire gives rise to a hybrid culture which consists 
of cultural elements of both the colonisers and the colonised. Hybridity, in effect, “is a 
problematic of colonial representation and individuation that reverses the effects of 
the colonialist disavowal, so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant 
discourse and estrange the basis of its authority”.167  
When the colonised will demand their right to self-determination, according to 
Bhabha, hybridity will play an important role in the construction of their national 
identity. For instance, the very means by which national identity will be established 
and/or spread will invariably be the same as those of the colonisers, namely historicist 
literature. The present construction of the past in order to serve the purposes of a 
narrative of a nation, for Bhabha, manifests the liminality of the nation. The following 
quote explains the same point but with reverse logic: 
The transnational dimension of cultural transformation - migration, diaspora, 
displacement, relocation - makes the process of cultural translation a complex form of 
signification. The natural(ized), unifying discourse of nation, peoples, or authentic folk 
tradition, those embedded myths of culture’s particularity, cannot be readily referenced. 
The great, though unsettling, advantage of this position is that it makes you increasingly aware of 
the construction of culture and the invention of tradition.168
 
By depriving the narratives of the nation from historicism, Bhabha argues, the nation 
is transformed from “being the symbol of modernity into […] the symptom of an 
ethnography of the ‘contemporary’ within culture”,169 and only then can we perceive 
of its narrative constructing the ‘people’ through the “repetition and pulsation of the 
national sign”.170
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While Bhabha himself states early in DissemiNation that he is more interested 
into the workings of culture than those of nationalism, his approach constituted a 
critique and a challenge for scholars of nationalism to re-examine the phenomenon 
considering the post-colonialist findings. Anthony D. Smith’s research moves along 
those lines of inter-marrying a modernist approach with an explanation that takes into 
consideration past proto-nationalist phases.171 In fact, he recognises that to regard 
nationalism as exclusively modern, with no links to the past, is a common anomaly 
found in most modernist theories. Smith, although he concedes that nationalism is an 
essentially recent historical phenomenon, he underlines that it is impossible for 
nationalism to emerge if there are no foundations upon which to built a nationalist 
doctrine. It is what he calls la longue durée, the examination of origins and formation 
of nations over long periods of time and has termed his approach as ethno-symbolism. 
Nationalism is a historical phenomenon, not only because it emerged at a particular 
historic moment and has been established over long period of time, but also because it 
projects myths, symbols, and shared memories that were born in the distant past. 
Smith identifies three ways in which nationalist doctrines connect the past with the 
present and the future. The first is recurrence, which indicates the existence of a pre-
modern cultural identity that resembles, but is not identical to, the current or modern 
identity of the group in question. If certain key identifying components of an ethnic 
identity can be traced back to generations and can still be observable today, however, 
then the ethnic past is linked to the nationalist present through continuity. Finally, 
appropriation of the past is another way in which the present, and certainly the future, 
can be linked to the glorious past. Smith refers to the historicist attempts of nationalist 
intelligentsia to invent ‘their’ ethnic past.  
Smith looks at nations and ethnic communities, to which he refers as ethnies, 
as two different entities. The distinction seems to draw on the analogy between 
civic/ethnic nationalism, since “nations are defined by the historic territory they 
occupy and by their mass public culture and common laws”, whereas ethnie are 
defined by their ancestry myths and historical memories”.172 His purpose was to 
demonstrate that there was some kind of national continuity observable in certain 
ethnies, which were then used as the foundation for the creation of the nation. Ethnies 
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came about by the shared experiences, myths, symbols and memories of several 
generations of cohabiting populations. It is these myths and symbols that indicate the 
distinctiveness of each group and it is precisely because of the memories, the 
traditions and the culture that lead to ethnic persistence and mobilisation. In other 
cases, for example the Swiss, the geographical environment might also be depicted in 
the ethnic identity. 
Smith identifies two patterns of nation formation, that is, the evolution and 
transformation of ethnies into nations that depend on the type of ethnies. The first 
type of ethnie is a “lateral” or aristocratic whereas the second is “vertical” or demotic. 
Aristocratic ethnies are usually separated from the lower social strata and interaction 
between the two is scarce. They are often the constructors of the nation-state in which 
they constitute the ethnic core. By establishing a centralised and bureaucratic state 
and a mass public education system, they incorporate adjacent populations to the 
culture and territory of that state. The second type of ethnie corresponds to 
nationalism’s cultural type and reflects the historicist attempts of an indigenous 
intelligentsia to fabricate and appropriate, for political purposes, “the vernacular 
cultures of the lower strata and through the vernacular mobilisation of these strata 
attempts to rouse them to political action so as to create ethnic nations”.173 Like other 
modernists, Smith has identified certain themes that are repeated in all nationalist 
ideologies. These are: 
 
“1 the world is naturally divided into nations, each of which has its peculiar character 
and destiny; 
 2 the nation is the source of all political power and loyalty to it overrides all other 
loyalties; 
 3 if they wish to be free, and to realise themselves, men must identify with and belong 
to a nation; 
 4 global freedom and peace are functions of the liberation and security of all nations; 
 5 nations can only be liberated and fulfilled in their own sovereign states”.174  
 
Both arguments of the content of nationalist ideology and the distinct types of 
ethnies are recurrent in the modernist paradigm and, therefore, there is nothing new in 
Smith’s theory about it. What is path breaking, and also ethno-symbolism’s major 
contribution in the field, however, is that it identifies one’s primordial feelings for his 
nation as generated not by nationalism but by the power of the symbols the nation 
                                                 
173 Ibid., p. 72; emphasis in the original. 
174 Smith, 1998, op.cit., p. 187. 
 70
carries and projects. As an example, Smith looks at the European Union and notes its 
incapability to transcend the modern nations and evolve distinctly and separately.175 
The reason for this weakness, for Smith, is the lack of symbols and myths that will 
generate such feelings. The situation becomes even worse if one thinks that Europe’s 
past cannot offer shared experiences other than wars and national antagonisms, even 
long after the European Union was born. 
Smith’s theory is the most inclusive of all and it offers significant insights for 
the approach of a study on nationalism. Smith has recognised that the most important 
question to be answered by ethno-symbolists is to prove the historical links between 
the pre-modern identities and the modern nations. But it is a theory that encompasses 
the insights provided by many scholars so far, and through a useful critique and/or 
reassessment, it accounts for the passion that nationalist phenomena stir and the 
political games that accompany them.  
 
Definitions of the concepts 
Taking into consideration the above formulations and findings of the scholars, 
this section will attempt to define the concepts that will be used throughout the text. 
As it has been noted above, many commentators distinguish between ethnicity and 
nationality, between ethnic group and nation. Yet, the terminological chaos has 
ensured that many of the concepts are not aligned with their meaning. Therefore, 
while there might be stateless nations like the Kurds and the Palestinians, the term 
‘national identity’ is often used as a synonym to ‘citizenship’, denoting the 
geographic place and the cultural background of the state of which the individual is a 
citizen. Instead, the term ‘ethnic identity’ is used to describe members of nations 
residing in a state other than the one of their own, for example Algerian immigrants 
living in France. In the Basque case, similarly, everyone speaks of the Basque 
ethnicity but there is only one nationality to speak of, the Spanish, even though the 
vast majority of Basques, moderate and/or extremists, feel as a nation.  
It is therefore appropriate to provide the definitions of the concepts that will be 
used in this thesis and evaluate whether they could lead to a more sophisticated 
understanding of the concepts used in this field. An ethnic group, thus, is defined as 
the association of a group of people that share certain cultural characteristics, 
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experiences and memories, and the perception that they are all of common descent. 
These characteristics are unique and they are the factors that ascertain the 
distinctiveness of the group from other groups. This definition can be applicable to 
most ethnic groups, because it does not take into consideration the status of 
territoriality and, consequently, it omits any questions with regards to the sovereignty 
over the specified territory. To include these parameters in a definition of ethnic 
groups, one would have automatically assumed that every ethnic group’s objective is 
to reach independence and self-sovereignty. Yet this claim would have been 
misleading, if one takes into account the vast communities of immigrants in west 
European societies currently.  
On the other hand, including only the issue of territoriality without taking into 
consideration that of sovereignty, one is led to a formulation of the definition of a 
nation: the association of a group of people that occupy a specific territory and share 
certain cultural characteristics, experiences and memories, and the perception that 
they are all of common descent. These characteristics are unique and along with their 
geographic location they are the factors that ascertain the distinctiveness of the group 
from other groups. This definition is applicable to sovereign as well as stateless 
nations. The Basques, for example, would qualify under this classification, as would 
the Kurds and the Palestinians.  
The confusion that arises from the interaction of the concepts of ‘state’, 
‘nation’ and ‘ethnic’ is self-evident. This is because most states are currently multi-
national nation-states, what I define as an association of the people of one or more 
ethnic groups, possessing common cultural characteristics, shared experiences and 
memories, common citizenship rights, and occupying a unified, sovereign territory. 
The concepts of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘statehood’, however, are key in defining 
nationalism per se. In a Bhabhian framework, the argument would be that in the eye 
of stateless nationalists, a fulfilled nation is not only territorially defined but sovereign 
as well – that is, they are all after the very thing it is they oppose. Stateless 
nationalisms, like the Basques, will always drive towards more self-determination, 
either in a democratic or a violent fashion, primarily because the violence which they 
faced from the State because of their cultural difference, has galvanised the very 
concept of their difference (vis-à-vis the “others”) in their cultural identity. State-
nationalisms, on the other hand, will also be driven by power, and direct it either 
against internal enemies that undermine the national identity and cohesion – as was 
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the case in Franco’s Spain – or against both internal and external, as was the case with 
Nazi Germany.  
However, this thesis does not concentrate on instances where state-
nationalisms have generated inter-state conflicts. Rather, the reference to Franco 
implies that the Basque nationalism might as well be a reaction to the policies and 
tactics of state-nationalism, something that, as a general cause of irredentism, is well 
accounted for in the literature. This project will utilise Smith’s definition of 
nationalism, which sees it as “an ideological movement for the attainment and 
maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of 
whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation”.176 The Basque 
nationalist movement is bound together by the same elements that form the nation, 
that is, the cultural characteristics, boundaries and relationships. This formulation of 
the definition makes explicit the political focus of the movement, and does not 
distinguish between ethnic or civic forms of nationalism. As explained by Levinger 
and Lytle, nationalist rhetoric operates in a triadic structure that uses the past in order 
to conquer the future.177  
This thesis argues that no nationalism is ‘good’ or ‘bad’.178 Neither does it 
purport that all stateless nationalisms lead to violence. Rather, the Basque case makes 
evident the need for contextualisation of the study of nationalism. Had it not been for 
the heavy-handed policies of the Francoist regime against the Basques, and the strong 
historicist literature which served as the basis for the rebirth of the Basque nation, 
perhaps the scenario would have been different.179 The popular reaction to the 
persistence of violence, however, indicates that there is a prioritisation in the human 
and social needs of a very large sector of the Basque population. Namely, the 
importance of peace in parallel with the development of the national culture and 
identity, or, to a greater extent, a nationalist project. The message sent from such a 
stance is that nationalist ideology can exist without becoming a synonymous of 
terrorist practices. Basque civil society has recently risen to reject any political 
representations that purport to exist in its name, and has repeatedly taken a stance 
against violence. Yet, the mass rejection of violence was not a decision that was part 
                                                 
176 Anthony D. Smith, 1983. Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed., London: Duckworth, p. 171. 
177 Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Little, 2001. “Myth and Mobilisation: the triadic structure of 
nationalist rhetoric”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 175-194. 
178 Alter, 1994, op.cit. 
179 Franco was never as aggressive towards the Catalans partly because Catalan culture was more 
pervasive, at the time, than the Basque in the Basque country. See Conversi, 1997, op.cit.  
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of a greater dichotomy, that is, the elimination of violence does not necessarily imply 
the abandonment of the original target of the nationalist project: incremental 
autonomy – which entails political negotiations – that will lead to independence. 
While nationalism is presented as something artificially (even artfully) constructed, 
and despite the fact that it has been deconstructed so as to be understood properly, the 
great mass for which it claims to exist, the ‘people’, are more often than not absent 
from the action. What the Basque case shows is that, under specific circumstances, the 
people can decide for themselves and impose on their representatives, elected or self-
appointed, a strategy for the development of the nationalist project. In order to make 
the correlations between violence and nationalist ideology evident in the Basque case, 
the following chapter analyses theories of political violence and how terrorism came 
to be understood and explained academically.  
 
  
 
 74
CHAPTER 3 
 
Theories of Terrorism: 
Critical Approaches to Violence 
 
 
 
This chapter examines theories of terrorism and looks at the different 
problems that surround the study of the subject. It will examine the typologies of 
political violence and the typology of terrorism as presented in the literature. It will 
offer a historical overview of the academic efforts to theorise terrorism, and it will list 
those factors that scholars have identified as possible causes of terrorism. The 
principal aim of this chapter is to critically assess orthodox theories of terrorism,1 the 
majority of which was brought forward during the Cold War and, as such, exhibits a 
rigid theoretical framework which considers violent actions against the State to be 
illegitimate, without necessarily and always seeking for the roots of said violence. 
Particularly in cases where the violent opposition takes place against a liberal 
democratic state, the majority of the early literature uncritically sides with the state 
anti-terrorist discourse, even if the state itself has failed to deal with the claims of the 
opposing group. This means that by terming them “terrorists”, academia does not only 
adopt a term but also its implications on the illegitimacy of that group’s claims. 
Moreover, in ethno-nationalist terrorism, there has been many a debate as to the 
legitimacy claims of the terrorists, giving rise to the proverbial “one man’s terrorist is 
another’s freedom fighter”. “The means become the end” is another phrase often used 
to describe the irrationality of terrorist actors, implying that the acts of violence are 
void of symbolisms, meaning and, therefore, context.  
However, this thesis proposes that terrorism as an activity cannot exist, or be 
studied, secluded and isolated from its socio-political environment, which implies that 
the study of terrorism can be contextualised.2 The fact that terrorism is more effective 
in liberal democratic settings should not automatically imply that liberal democracies 
                                                 
1 Jason Franks, 2006. Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
p. 3. See also, Jenny Hocking, 1984. “Orthodox theories of terrorism: The power of politicised 
terminology”, Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 103-110. 
2 Martha Crenshaw, 1995. Terrorism in Context, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
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do not violate human rights. The extra-judicial anti-terrorist killings during the 
Socialist party’s office in mid-1980s reversed the falling rates of ETA’s popularity 
among the Basque population, and helped resurface the feeling that Spanish 
discrimination against the Basques did not end along with the dictatorship.3 Orthodox 
terrorism theories do not move beyond the unidimensional focus that is the State and 
its integrity, primarily because of the Westphalian discourse that surrounds States and 
statehood, and hence fail to account for conflicts generated by, or including, issues of 
identity and representation.4  
 
Typology of Political Violence 
The majority of the scholars in the field are keen to underscore the differences 
between terrorism and political violence, and to correct the mistake that terrorism 
equals political violence automatically. Wilkinson argues that the term ‘political 
violence’ should be perceived of as an umbrella notion that includes many a different 
manifestation of violence for political ends.5 He offers two typologies of political 
violence, one based on the number of participants – mass or small group political 
violence – and the escalation of intensities, and another founded on the type and 
purposes of those who promote, support or simply utilise political violence. The 
former includes riots, rebellions, revolutions and war, as far as mass political violence 
is concerned, and everything from isolated attacks on property to guerrilla warfare, 
domestic or international, for the small group political violence. The second typology, 
that concerns the aims of each genre of political violence, includes nine different 
types that range from inter-communal violence, to violence with revolutionary 
objectives.6
Many of the forms of political violence may create fear and terror but that type 
of fear cannot be compared to that provoked by terrorism. When a riot takes place, for 
example, it might lead to clashes with police, other groups or property damage. But 
this is not the same type of violence used by terrorism, nor the same type of fear 
                                                 
3 Daniele Conversi, 1996. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist 
Mobilisation, London: Hurst & Co, pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. The Basques: The 
Franco Years and Beyond, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. The Triumph of 
Democracy in Spain, London: Methuen. 
4 Andrew Silke, 2001. “The devil you know: continuing problems with research on terrorism”, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 1-14. See also Oliver Richmond, 2003. 
“Realising hegemony? Symbolic terrorism and the roots of conflict”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.289-309. 
5 Paul Wilkinson, 1983. Terrorism and the Liberal State, Basingstoke; London: MacMillan. 
6 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
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provoked by terrorism. Thackrah7  observes that the confusion of the meaning of 
terrorism with that of rebellion, civil strife, insurrection and other forms of political 
violence “inflates the statistics” and “makes understanding the specific character of 
terrorism and how to cope with it more difficult”.8 Quinton shares this view and 
argues that riot must be distinguished from terrorism, because the levels of violence 
are usually limited to property damages.9 Revolution is also different from terrorism 
in that violence is not a necessary ingredient for one to take place. What differentiates 
terrorism from other forms of violence, argues Quinton, is that the victims are 
“passive means to the realisation of ends which they are themselves in no position to 
promote”.10 Rubenstein (1987) on the other hand, asserts violence is inherent in 
terrorism because of terrorism’s objective, which is to create a mass movement;11 
“whereas guerrilla war, sabotage, or assassination may simply represent a choice of 
weapons by the mass movement”.12 This is also the view put forward by Wilkinson, 
who locates the differentiating factor between terrorism and other forms of political 
violence to be the systematic use of violence or threat of violence by terrorists. 
 
Theorising Terrorism 
Even though the concept of terrorism is relatively new, the phenomenon is not. 
The world’s first terrorists, according to Wardlaw, were the Assassins, a religious sect 
who had developed a “doctrine that justified the murder of their religious and political 
opponents”.13 However, the use of terror in politics is located in time by many authors 
in the era of the French Revolution. O’Sullivan identifies the diffusion of three major 
assumptions that emerged during and after the Revolution to be the basis of the 
emergence of terrorism.14 The first is the assumption that the restructuring of a 
degenerated society was possible. Radical change of society is one of the primary 
objectives of today’s terrorists. Second, there is the assumption that humans are 
inherently good. Evil is generated in society “and may therefore be removed from the 
                                                 
7 Richard Thackrah, 1989. “Terrorism: a definitional problem” in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart 
(eds.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, pp. 24-41. 
8 Ibid., p. 25. 
9 Anthony Quinton, 1990. “Reflections on violence and terrorism” in Martin Warner and Roger Crisp 
(eds.), Terrorism, Protest and Power, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
10 Ibid., p. 38. 
11 Richard Rubenstein, 1987. Alchemists of the Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World, London: 
I.B. Tauris. 
12 Ibid., p. 194. 
13 Grant Wardlaw, 1990 (2nd ed.). Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18. 
14 Noel O’ Sullivan (ed.), 1986. Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
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world by making the appropriate social changes”.15 This transformed politics into a 
religion and the new mission was to awake the people, to show them that they need to 
be liberated and indicate to them the group responsible for the evils of their society. 
Marxism, Nazism, and anti-colonialists all resorted to the above discourse and 
terrorists are no exception. Third, for O’Sullivan, was the influence of the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, namely the principle of sovereignty. Its impact 
on the emergence of nationalist and liberation movements, the anti-colonial struggles 
and the increased calls for self-determination has been highlighted in the previous 
chapter. Hoffman on the other hand, draws parallels between modern day terrorism 
and Robespierre’s régime de la terreur.16 It too was organised, systematic and 
espoused the belief that terror and violence would bring about a regenerated society.  
The Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will), however, has attracted more attention 
by scholars because its members openly expressed the belief that violence can 
constitute the wake-up call for the masses and initiate the revolution. The group 
consisted of young students who attacked the Czarist regime long before the Russian 
Revolution, and whose idea was that although their actions do not constitute a 
revolution, they are its precursor.17 Most prominent among them was Sergey 
Nechayev. Nechayev himself had written that the aim of their violence is to provoke 
such an aggravation to the people that it will lead to a popular uprising.18 Almost a 
century later, Carlos Marighela, a member of the Brazilian urban guerrilla, promoted 
this idea of spiral violence, arguing that the actions of the Brazilian government will 
exhaust the people and turn them into supporters of the guerrilla movement.19 For 
Marighela, the role of the urban guerrilla was only supportive to the use of rural 
guerrilla.20 In other words, he recognised that use of terrorism only was insufficient 
for the revolution. An opinion that is also shared by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who also 
highlights that depending solely on terrorism would endanger the course and 
significance of the revolution, since it endangers the lives of too many people that 
could have been part of the revolution.21
A philosopher contemporary to Guevara and Marighela is Jean-Paul Sartre, 
who is considered to be one of the most passionate advocates of violence. In his 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 7. 
16 Bruce Hoffman, 1998. Inside Terrorism, London: Victor Gollancz, pp. 15-17. 
17 Rubenstein, 1987, op.cit., p. 30. 
18 Nechayev, quoted in Rubenstein, op.cit., p. 98. 
19 Carlos Marighela, 1971. “Minimanual of the Revolution” in Robert Moss, Urban Guerrilla Warfare, 
London: Institute of Strategic Studies, p. 28. 
20 Ibid., p. 20. 
21 Che Guevara, in Wilkinson, 1986, op.cit., p. 59. 
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works, the depiction of the world resembles that of Hobbes’. Notions like ‘love’, 
‘sympathy’, ‘affection’, and ‘compassion’ have no place in humanity, for the human 
species is purely antagonistic and everyone’s life depends on someone else’s death. 
For Sartre, as for Hobbes, the state was brought together by fear and terror and, 
ultimately, it is these two that hold it together. When man is confronted with violence, 
it is violence he should reply with, for it is cleansing and cathartic. “It is man 
recreating himself”.22   
Franz Fanon moves along the same line, recognising that political violence 
liberates its practioners from psychological manipulation.23 Fanon’s work centres on 
the anti-colonial struggles of the second half of the twentieth century. His theory 
holds that colonialist oppression took place because of the feelings of inferiority of 
the native populations. By resorting to violence, the natives declare their will for 
independence and at the same time affirm the existence of their community vis-à-vis 
the oppressor(s). State violence, in Fanon’s theory, is an indispensable ingredient in 
spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population, instigating 
them to fight back.24
The previous chapter has stressed the importance of anti-colonial struggles in 
Africa and Asia and the Marxist revolutions attempted at Latin America, and the 
significance both phenomena had for the development of similar movements in 
Europe. The aforementioned ideas of the philosophers of urban guerrilla and the 
theoreticians of terrorism have been echoed in the strategies, rhetoric, and 
identification of many organisations that appeared later in time. Technological 
advance and the spread of the Internet has contributed to the dissemination of these 
ideas and has facilitated knowledge on how to construct bombs made from ordinary 
and readily available materials (as was the case, for example, with the Unabomber). 
The statement that the amateur terrorist can now be just as destructive as his 
professional counterpart25 is increasingly verified in the last decade or so.  
 
Typology of Terrorism 
As with ‘nationalism’ and other essentially contested concepts, there is an 
overwhelming disagreement on the field as to the precise definition of the term 
                                                 
22 Jean Paul Sartre, 1967. Preface to Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Harmondsworth: 
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23 Rubenstein, op.cit., p. 100. 
24 Daniele Conversi, 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, London: Hurst and Co., p. 244. 
25 Hoffman, op.cit., p. 203. 
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‘terrorism’. The number of definitions virtually equals that of the number of scholars 
who have written on the subject and the levels of oscillation are great. Indicative of 
the terminological chaos is the study carried out by Schmid and his collaborators, 
who, in the second edition of their research guide to terrorism, still did not manage to 
encounter one common definition.26 The result was 109 different formulations that 
were, supposedly, defining the same ‘thing’.  
As desperate as the situation might look on the theoretical level, there have 
been certain characteristics that most commentators highlight in their studies. 
Evidently, such characteristics would be the unpredictability of the terrorist attacks, 
the arbitrary nature of the violence, the fear and terror that it instils and its magnitude 
and duration. Every terrorist act is conducted against a hated political economy27 and 
it aims at a social and/or political change. At once, it manifests the grievances of the 
group that carried the attack and it attempts to disclose the weak side of the incumbent 
authority. Thus, every terrorist act is politically motivated. The political aim and the 
symbolism inherent in every terrorist act are the factors that differentiate it from 
common criminal acts. As Hoffman argues criminal violence does not affect a large 
audience nor does it convey a long-term intention to terrorise.28 Along these lines, it 
must also be noted that every terrorist act consists of two targets: the target of 
violence, that is the victim itself, and the target of terror, which involves a greater 
group of people, whether of the same social and/or professional status as the victim 
(say, a politician or a member of the security forces) or the population in general. 
Berry (ibid.) also argues that the reactions of the target of terror are the ones that pose 
the greatest threat to a liberal democratic country faced with terrorism.  
Although the magnitude of terrorist actions is overwhelming and tends to 
attract comments concerning the sanity of the perpetrators, most commentators warn 
that it is a grave mistake to view terrorists as maniacs, lunatics, or psychopaths of 
some form or another. Their actions require some form of organisation, the level of 
which is critical for the ‘success’ of the operations. Contrary to the psychopath’s 
violence, which can often be unjustified, there is always a cause lying behind every 
terrorist act. In fact, “the terrorist […] seeks to persuade us of the reasonableness of 
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his acts, fantastical as they may sometime seem”.29 Perhaps, then, it is their 
motivation that should be examined in order to identify and assess possible injustice 
and grievances. 
Before engaging in a discussion of authors and the issues they have 
highlighted as important in the study of terrorism, it must be noted here that the 
terrorism of the state is of equal importance for the field as that of small groups that 
defy the state. State terrorism usually indicates the support a state gives to terrorist 
activities elsewhere, if that is found to be in its interests. This support involves 
funding of activities, facilitation in the acquisition of military equipment – if not 
direct concession of it –, training, and any other action that would augment the 
strength of the organisation. State terrorism, however, should also indicate the degree 
to which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes use terror and force in order to 
suppress opposition and thus maintain the current political and social status quo. This 
is what Reinares terms “vigilant terrorism”.30 Philosophically, it is difficult to see 
how one can separate the notion of ‘terror’ form the very nature of such regimes, 
since fear and destruction are measures universally applied by the world’s dictators. 
Notwithstanding, theory would dictate that state-terrorism and liberal democracies 
don’t go hand-in-hand, despite the many instances in which liberal democratic 
countries have utilised terror outside their borders and when in their interests to do so. 
The Cold War – which was pretty ‘hot’, as it were, elsewhere – and the anti-colonial 
struggles of the 1960s and 1970s have proved just that.  
State terrorism is central in the Basque conflict not least because it accounts 
for the emergence of terrorism in the 1960s as a response to Franco’s oppression. 
However, there has been one very critical instance during the mid-1980s, when the 
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL), an extra-judicial anti-terrorist branch 
formed during the Socialist Party’s government, executed Basque individuals inside 
French territory that served well to the aims of the nationalist movement and its 
extremist wings. Considering that the high cadres (including a former Minister of 
Interior) that were found responsible have served or are still serving prison, it is a case 
that is now closed. Its repercussions, however, were more important and as such must 
be analysed in the light of a nationalist-separatist organisation that acts within the 
borders of a liberal democratic country, where, allegedly, the use of extreme or 
indiscriminate violence from the part of the state cannot even be conceived of.  
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Exploring the general purpose of terrorism, Wardlaw underlines the 
importance of fear and anxiety. The unpredictability of danger is the most 
psychologically damaging factor, since it leads to a break-down of social normality 
and it upsets the social structure (1990: 35).31 But, as studies from World War II air 
raids have shown, violence might have adversary results on the targeted audience. 
Instead of inciting political action, regular and/or successive terrorist attacks might 
numb the senses of the public. Wardlaw defines terrorism as  
“the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or 
in opposition to the established authority, when such action is designed to create 
extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate 
victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands 
of the perpetrators”.32
 
Wardlaw notes that provocation of terror might not be the sole purpose of 
terrorism. Rather, there have been specific terrorist actions whose aim was to secure 
material gains (ransom) or political concessions (release of prisoners). Publicity is 
another objective terrorists are after, since any terrorist attack is guaranteed to attract 
the attention wished for by the terrorist. It is widely recognised that the media play an 
important role in the indirect ‘advertising’ of the terrorists’ cause by covering their 
actions. Wardlaw examines the role of the media and cites numerous examples that 
have played on the hands of the terrorists, mainly due to the disobedience of 
journalists towards the advice given to them by those handling the situation. He 
stresses that the media often magnify the effects and consequences of terrorism. The 
result is that “it is our reactions to terrorism which may constitute the primary danger, 
not terrorism itself”.33 In Spain’s case, both the GAL scandal and the negative 
predisposition of the centre-right governments of Jose Maria Aznar in the 1990s to 
any form of negotiations (either with nationalist parties or ETA itself), contributed 
further to the prolongation of terrorism, precisely because the political will to 
understand the problem was not present.34 Notwithstanding, Wardlaw notes the 
internal situation of the group must also be examined, for an attack may take place to 
build the morale or vanquish the doubts of the rest of the members.35
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Phillips, on the other hand, explicitly claims that defining terrorism is not such 
a daunting task.36 “Terrorism is the direct attack upon innocent people with the 
intention of radically altering some political or social situation”.37 The difficulty that 
academics, journalists and politicians have faced, Phillips argues, lied in defining 
terrorism in such a way that it would be an “appropriate description of the activities of 
our opponents but not of our own”.38 In a similar spirit, he rejects the claim that the 
terrorists aim at destabilising the state.39 It has never happened despite the triumphs 
that terrorists have marked over the past years. There are two reasons for this: first, 
fear and terror targeting the public but directed against the state, tend to drive the 
public more towards the state’s arms; second, it is war on the cheap. Even where 
assassination is employed as a tactic, Phillips argues that it is morally risky since it 
entails a subjective judgement about the victim that may or may not be true. For 
Phillips, assassinations could be justified in times and places of extreme oppression, 
but this claim has no validity in a democratic state.40
For Phillips, terrorism is directly linked with three large philosophical ideas 
that emerged in the last three centuries: popular sovereignty, self-determination and 
ethical consequentialism. The principle of popular sovereignty claims that the people 
should be the state, each armed with a vote and, thus, a share in political power. 
Therefore, Phillips asks, is not the people’s responsibility to defend the state and bear 
any attacks upon it? Although no answer so far has been satisfactory enough, the 
claim that there are no innocents still forms part of terrorist rhetoric. The same can be 
said about the principle of self-determination. It is a flawed concept, argues Phillips, 
formulated in such a way that it could be claimed by innumerable religious or ethnic 
groups.41 But then, the question that arises is which group is entitled to self-
determination, in other words, who are the people, and who decides whether they are 
entitled to this status. Furthermore, ethical consequentialism is also of cardinal 
importance in the way terrorism is perceived. Phillips argues how the Western 
cultures are an amalgam of Classical and Christian culture. The point where the two 
meet is that “good life involves strict adherence to moral principles”.42 Justice and 
virtue – or rather, being good –, for example, is of paramount importance to both the 
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ancient philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The 
Just War Theory is only an example of the foundations of western cultures. 
Consequentialism, on the other hand, surfaced with Machiavelli, who, was the first to 
‘bend the rules’, as it were, laid by the Classics and the Christians. His theory was that 
the end justifies the means. While the Prince should always adhere to the good, there 
would always be instances where some good had to be sacrificed in order for the state 
to be saved.43 By the nineteenth century, this came to imply that moral rules are 
breakable, if good will be maximised by such defiance.  
Taking into account the lethal consequences of terrorist strikes, it would be 
logical for one to draw a parallel between terrorism and war, in much the same way 
one compares a region where crime is rife with another experiencing war. In fact, 
certain commentators have termed terrorism ‘war on the cheap’.44 In reality, however, 
this is a claim that comes from the terrorists themselves, who often present themselves 
as freedom fighters, defenders of democracy, and other similar notions denoting 
virtue and nobility, hence, the well-worn cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter”. Terror, as has been observed by many a commentator, is a 
subjective procedure. Instances of violence, like the once employed by the Mafia, are 
not considered to be terrorist acts, although they do aim at inciting terror and fear. 
George upholds the above statement and argues that “it is possible to fight for 
freedom by means other than terror and to employ terror in pursuit of other ends than 
freedom”.45 But, he argues, it is pointless to attempt to explain the difference between 
the two by a means/end dichotomy. The only insights it can offer is that freedom 
fighters will restrict their violence towards non-innocent targets and limit it solely to 
the attainment of freedom, whereas in terrorism’s case both principles are ignored.46  
A better way of understanding the distinction between freedom fighters and 
terrorists is by looking at the selection of targets, whether they are legitimate or 
illegitimate. The just war theory, which will be explored further below, distinguishes 
them by considering combatants as legitimate targets and non-combatants/civilians as 
illegitimate. As noted above, freedom fighters will point their violence towards 
combatant targets and they themselves will constitute legitimate targets for their 
enemy. Terrorists usually act in the opposite way. Moreover, terrorists usually operate 
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in peacetime, “so there are no combatants (and hence no non-combatants) to 
attack”.47  
Wilkinson also rejects the claim that terrorists operating in a liberal 
democratic setting are or can be seen as ‘freedom fighters’.48 Rather than fighting for 
freedom in its democratic sense, they are seeking  
 
“their own freedom to use the gun and the bomb in an effort to impose their own 
petty minority tyranny on the majority, because they have been forced to recognise 
that they cannot win the support for their ideas through the ballot box”.49
 
Wilkinson distinguishes four types of terrorism.50 The criminal makes constant use of 
terror for material gains. The psychic terrorism aims for mystical or religious ends. 
War terrorism aims at the annihilation of the opponent. And, finally, political 
terrorism is identified as the systematic use or threat of violence to achieve political 
goals. The latter genre of terrorism differs from war terrorism, as Wilkinson explains, 
in that it seeks to control, rather than annihilate the opponent. Wilkinson usefully 
distinguishes between political terror and political terrorism. The former refers to an 
isolated act or a series of random acts that are neither organised nor systematic.51 On 
the contrary, political terrorism “is a sustained policy involving the waging of 
organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction or by a small 
group of individuals”.52 It requires some form of organisational structure and “some 
kind of theory or ideology of terror”.53
Wilkinson divides political terrorism into three distinct categories: 
revolutionary, whereby violence is the precursor to the revolution; sub-revolutionary, 
where small groups utilise violence “for purposes short of revolutionary seizure of 
power”;54 and repressive, indicating the use of terror by states in order to suppress 
opposition movements. For Wilkinson, just like for most of the earlier theorists of 
urban guerrilla and political violence, terrorism is a method used by guerrillas and as 
such it cannot be said with certainty that it will evolve into full-scale revolution. 
Whether it will do so depends on a number of factors, for example its capacity to gain 
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popular support, its capacity to maintain access to warfare material and the counter-
terrorist policies of the state attacked.55
 
Causes of Terrorism 
Issues and problem with the study of terrorism are not exclusive to definition. 
The community also lacks a solid theoretical background on which to base its 
assumptions on what causes terrorism, or even if causes matter. There has been an 
array of inter-disciplinary approaches to the study of terrorism, including, 
psychological, sociological, economical and rational choice explanations. However, 
they all seem to be inadequate in one way or another, primarily because they attempt 
to isolate the phenomenon of violence from its very origin.  
Rubenstein, for example, looks at the issue of terrorism from its revolutionary 
side. He asserts that terrorism is a form of political communication. If the world of 
politics is one of “promises and excuses, equivocation and lies, only violence is 
unambiguous and trustworthy”.56 Use of that type of violence, Rubenstein argues, has 
been, and still is, the use of the anarcho-communist intelligentsia. Radical members of 
the intelligentsia who cannot find support from a party or other institution are more 
probable to make the leap and adopt the language of violence.  
Intellectuals who believe themselves to be minds in search of bodies, they see 
in the masses a body in search of a mind.57 When the masses fail to mobilise in 
support of the terrorists, the means become the ends. The radicals see themselves as 
the only ones responsible to fulfil the deed.58 The difference between the anarcho-
communist and the nationalist intelligentsias, for Rubenstein, is that the former breaks 
up its ties with both the upper and the lower classes, whereas the latter already 
disposes of an audience. This view is also shared by Wilkinson who considers the 
anarcho-communists, or “ideological” terrorists as he names them, to be “more 
analogous to tiny gangs of bandits than to serious political movements”.59 The socio-
economic stagnation and instability that followed the period of growth in Europe and 
Latin America in the late 1960s and early1970s had left many of the middle-classes 
and the intelligentsia aggravated.60 This was the case in Italy with the emergence of 
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the Red Brigades after the Historic Compromise between the Communists and the 
Christian democrats, and in Germany after the Communist party was banned.  
However, Rubenstein’s findings do not explain why the intelligentsia is prone 
to violence. as we will see in greater depth in the chapters that follow, the Basque case 
was not characterised by socio-economic stagnation. The Basque nationalist 
intelligentsia did adopt the Marxist discourse appropriate to the era but the economic 
goals of the entire movement were always second to the importance of independence. 
Considering that the Basque region was and is the motor of the Spanish economy, 
along with Catalonia’s industry, Rubenstein’s theory seems slightly misfit. While the 
mechanisms he identifies in the emergence of terrorism are observed in the Basque 
country (intelligentsia, use of violence as a means of communication), his variable of 
socio-economic stagnation is absent. As with Hechter’s nationalism, Rubenstein’s 
approach is not echoed in the Basque case.  
Psychological approaches to terrorism have contributed significant insights to 
the study of terrorism, although some findings are too narrow to be taken into account 
in theory formulations. Wardlaw, for instance, recognises cases where the motivation 
for the terrorists was “based on the thrills of terrorism and destruction for 
destruction’s sake”.61 The above statement rather makes things hazier and prompts 
the question, “if violence takes place for fun is it not a-political, therefore not 
terrorist?” The answer to the question is provided by Quinton, who claims that  
 
“a member of a politically motivated group who takes part merely because he likes 
killing people or blowing things up is still a terrorist, because his violent action is part 
of the declared and, for the most part sincerely, politically motivated violent activity of 
the group”.62
 
Crenshaw, on the other hand, analyses the psychology of terrorism from the 
point of view of strategic choice.63 Those who take up arms, usually do so because 
they desire a “radical” change in the status quo or they attempt to prevent one from 
happening. Usually, but not exclusively, these changes are linked to socio-economic 
privileges.64 The decision to resort to violence could be the last in a sequence of 
choices and it normally reflects the weakness of the organisations to confront the 
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enemy, that is, the state.65 Interestingly, Crenshaw does not refer to the strategic 
importance of the organisations’ small numbers. Rather, she assumes lack of popular 
support which can be attributed to a number of reasons – Crenshaw points to failed 
mobilisation, the cause’s lack of appeal to the majority and fear of retaliation, if in a 
repressive state.66 Time, writes Crenshaw, is equally important to the development of 
terrorist strategies and tactics. A moment of weakness for the state, for example, 
might be perceived by the terrorist as the perfect opportunity to strike. 
For Crenshaw, the costs of terrorism are clearly outnumbered by the 
advantages. While it will most often attract punitive reaction by the state, it has “an 
extremely useful agenda-setting function”.67 A terrorist strike will not only provoke 
fear but will also bring the original cause to the forefront of public life. “The 
government can reject but not ignore an opposition’s demands”.68 If the strategy 
followed is one of indiscriminate violence, the terrorist risks losing, rather than 
attracting, popular support. But their violence may be intended as a preliminary step 
to revolution. Terrorist violence shows that the regime is not all-powerful and, as 
such, it inspires resistance. Linked to the above, is the strategy of spiral violence, 
whereby a terrorist strike is supposed to attract the repression – preferably mass and 
indiscriminate – of the state’s security forces, which will push more people into the 
ranks of the organisation. The advantages are obvious but, as Crenshaw notes, they 
depend heavily on the “lengths to which the government is willing to go in order to 
contain disorder, and on the population’s tolerance for both insecurity and 
repression”.69  
Another psychological approach is that of Bandura, who focuses on the 
mechanisms that allow moral reactions to disengage from inhumane conduct, 
especially those mechanisms used by the terrorists to either operate or recruit.70 These 
processes take place gradually and the subjects might not be aware of the 
transformation.  ‘Cognitive reconstrual’, for example, is useful in presenting as 
honourable that which is wrongful.71 “Adversaries sanctify their own militant actions 
but condemn those of their antagonists as barbarity masquerading behind a mask of 
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outrageous moral reasoning”.72 The use of language, and particularly the use of 
codified language, is also of importance for Bandura. “Soldiers “waste” people rather 
than kill them, […] bombing attacks become “clean, surgical strikes”, […] and the 
civilians they kill are linguistically converted to “collateral damage””.73 Equally 
significant is what Bandura calls the advantageous comparison, whereby a killing 
might even seem negligible when compared to genocides. “Cognitive restructuring of 
behaviour through moral justifications and palliative characterisations is the most 
effective psychological mechanism for promoting destructive conduct”.74 Another 
mechanism is the replacement of responsibility, whereby the terrorists do not 
recognise their acts as a consequence of their will but, rather, as a consequence of the 
grievance that others have caused upon them. Dehumanisation is one more 
mechanism common to all humans and not only among the terrorists. As Bandura 
explains, punitive conduct is more easily justified and accepted by people if it is 
directed against someone deprived of his humanness. On the contrary, when such 
conduct is directed against people depicted in humanised terms, such conduct is more 
often rejected.75 Interestingly, Bandura concludes that, historically, dehumanisation 
was more a result of conducive social conditions, than that of the plans of monstrous 
minds.76
Several of the insights that Crenshaw and Bandura note in their studies are 
useful and in many cases hold to be true. Yet it fails to explain how terrorist, rather 
than political, violence becomes a strategic choice, particularly when such choice is 
mounted against a liberal democratic state. Is the wish for a radical change so 
common in so many individuals, that it drives all of them to murderous acts? 
Similarly, Bandura identifies the symbolism inherent in terrorist organisations and 
reminiscent of the ethno-symbolic model of nationalism, but he concedes that social 
standards and constructions may have some influence as to what degree is violence 
accepted. In the Basque case, the society has been rejecting any violence that has been 
used in its name for the last 15 to 20 years. What is more, Bandura’s approach cannot 
explain the participation in ETA of descendants of Spanish immigrants, or other 
individuals who did not experience the barbarity of the Francoist regime or the anti-
terrorist consequences of the GAL of the mid 1980s.  
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Ehud Sprinzak puts forward the argument that group psychology can also be 
useful in explaining ideological terrorism.77 Sprinzak’s study, focusing on the 
Weathermen case of the late 1960s and early 1970s, shows how group identity 
gradually takes over the members’ personal identity. Sprinzak argues there are three 
psycho-political stages of transformation, the first of which is a crisis of confidence.  
It “involves an angry critique of the established authorities or rulers from the very 
ideological assumptions on which the regime itself is founded”.78 The group will 
confront the establishment ideologically, that is with protests, demonstrations and 
disobedience. The second stage is conflict of legitimacy, the point where the group 
becomes radicalised, in that its dissatisfaction with the establishment expands to 
include the system.79 The fight against the ruler is insufficient because the system is 
also dysfunctional, thus, a better system altogether is the goal. The next step is the 
development of an ideology of delegitimation that will lead to a rupture with the 
current political establishment. This is the moment when the opposing group becomes 
more radicalised, something that is reflected in the group’s political actions, language 
and rhetoric. The final stage is that of the crisis of legitimacy, and it involves further 
radicalisation of the group’s members, to the extent that every individual associated 
with the political order is considered not only guilty, but also becomes dehumanised 
and depersonalised in the eyes of the terrorists. A process that Sprinzak considers 
necessary if the terrorists are to become “morally disengaged”.80 The moral 
manifestation of this psycho-political stage is revolution while the political 
manifestation is strategic terrorism. Sprinzak accepts that most radicals stay well 
behind the line that separates the second level from the third. Those that do, consider 
themselves the true avant guarde and look down on the other radicals, what Sprinzak 
calls the rearguard. But, he argues, without the latter it would be virtually impossible 
for the terrorists to exist politically as well as operationally. Sprinzak’s theory seems 
self perpetuating, and not allowing scope for explanations of the many instances 
where terrorists have become politicians (like in N. Ireland, Cyprus, Kosovo and 
elsewhere) or that have taken an active role in advocating the benefits of a ceasefire 
(as in the Basque Country). That process alone should be considered as one indicator 
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to the fact that using political violence as a language is only a circumstantial option 
and therefore it cannot be isolated and studied separately from those conditions.  
Gurr on the other hand, offers what could be termed a ‘corrected’ version of 
Sprinzak’s theory of delegitimation.81 He asserts that the political context in which 
terrorism surfaces in a liberal democratic country always follows one of two paths: 
radicalisation and reaction. The former refers to the dissatisfaction of some of the 
group’s members with the failure of the movement to achieve the goal. Similarly to 
Sprinzak’s theory, these individuals intensify their efforts for the common goal and 
look for greater impact in their actions. Reaction, on the other hand, denotes a process 
where the group’s members resort to terrorism “in response to threatening social 
change or intervention by authorities”.82 Gurr usefully notes that in many cases, 
including those of the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, the two seem to 
intermingle. But, insofar as theory is concerned, Gurr notes that it is insufficient to 
look at the terrorists alone in order to produce a theory. In his view, one must also 
examine the relationship between the terrorists and the public, especially in a 
democratic setting. Indicative of the importance of the above statement is the erosion 
that most terrorist organisations suffer after a period of time.  
Gurr highlights three processes by which the organisation’s support base 
decreases. The first, backlash, indicates the instances where terrorist activities 
alienate, rather than attract the public, as was the case in Quebec. However, lack of 
popular support towards violence does not presuppose a similar lack of popular 
support for the cause. A second process of erosion is caused by reforms, that is, 
government policies oriented towards alleviating some of the group’s grievances. 
When the relationship between the group and the political establishment has entered 
the phase, political violence may in fact hamper, rather than speed, any policy of 
concessions or any process of negotiation. Finally, the political establishments should 
always focus on deterrence, whether it is traditional law-enforcement techniques or 
special counter-terrorist policies – like the Italian example of incentives to defect. 
Nonetheless, governments should be wary of the use of deterrent measures, since they 
are closely linked with the degree of popular support the organisation counts with. 
Where an organisation is known to enjoy support, strong anti-terrorist initiatives will 
be counter-productive.  
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From the sociological point of view, Michel Wieviorka’s study is considered 
to be one of the seminal works in the field.83 Wieviorka views terrorism as the 
product of a social anti-movement. Social movements, argues the author, are 
characterised by three principles: identity, opposition and totality. A social 
antimovement begins by inverting these principles into one. The principle of identity 
ceases to make reference to some social entity and instead focuses on a mythic or 
abstract entity. The principle of opposition, in turn, no longer focuses on adversaries 
and antagonists but rather on enemies. And lastly, the principle of totality moves 
further away from future objectives and plans, and instead focuses on the present and 
how that present can be destroyed.84  
Terrorism as a social phenomenon exhibits the same symptoms, only that in 
this case they are far more aggravated and fused into one, rather than inverted. The 
principle of identity becomes so narrow that is impossible for the terrorist to define 
himself without referring to his cause. It is the stage where the terrorist proclaims 
himself to be the vanguard of a degenerated society. The principle of opposition 
becomes even more blurred than in social antimovements, and the enemy can now be 
located on everything that pertains to the opposite group. Consequentially, the 
principle of totality does not refer to a new society or a new structure that would 
alleviate the present grievances, rather it concentrates on how to demolish the present 
structure and bring down the incumbent authorities.85 Nonetheless, Wieviorka is 
quick in pointing out that, although there is a great deal of commonalities between 
terrorism and social anti-movement, the two are significantly different. One such 
difference is that the formation of an antimovement does not imply the adoption of 
violence as a strategy. And even if it does, it cannot be termed terrorist violence. It 
only becomes such when an armed group, in the absence of any direct or concrete 
relationship to a communal reference group, declares itself to be the latter’s 
spokesperson.86
Intellectuals are of great importance to the terrorist organisations because they 
can drive a group of people into political violence or deter them. In the first case it 
will be the radicals who do not conform to the ideas of more moderate intellectuals 
calling for negotiations and compromises. Wieviorka underscores the necessity of an 
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ideological base for every terrorist organisation. However, and taking into 
consideration the above processes, the ideology expressed by a terrorist organisation 
is almost never that advocated by the movement that the organisation claims to 
represent.  
 
“In every case in which a terrorist initiative has been launched, it has always entailed a 
disengagement from and a reversal, on the part of its militants, of their position with 
regard to the intellectual matrix from which they had proceeded prior to moving from 
non-violent resistance to armed confrontation, or from limited violence to all-out 
terrorism”.87
 
An obvious example to the above statement is the Marxist and Leninst ideologies that 
have been misinterpreted by the leftist movements of the 1960s.  
As Wilkinson has argued, the lack of a grand-theory in terrorism studies 
certainly hampers the efforts to understand as well as explain the phenomenon.88 It is 
not certain to what extent a grand-theory is what the field is lacking, but the 
interdisciplinary approach that is currently emerging should not be viewed as 
threatening to the quest for an understanding. Partial theories might be just as useful 
in the theoretical fulfilment of the field. No matter how promising such an approach 
looks, however, lack of coordination between the academic community and the 
existence of hidden agendas within it might indeed leave us with nothing more than 
bits and pieces of a phenomenon, which might turn out to be far clearer and easier to 
grasp than it was thought of. 
In fact, as I have argued in the beginning of this chapter, what the field of 
terrorism lacks is contextualisation. Looking at terrorism into its proper notional and 
physical surroundings, allows us to see the contributions of the different theories. 
Groom’s is one such theory that allows for the contextualisation of terrorism and 
allows for an explanation as to why violence should become an option.89 It points to 
relative deprivation90 or status disequilibrium. The deprived, that is those that are 
struck directly by structural violence, will challenge authority when it is not 
distributed equally. “Authority without coercion can only be sustained on the basis of 
a continuously renewed consensus”.91 One more cause identified by Groom is the 
unrealised demand for social change. If problems that gravely affect the socio-
                                                 
87 Ibid., p. 32; original emphasis. 
88 Paul Wilkinson, 15 October 2003. Inaugural Lecture of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and 
Political Violence, University of St Andrews. 
89 A.J.R. Groom, 1978. “Coming to terms with terrorism”, British Journal of International Studies, 
Vol. 4, pp. 62-77. 
90 Ted Robert Gurr, 1970. Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
91 Ibid., p. 65. 
 93
political system have been identified and indicated to the incumbent leadership but the 
latter’s reaction remains minimal, this inaction might give rise to, among others, 
challenges of authority and to the growth of perceptions of relative deprivation.92  
Yet, correct as the identification of the cause may be by Groom, it cannot 
account for the emergence and sustainability of terrorist practices in a liberal 
democratic state, where, theoretically, there are institutionalised means for the 
citizenry to deal with its government. In the Basque case, for example, Groom’s 
theory can almost identify the reasons as to why political violence emerged, yet it 
fails to explain why its most dramatic phase was once democracy was established, and 
why does it persist to our days. Perhaps he fails to take into consideration the fact 
democracy’s majoritarian rule can be a tyranny for the interest of a permanent 
minority, like, for instance, the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland.93 It is at this 
point that Crenshaw’s strategic choice theories are useful and have already been 
accounted for by former ETA members.94 The radical change in the status quo that 
Crenshaw and Sprinzak and other authors have identified, in the Basque case is 
nationalism. Detaching the practices of the Basque extremists from the totality of 
historical and socio-political circumstances hampers the analysis of the very 
phenomenon and impedes us from obtaining useful conclusions that can be used 
elsewhere. 
 
Terrorism and the Law 
The claim that the terrorists’ struggle is nothing short of war has been 
analysed by many commentators, especially from the field of political philosophy and 
international law. Prominent among those analyses is the employment of Just war 
theories and models, the medieval doctrine that determines the permissibility to 
engage to war and which was developed by moral theologians, principally St 
Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. Just war theory divides the conditions to engage 
to war into two sets: the jus ad bellum, the permissibility to go to war, and the jus in 
bello, what is right in war. Both sets consist of further conditions which must be met 
for the permissibility to be guaranteed. Briefly, for the first set, those conditions are a 
just cause, a right intention, a legitimate authority, a formal declaration of war and the 
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use of war as a last resort.95 Jus in bello, on the other hand, requires non-combatant 
immunity, a dogma protected until today by international treaties and agreements. The 
two sets of conditions have also given birth to two different strands of theory, the 
punitive and defensive.96 The first sees ad bellum as punishment of a wrong and in 
bello as the correction of a wrong. The second strand of Just War theory understands 
ad bellum as a prevention of wrong and in bello as the furthest point required to repel 
a wrong doer. 
Gilbert examines the phenomenon of terrorism in the context of Just War 
theory. He is sharp to point out although the public uses the theories to refute terrorist 
claims, it is those very theories that are evoked by terrorists in order to justify their 
choice of targets. In this context, Gilbert attempts to explain the targeting of innocent 
people. According to the punitive branch of the just war theories, “many not engaged 
in war itself may be regarded as legitimate targets because they are engaged in 
activity that furthers an injustice”.97 Examples can be a builder who was killed by the 
IRA because he was contributing to the activities of the British Army;98 where 
terrorists operate in liberal democracies, particularly with mass-killing violence, their 
argument is that there are no innocents.99 The public participates by voting its 
representatives and thus contributes to the injustice, whether it is real or perceived to 
be real by the terrorists. On the other hand, the defensive theory regards as legitimate 
targets those who can be termed as ‘combatants’, and the loss of one’s life as a 
necessary step for the preservation of someone else’s life is unacceptable (what 
Gilbert calls the double effect of the principle of discrimination) 
Terrorists are waging a kind of war, which, evidently, lacks the jus ad bellum. 
That is precisely, as Gilbert claims, what makes them terrorists rather than freedom 
fighters.100 Gilbert likens terrorism to tyrannicide and draws a specific analogy 
between tyrannicide and revolutionary terrorism. Utilising the just war theory as his 
guide, Gilbert claims that it is not always distinguishable whether revolutionary 
terrorists have always a just cause. Rather, “if the punitive theory can provide a 
justification for war then its application to terrorism would be the more convincing 
the more closely the internal situation resembles that of external aggression”.101  
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Another criticism Gilbert explores regards the terrorists’ lack of proper 
authority. According to the just war theory, war is a form of public killing and needs 
to be supervised and exercised by public authorities. As Hoffman indicates “the 
absence of any existing, publicly identified central command authority is significant 
in that it may remove previous inhibitions on the terrorists’ desire to inflict 
widespread, indiscriminate casualties”.102 But in order to find an answer to the 
question whether that removes the just cause for the terrorist group, one needs to 
examine which of the groups that claim to be fighting for the people really do so. And 
since one of the most basic terrorist tactics is to maintain a low profile by making 
themselves indistinguishable from ordinary civilians, thus putting everyone else’s life 
in danger, it is not very convincing that the terrorist struggle is in the people’s 
interests. In fact, Gilbert claims, guerrilla warriors only pose a threat to the population 
when pretending to be civilians whilst fighting. But even then, Gilbert continues, the 
level of risk for the population depends not on the presence of guerrilla fighters but by 
the ability of the state’s security forces to distinguish them from proper civilians.103
Furthermore, Gilbert refutes the argument that terrorists cannot wage war 
during peacetime by pointing at the nature of the terrorist groups. Their attacks can be 
seen as the first steps towards a war. Therefore, even when the terrorists are using the 
population as a shield, it does not suffice to show that they are not engaged in war.104 
Equally, terrorists are not acting outside the law. War is governed by international 
law, which, in turn, consists of agreements made between the states and thus it rules 
an activity that, usually, takes place between states. Insurgents, however, almost 
certainly will not possess a state of their own and therefore the conflict will be an 
internal one. The situations where an internal conflict becomes international, as set 
out briefly by Gilbert, are rare. What is important, however, is that the state is in a 
position to call the shots. “Simply by declining to [resort to military force] the state 
can prevent recognition under international law that terrorists are engaged in 
warfare”.105  
This has been the practice so far as international institutions are concerned. 
Many of the forms terrorism has adopted are sub-state. International law, however, 
concerns practices among states, and the religiously preserved Westphalian dogma of 
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non-intervention has made it difficult for other states to intervene unless their help is 
explicitly asked for. Terrorism is viewed as an ‘evil thing’ that must be combated, and 
that was the view long before September 11, 2001. In regards to that, it seems ironic, 
as Cassesse notes, that even when the aspirations of some terrorist organisations are 
endorsed and even legitimised by the international community, “the means used to 
assert these aspirations are condemned with great firmness by the majority of 
states”.106 The Palestinians and the Kurds are just two such cases. The United Nations 
has yet to reach and apply a resolute definition of what constitutes terrorism. A 
breakthrough came in 1994 when it adopted a resolution that condemned terrorism in 
all its forms and called upon nations to combat it,107 while it has drafted more or less 
fifteen treaties and conventions on various forms of terrorism. However, because of 
the lack of a law-enforcing agency with regards to states, practice in the field of 
counter-terrorism rests upon the needs of the state, or, where there is more than one 
state involved, it is regulated by bi- or multilateral agreements of cooperation. 
On the other side of the ‘terrorism is war’ claim lays the statement that 
terrorism is nothing more than crime, especially in a liberal democratic setting. It is 
the “preferred practice of Western governments”,108 namely that terrorists are treated 
as mere criminals, only with a political motive. Gilbert has elaborated substantially on 
this model, which “locates the criminal character of terrorism outside of its political 
motivation”.109 If it did otherwise, the state would have automatically given reason to 
the terrorists’ cause and/or claims. Gilbert, however, notes that the state’s denial often 
“underscores rather than denies [the terrorists’] warlike aims”.110 As an example 
Gilbert shows that states treat condemned terrorists quite differently from other 
criminals: they are tried by special courts and might serve their punishment in special 
facilities. The political crime model is inapplicable in liberal democracies because “in 
such societies there is no justification for pursuing political ends by other means”.111
In an interesting analysis, Gilbert elaborates how terrorism’s criminal 
character emanates from the state’s dual responsibility to preserve security and civil 
order. In order for one to wage a war, one needs to surpass the limits of civil order. 
Terrorists do so by committing murder or material damages. The reasons why 
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violence becomes a choice for the terrorist are explained by Gilbert in juxtaposition 
with other ways of expressing one’s grievances to the state. Disobedience, protest, 
and conversion – to cite only a few – are all forms of political manifestation that 
enable one to communicate his complaint(s) to the state. The significance of non-
violence, however, lies in its contracting scenarios. “Those who are committed to it 
must accept the limitations they impose on what can be achieved thereby”.112 Those 
using violence do it to incite constitutional changes, social and, in our case, national. 
Gilbert explores the dynamics of revolutions from the left and the right, noting that, 
more often than not, nearly all revolutions claimed to have been in the interests of the 
people. But ‘the people’, for Gilbert, is at the very core of the problem because there 
is no agreement on who ‘the people’ are. Democratic procedures run out of inspiration 
when this stalemate is reached and that is why terrorism is likely to emerge in 
disputes involving national statehood.113 The idea of the ruling majority, which must 
hold in every liberal democracy, does not always constitute an effective solution for 
minorities, especially those that are characterised as ‘permanent’.114 And if majority 
rule is the case, then statehood will most probably be shaped according to the 
majority’s will. What Gilbert highlights is the majorities’ ability and capacity to 
determine the political organisation of a territory, leaving minorities outside. What 
voluntarism does not explain is who or what “determines from what population the 
majority should be drawn”.115
Just War theory is considered by orthodox terrorism theories to be a useful 
guide in determining the legitimacy of the terrorists’ claims. It is the tool that distorts 
the picture when liberal democracies find themselves fighting terrorists. Considering 
that the theory is a product of the Westphalian system of ideals, its utilisation as a 
standard of academic research when it comes to conflicts of identity and 
representation is inadequate. Not because every liberal democratic state is justly 
opposed to by terrorist with true grievances, but because certain cases like the 
Basques and the Northern Irish do. More importantly, Just War theory is primarily a 
doctrine that concerned practices among states and as such, it is relatively weak when 
applied to sub-state groups wishing to engage to war. 
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Counter-Terrorism 
Most of the authors dealing with the study of terrorism are keen to present lists 
of measures that are proved, or are thought, to be effective counter-terrorist policies. 
Most analyses of the kind clearly regard the use and application of such measures in 
liberal democratic countries faced with the threat of terrorism. Logically, if one was 
speaking about the threat of terrorism that totalitarian regimes face, one would find 
himself in a semantic dead-end, since these types of regimes themselves involve 
terroristic elements in their political behaviour. On the other hand, there have been 
studies based on statistical and comparative analyses, according to which terrorism 
and democracy usually go hand-in-hand.116 Terrorism has come to be seen as “a 
perversion of pluralism and democratic freedoms”.117 It is partly due to this and 
similar perceptions that the approach taken for the proposals of anti-terrorist measures 
has taken the form of ‘war’. Scholars, without necessarily having been correct in their 
hypotheses about or understanding of terrorism, seem to share the idea that terrorism 
is evil and must be combated at all costs. When it comes to this section the field 
resembles a medieval ‘witch-hunt’ that is not – or at least, should not be – proper in 
academic circles. Indicative of this approach is the study made by Cotler, who 
advocates that terrorism is an attack to the human rights principle and, unless the 
international, as well as domestic, law and counter-terrorist policies focus principally 
on the infringement of human rights by it, the battle against terrorism will be 
feeble.118 At no point does the author attempt to reflect, for example, on the 
possibility that the terrorist’s human rights were violated before he found refuge in the 
use of political violence. Albeit not an ubiquitous element, the early days of Basque 
terrorism attracted social support precisely because it was seen as a response to the 
lack of human rights from the part of the State. 
Wardlaw suggests no less than fifteen options governments have in their fight 
against terrorism.119 Stricter legal criteria and treatment for terrorists, creation of 
specialised anti-terrorist forces and increased control over the members of society are 
some of those choices – although, in regards with the latter, it must be noted that 
Wardlaw does stress the importance of the measures taken to be seen to be directed to 
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terrorists only. Quoting Bobrow,120 Wardlaw lists four policy models governments 
can adopt when handling terrorist situations: the domination model – the annihilation 
of terrorists is more important than the hostages; the contingent concession model – 
the fate of hostages is a consideration but still of secondary importance to the 
elimination of the terrorists; the ransom with entrapment model – where the aim is to 
deceive the terrorists into liberating the hostages but receive no ransom; and finally 
the ransom with eventual retribution model – where control of situation lies wholly on 
the hands of the terrorists and the only solution for the government is to accede to 
their demands.121
Considering the use of the military in an anti-terrorist policy scheme, Wardlaw 
warns against the difference of operability between the regular police and the army 
itself. The former is part of the civil life and its main concern is to uphold the law and 
protect the civilian population. The latter has its own internal code of behaviour, it is 
not as much a part of the public as the policeman is seen to be and it is subject to 
orders which it must obey if it is to function properly. Using the army to combat 
terrorism “implies an extremely serious threat which could easily be used by the 
terrorists to their own propaganda advantage”.122 Its presence in the situation denotes 
that less violent measures have failed.123  Furthermore, unless its presence is carefully 
controlled and fully justified, it might have the opposite effect of the one originally 
intended. Wardlaw points out that the creation of a ‘third force’ will offer a more 
appropriate and ‘balanced’ response to terrorism. It should be part of the civil police 
force – although not involved in routine police work –, it should be highly specialised 
in dealing with incidents like terrorism, and it should be “ready to respond in force at 
very short notice”.124
Wilkinson’s orthodox approach to combating terrorism consists of nine 
guidelines: 
 
1. Overreaction and general repression, which could destroy democracy far more 
rapidly and effectively than any campaign by a terrorist group, should be avoided. 
2. Underreaction – the failure to uphold the constitutional authority of the government 
and the law – will bring the threat of sliding into anarchy or the emergence of no-go 
areas dominated by terrorists, war lords, Mafia gangs and drug barons, and so should 
also be avoided. 
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3. The government and the security forces must at all times act within the law. If they 
fail to do this they will undermine their democratic legitimacy and public confidence 
in, and respect for, the police and the criminal justice system. 
4. The secret of winning the battle against terrorism in an open democratic society is 
winning the intelligence war: this will enable the security forces, using high-quality 
intelligence, to be proactive, thwarting terrorist conspiracies before they happen. 
5. The secret intelligence agencies and all the other institutions involved in combating 
terrorism must be firmly under the control of the elected government and fully 
accountable to it. 
6. If emergency laws are found to be needed in a particularly serious terrorist conflict 
the laws must be temporary, subject to frequent review by parliament, and subject to 
parliament’s approval before any renewal. 
7. There should be no concessions of special status for convicted terrorists: terrorists 
are not convicted for their beliefs but for committing crimes of a particularly 
atrocious nature and for violating the basic human rights of fellow citizens. 
8. Terrorist campaigns of propaganda and defamation must be fully countered: if they 
are not there is a danger that terrorists may achieve through their political 
manipulations what they have been unable to achieve by the bomb and the bullet. 
9. Despite, or perhaps because of, the dilemmas facing governments in hostage crises, 
governments should avoid granting major concessions to terrorists.125  
 
Wilkinson accepts that minor concessions might be a strategic and very 
convenient way for the governments to escape from terrorist threats. But it depends 
heavily on the number of innocents involved, the losses it will suffer due to the 
concessions and the degree to which the terrorists are ready to accept such an offer. It 
is generally thought, however, that successful terrorism depends on the reactions of 
the target. As Frankin puts it, “terrorism wins only if you respond to it in the way that 
the terrorists want you to; which means that its fate is in your hands and not in 
theirs”.126 Generally, as noted above, it is suggested that the state should avoid 
complying to terrorist demands because that could give rise to their beliefs that the 
state is indeed weaker and they might indeed achieve its break-down, if they can 
maintain or increase the levels of their campaign(s).  
This is an argument put forward by Pedahzur and Ranstorp, whose study seeks 
to explain the deficiency of the “war” and “criminal justice” models in counter-
terrorist policies.127 The authors identify certain grey areas in-between the two types 
of policy and advocate that a tertiary model can address these grey areas and be useful 
in identifying the pragmatic degree of threat posed by terrorist activities. Pedahzur 
and Ranstorp argue that the two models are insufficient because, although the war 
model is guided by well-defined principles and has clearly marked boundaries, the 
criminal justice model is considered to be quite elastic when it comes to dealing with 
terrorism. The special treatment that most terrorists receive when captured in a liberal 
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democracy, as was noted above, the greater powers allocated to the security forces, 
and the curtailment of certain fundamental liberal democratic principles, sometimes 
deemed as necessary for the protection of the state and the efficient combat of 
terrorism, are all an example of the above statement. This deficiency, the authors 
argue, can be countered with the use of an “expanded criminal justice” model that is 
situated between the other two, thus operating as a continuum between them, and 
makes the classification of terrorist policies, or any significant changes to it, easier to 
identify.128
Rich and diverse as the study on terrorism has been and still is, it has not 
managed to find the common ground necessary for satisfactory explanation and 
understanding. The reasons are many and situated in various levels and types of 
analysis, whether methodological, epistemological or other. For example, Gordon 
identifies a difference between terrorism and other, already established disciplines in 
academia.129 Whereas the latter have a closed scientific system that involves 
circulation of information from academic circles to the outside world, in the terrorism 
research community, the flow is reversed. Researchers, gather their data by sources 
external to the academic research. More often than not this is down to the difficulties 
inherent in such study, namely, the classification of documents by governments, the 
difficulty in speaking with the subjects of the study, etc. The following section 
addresses further and more precisely problems encountered in the study of terrorism 
and presents alternatives that have been claimed to solve some, if not all, of the field’s 
maladies.  
 
Problems in the Study of Terrorism 
Traditionally, as Jenkins argues, terrorists “find it unnecessary to kill many, as 
long as killing a few suffices for their purposes”.130 Indeed, until 1995 the number of 
terrorist incidents was falling steadily. However, the number of the victims in each 
terrorist incident was rising. This has been accepted by the scholars as an indication of 
the ‘new terrorism’ the international community would have to face. The Oklahoma 
city bombing, the poisoning of the Tokyo underground system and the incidents of 
September 11, 2001 verify at once these claims and the fact that traditional theories of 
terrorism have become obsolete and need to be reformulated and their ideas revisited.  
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Richmond exposes this view and argues for the study of terrorism not only by 
scholars of the terrorist field but also by students of conflict in general.131 Terrorism is 
after all a form of conflict, more concretely an asymmetric one. The asymmetry 
indicates not only the numerically weak side of the terrorists vis-à-vis the state 
apparatus, but also the advance of technology and the every-day activities that have 
facilitated the disguise and camouflage of the terrorists and, thus, have turned the 
scale in the latter’s favour. However, no matter what the impact of a terrorist incident 
or the degree of strengthening of the terrorist organisations, Richmond asserts that 
terrorists could never balance the asymmetry between them and the state. Thus, 
terrorism is not literally a war but it moves to a level beyond that of war. The 
symbolism inherent in every terrorist action transforms terrorism into a symbolic 
dispute of the legitimacy of the hegemon in the eyes of the terrorist’s as well as in the 
eyes of the hegemon’s audience.132 Because of the asymmetry then, the only option 
left to terrorists is the escalation of violence. The greater the impact, the greater the 
dispute of the legitimacy.133 This new form of terrorism has emerged as a 
phenomenon in the post-Cold War era, which, according to Richmond, is a 
manifestation of anti- and counter-hegemonic behaviour.  
However, Richmond’s analysis on the post-Cold War characteristics of the 
international system, and how they have contributed to the transformation of 
terrorism, provides insights on the examination of the role of other factors as well. It 
is not only the element of bipolarity missing from the post-Cold war era, and all the 
strategic advances that emanate from it – for example, knowledge of the opponent’s 
capabilities, symmetry of conflict, etc. Although it is a process and as such it requires 
large periods of time to operate and develop, it is with the fall of bipolarism that 
globalisation has transformed the world into a tiny village. The argument explained 
above, that the greater the terrorist strike is, the greater the dispute of the legitimacy, 
could thus be turned on its head. Never before did the terrorists dispose of such a 
large audience and never before were their actions so extensively covered, so fast. It 
could be argued, hence, that because they have attracted the whole planet’s attention, 
they are willing to mount more spectacular –and, therefore, deadlier – attacks, in order 
to provoke an impact similar in size with their audience.  
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On the other hand, one could argue that under a bipolar international system, the 
conditions were not ideal for carrying out attacks such as some of those that took 
place in the last decade. Although there were many incidents where terrorist attacks 
were mounted with the support of one superpower in order to undermine the strength 
of the other, no terrorist attacks took place that defied the joint capabilities of both 
superpowers. That could be either because the world was utterly absorbed by 
bipolarity and, as a result, nothing could be thought of outside that context; or because 
it was calculated as ‘mad’, irrational and senseless by a terrorist group to enrage both 
superpowers, offering them some common ground and the opportunity to co-operate 
in eliminating the mutual threat. A critique of this line of thought could be that two 
years after the declaration of ‘war on terror’ and the international backing and co-
operation it has received (which logically involves more resources than any two 
superpowers), the culprits are still on the run and no serious and tangible results have 
been achieved. However, the present ‘war on terror’ might not be a good counter-
argument, since it is claimed that it has assumed ends, values and objectives different 
from those it originally set out to defend. 
Another approach is proposed by Brannan, Esler and Strindberg, in which 
social identity theory has a prominent role.134 The authors ferociously attack the 
school of terrorism as obsolete and inherently inadequate to answer significant 
questions about terrorism. A very large part of the literature is based on secondary 
sources and, even where there may be opportunities for primary source investigations, 
the latter will be turned down. Therefore, most of the assumptions made about 
terrorism do not necessarily reflect much truth. This is one of the most fundamental 
reasons why the field has developed “an attitudinal predisposition and framework of 
analysis that has the researcher approaching her or his research subjects 
antagonistically, as a threat, with a view to facilitate its defeat”.135 This is, they argue, 
the reason why the terrorism studies community has come to see itself “as an adjunct 
of the agencies, an intellectual counterterrorist vanguard”.136 On the contrary, the 
approach proposed by the authors is derived from social identity theory, which is 
itself non-reductionist. Theories of social identity argue that membership of the group 
contributes to the individual’s identity, in that they offer a sense of belonging and 
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become part of the self-concept. The authors argue that no objectivity can be reached 
unless researchers realise the importance of first-hand experience for the outcome of 
credible conclusions. But even then, scholars must guard against the cultural gap 
between them and their research subjects, for it may hamper the entire effort. This 
means that the phenomenon in question should be situated “in its own particular 
cultural context” and that “the researcher’s own and different culture does not cause a 
misinterpretation of the persons and data under consideration”.137
It must be noted here that the problems accounted for by Esler and Strindberg 
are not new. Equal criticisms have been addressed by Ronald Crelinsten,138 nearly 
fifteen years before Esler and Strindberg’s study. Crelinsten too addresses the 
maladies of the subject that have resulted in a “skewed focus” from the part of the 
researcher, the “narrow conceptual frameworks utilised” and the “ahistorical, linear 
causal models which ignore the historical and comparative aspects of terrorism”.139 
Similarly, Andrew Silke140 has compared terrorism research with similar field of 
social science (forensic psychology and criminology) and has found that despite the 
similarities in the conduct of research between the three fields, the terrorism subject 
“exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally 
dubious”.141
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion that comes out of these critiques on the methodological and 
epistemological aspects of the study of terrorism is two-fold. Firstly, they indicate the 
inadequacy with which the subject has been approached and studied for during all 
these years. By inadequacy, I mean primarily in terms of contextualisation and lack of 
deeper understanding when it comes to recognising the reasons that lead to its 
conception and adoption as a vehicle of mobilisation and/or resistance. In the Basque 
case, the majority of the orthodox terrorism theory fails to go beyond the territorial 
boundaries and the claims that surround them and include a cultural perspective in its 
examination of the conflict. The history that surrounds the Basque ethnonationalist 
movement, and the elevation that it has received either in the form of historicism or in 
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the form of popular myth, is virtually irrelevant to the motivations of the terrorist and 
the achievement of his/her objectives. This highlights that in a world that is constantly 
under pressure to change, theories like those of terrorism cannot remain unchanged, 
since the phenomenon they study is itself subject to alterations and transformations.  
On the other hand, those same studies highlight the immense reserve of 
thought that lies in other disciplines, related and much closer to terrorism than 
originally thought, with significant insights for the resolution of key problems in the 
study of terrorism as a form of political violence. After all, a grand theory might not 
be readily available, or even necessary, as Wilkinson observed, but many small 
theories derived from inter-disciplinary approaches might help us steer the study of 
terrorism in a direction that is certainly more correct than the one it has so far 
followed. A direction, which, for Gordon has already been adopted and is leading 
towards “more structured research and greater conceptualisation”,142 thus turning the 
field into an established discipline.  
So far, however, we have only understood how the individuals behave once 
inside the organisation, what are their preferred strategies, ways of recruitment, and so 
on. Yet, what is it that makes the same thing, terrorism, accessible to such a variety of 
movements? As some of the works discussed above indicate, grievances that are 
related to basic material and cultural needs are the primary reason. The view of 
terrorism as only one method of conducting a war, even if it is on the cheap, or 
communicating political grievances to a central authority allows for an understanding 
of the phenomenon that is not parted from the greater environment in which terrorism 
emerged. Because, as the Basque case will show, nationalisms are not always bad or 
always good. They can be both civic and ethnic, at different stages of their 
development. This thesis concentrates on this very moment, whereby the primary 
identity of a social movement – in our case, a nationalist one – sees fit to utilise 
violence in order to promote its grander objectives, and not because violence per se is 
synonymous to all social movements. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Theories of Conflict Resolution:  
Root Causes and Human Needs. 
 
 
 
This chapter intends to outline the development of theories of conflict and 
conflict resolution. It intends to do so by focusing on the theoretical perspectives 
offered through the years, as well as by looking at the practical application of those 
theories by actors in the international arena – states, institutions like International 
Organisations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), leaders, etc. The 
aim of the chapter is to identify those theoretical frameworks that have been applied 
to ethnic conflicts around the globe, not dissimilar to those of the Basque Country, 
and to establish whether practice and theory have matured enough so as to be more 
functional when applied to the case study of this project. 
 
Early Days of Conflict Research 
The meaning of conflict has been explored in many different situations, 
ranging from the personal level, for example conflict in the workplace, to that of 
societies, for example war between states. As such, it has inherited a plethora of 
definitions, most of which focus on the goals and aspirations, the values and interests, 
and the needs of the parties involved. In the simplest way, conflict denotes an 
incompatibility of goals and values between two or more parties.1 That is the broadest 
generalisation that can be made out of different psychological, political and social 
approaches to the study of conflict. Conflict is, of course, as old as man himself, and 
the same can be said about the study of conflict, if one takes into account the legacies 
of Sun Tzu and Thucidydes. Conflict resolution, however, is very young. It sprang in 
the 1950s and began to establish towards the late 1960s. Many commentators refer to 
Mary Parker Follett as the pioneer of conflict resolution.2 Her work aimed at the 
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improvement of labour-management relations through the adoption of a mutual gains 
approach, contrary to the distributive approaches that took place until then and which 
led to confrontations.3 Hers, then, was the first study of behaviour during conflict and 
how it, and the values held by the parties, affected or transformed the conflict itself.  
Sociologists and psychologists were the first to establish research on conflict 
and come up with theories, which were to be later espoused by scholars of the 
International Relations field. The argument that aggression, a form of conflictive 
behaviour, presupposes the existence of frustration was formed as a psychological 
hypothesis.4 If certain goals that are perceived to be necessary for one’s existence are 
not met, the survival instinct prevails and humans adopt conflictive behaviours in 
order to achieve their goals. Sociologists, on the other hand, attributed a more positive 
role to conflict. Simmel viewed conflict as a mechanism that lets off tension between 
members of society.5 A mechanism, in other words, that brings members of the group 
closer, forces them to communicate the reasons of the friction and, thus, contributes to 
the group’s bonding. His view rested on the idea that the negative connotations of 
conflict in a society could be juxtaposed to the positive ones. That is, just as people 
need someone to whom they feel attracted to, they also need someone who they can 
hate, an object towards which they can direct their frustrations and ‘hostile impulses’.  
Based on Simmel’s work, Louis Coser observed that conflict “can occur only 
in the interaction between subject and object”6 and more often than not, it is the 
conflict’s purpose to preserve the interaction between the two.7 Conflicts are seen as 
either realistic or non-realistic, the former denoting conflicts that are directed towards 
the presumed frustrating object; non-realistic on the other hand, are those conflicts 
that “are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonists, but by the need for 
tension release of at least one [of the parties]”.8 Nonetheless, as Schmid argues, these 
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definitions and researches are very subjective to be accepted.9 The difference, as 
Galtung demonstrated,10 was that frustration is not only the consequence of another 
party’s actions; the system is often to blame for the emergence of conflicts. Galtung 
has described as ‘structural violence’ the situations in which the means to eliminate 
grievances exist but no action is taken against those very grievances.  
Galtung’s work was a breakthrough in that it took research on conflict one 
step further. The focus was not only on the actor’s objectively identified needs, goals, 
or objectives, but it accounted for the perceptions of the parties and how these 
perceptions influenced the conflict dynamics. Galtung came up with the idea that a 
conflict consists of three parts11 (also known as the ‘ABC triangle’ of conflict): the 
conflict attitudes of their parties – their perceptions and misperceptions for themselves 
and ‘the others’ – (A), the conflict behaviour of the parties (B) and the contradiction 
or conflict (C) that is characterised by an incompatibility of goals between the actors. 
The model can be applied to symmetric conflicts, as well as to asymmetric conflicts 
and it holds that conflict can erupt from any of the three corners: a hostile behaviour 
towards someone is likely to attract a hostile attitude by them, which in turn might 
lead to goal incompatibility; similarly, hostile attitudes – for example, ethnic 
superiority vis-á-vis the enemy – may generate hostile behaviour and goal 
incompatibilities between the two groups. Finally, if goal incompatibility emerges 
first, it is more likely to lead to hostile attitudes and behaviours. The disclosure of this 
set of conflict dynamics made Galtung speak of conflict transformation rather than 
merely resolution: “the parties need to be transformed so that the conflict is not 
reproduced forever”. 
Galtung’s research is not pioneering only because he was among the first to 
discern the cognitive and cultural aspects of conflict. His theory came as a solution to 
the problem that he himself identified in the research surrounding conflict and conflict 
resolution in particular. In 1964, in the Editorial of the first issue of the Journal of 
Peace Research, Galtung differentiated between two kinds of peace: the negative and 
the positive. The former implies nothing more than the freezing of the status quo, it 
brings about security by fomenting stability. In the simplest of words, it denotes the 
                                                 
9 Herman Schmid, 1968. “Peace Research and Politics”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 
217-232. Quote at p. 224. 
10 Johan Galtung, 1964. Editorial, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 1-4. 
11 Johan Galtung, 1996. Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation, 
Ohio: International Peace Research Institute, p. 72. 
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absence of war. Positive peace, on the other hand, is that which transcends the levels 
of merely managing the conflict and goes into practices and processes of resolution.12 
The picture that Galtung painted was to set the standard for the field to take on a new 
direction. The binary statement provided by Galtung proves very useful in describing 
the different approaches taken by scholars through the years in their attempt to 
understand, explain and intervene in conflicts.  
The easiest way to follow the developments in the field would be to offer a 
chronological description of the dominant theories. In essence, there are three 
distinctive phases in the evolution of peace and conflict thinking. The first is the 
traditional one and goes back to the rules and norms that emerged from the Treaty of 
Westphalia13, which ended the Hundred Years War. Its prevalence lasts until well into 
the Cold War, at which point it is incrementally challenged by more liberal 
approaches (Galtung’s being one of them) whose objective was not only to critique 
their predecessors, but rather to explore de novo the sources of conflict, its causes and 
multi-faceted manifestations, and to demonstrate that conflict, if dealt with 
constructively, can be transformed. This branch of theory, else known as the ‘human 
needs theory’, became quite popular towards the end of the Cold War and dominated 
the Post-Cold War academic circles. By the end of the 1990s, however, it too came 
under criticism and it was not long before it was challenged by a new generation of 
thinking. One, which seems to have been developed as a response to a fast-changing 
world, insofar as popular demands, values, ideologies, practices, norms and cultures 
are concerned. The following lines examine the above points through the literature of 
each period.  
 
Pre-Cold War and Cold War 
The Treaty of Westphalia signalled the end of the Hundred Years War. Its 
premises held that all states are equal, every state is sovereign and none is allowed to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another state. Although it concerned a very small 
part of the world and it was only an attempt to regulate (to an extent) the relations 
between the countries-parties to the agreement, the treaty’s legacy bequeathed the 
way the international system was to function for the next four hundred years. The 
                                                 
12 Galtung, 1964, op.cit., p. 2. 
13 Author unknown, The Treaty of Westphalia; October 24, 1648, The Avalon Project at Yale Law 
School, available online at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm, accessed on 10/02/2004. 
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principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were to be codified into the form of 
international law and become widely accepted by the majority of states. Westphalia 
was a pioneering move not only because it introduced two key concepts for the 
function of international relations but also because it showed the essence of 
diplomacy as understood even in our days, and that norms in the behaviour of states 
can be set, although these have to be accepted by all, or, better put by Cassese, “[o]nly 
when the interest of many States coincide can general legal standards - that is, 
standards applicable to all States – emerge”.14 The Congress of Vienna in 1815 
strengthened the view that the way in which a state deals with its internal conflicts is 
solely a matter for that state and that state only. Metternich of Austria went to great 
lengths to avert the sponsoring by British and Russians of Greek revolutionaries in 
their fight against the Ottoman rule, for fear that it will spark similar claims by 
minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and it will reinforce claims of 
independence by Italian principalities and duchies. But, it is precisely for this reason 
that the Congress was also seen as the first attempt to preserve peace through a co-
ordination of foreign policies, mutual consultations, the establishment of demilitarised 
zones15 and a distribution of power among the participants that would render 
aggression prohibitive.16 The Congress was substituted by the Concert of Europe 
(1830-1884), which provided the ground for debates between and deliberations 
among the foreign policy makers of that time. In 1899 and 1907, the Conferences of 
Hague were organised in order to elaborate laws of warfare recognised by the 
participant states. The innovation in this gathering was the participation of extra-
European countries, clearly indicating a growing will to take control of the conflicts 
springing around the globe.  
However, it was the impact of the First World War that proved to be the 
catalyst for a serious attempt to solidify such a controlling framework of international 
appeal and scope. The formation of the League of Nations, a precursor to our 
contemporary United Nations, was designed to achieve that specific goal. As Article 
10 of the League’s Covenant stressed, the goal was “to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all 
                                                 
14 Antonio Cassese, 2003. A Big Step Forward for International Justice, Crimes of War Project, 
available online at http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-cassese.html, accessed 30/03/2004. 
15 Gordon Craig and Alexander George, 1995. Force and statecraft : diplomatic problems of our time, 
New York : Oxford University Press. 
16 Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate, 1997. The United Nations and Changing World 
Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 22-23. 
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Members of the League”.17 Nonetheless, it was later seen as having been flawed from 
the very beginning of its inception, something that was also proved by the break out 
of the Second World War. For instance, the right to go to war was only restricted, 
rather than prohibited for the League’s members.18 On the other hand, it never 
managed to obtain the global membership it envisaged, as it lacked not only the 
necessary mechanisms to enforce decisions or even membership to the club itself, but 
also lacked the commitment of the then great powers to its ideals.19 Indicative of the 
League’s failure was the crisis that emerged with Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (both, 
members of the League at the time). The League’s decision to impose sanctions to 
Italy was not deemed to be an effective measure, as it excluded the prohibition of 
material vital for the conduct of war. Similarly, the arms embargo imposed on both 
sides was catastrophic for the Abyssinian army, that was after all much smaller, 
weaker and inexperienced than the Italian. Furthermore, the League was suffering 
from complex internal mechanisms that they themselves undermined its mission. The 
requirement of unanimity in its decision-making procedures made it hard for 
international pressing matters to be addressed properly and, more importantly, on 
time. And the lack of clarity between its two substitute parts, the Assembly and the 
Council, further impeded its establishment as a globally accepted actor. Although it 
was officially dissolved in 1946, the League became inactive prior to the hostilities of 
the Second World War. 
The post-war era saw the rebirth of the concept of the League of Nations into 
that of the United Nations. Traditional attitudes as to state sovereignty and non-
intervention continued to exist, only this time around the organisation was designed 
“to actively maintain peace around the world, to mobilise military might if necessary, 
to enforce international decisions and to shift from unanimous to majority voting”.20 
The views on state-centricity in the practice and conduct of international relations 
were also pre-eminent in the circles of scholars dealing with conflict and international 
politics. Early on, the study of conflict in the international sphere was dominated by 
                                                 
17 Author Unknown, The Covenant of the League of Nations, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/leagcov.htm#art10, accessed on 04/03/2004 
18 Weiss et al., op.cit., p. 25. 
19 The United States never joined the League despite the expectations that were raised by Wilson’s 
presidency. Japan began as a permanent member but left the organisation in 1932; similarly with Italy, 
leaving in 1937. Germany became a member in 1926 but left at 1933 and Russia joined in 1934 but 
was expelled after it invaded Finland in 1939. 
20 Weiss et al., op.cit., p. 29. 
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geopolitics. Stemming from the legacies of Westphalia and the, until then, established 
practices between states, the studies were focusing on the geographical position of the 
conflictive parties and the resources that that particular piece of land had to offer. 
Friedrich Ratzel supported that it is easier for states that occupy large territories to 
become dominant21 and his view was echoed in Halford Mackinder’s writings that 
“rule of the heart of the world’s greatest landmass could become the basis for world 
domination”.22 For Mackinder, the inner part of Eurasia (that is, Eastern Europe and 
North Asia) is the pivot area of international politics, due to its resources and its 
strategic place in the globe.23 This statement is better understood when put into the 
historical context in which Mackinder was referring to. Eurasia was standing right in 
the middle between the European powers of the time and some of their most 
important colonies in South East Asia (British India and Hong-Kong, French 
Indochina, Spanish Philippines etc). Furthermore, Russia and Eastern Europe in 
particular seemed to have been of particular strategic importance, if we take into 
consideration the numerous battles and the equally diverse powers (Austro-
Hungarians, French, Prussians and Ottomans, to name but a few) that went after the 
two regions. And of course one must not omit Napoleon’s and Hitler’s efforts to 
dominate in Europe’s biggest and only one country that is also part of Asian territory. 
However, as Cohen has observed, the geopolitical claims were based more on 
normative rather than empirical studies.24 It makes perfect sense to claim that big 
states will attempt to become dominant, whether globally or regionally, but that is not 
a sine qua non of international conflict. It is also true that there is no institution to 
prevent large states from expanding further, particularly through war, but that in itself 
is not the cause of war, as it will be explored below; rather, it should be designated as 
a permissive factor.  
This period immediately prior and during the Cold War is characterised by the 
establishment of the Realist school in the field of International Relations and, thus, its 
influence on statesmen and practitioners was to a certain extent unavoidable. The 
hypotheses that states feed only on power, and power is all they will ever need if they 
                                                 
21 Saul B. Cohen, 1999. “Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline,” 
in George J. Demko and William B. Wood (eds.), Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on 
the 21st Century, Oxford; Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 40–68. Quote at p. 51. 
22 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
23 Halford Mackinder, 1962. Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: W. W. Norton and Co, pp. 
268-278 
24 Cohen, 1999, op.cit., p. 55. 
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are to survive in a system which lacked the indispensable authority to set up accepted 
norms of behaviour for all and adjudicate in every dispute,25 hence itself a generator 
of conflict,26 did not leave much scope for original thinking to emerge, as far as 
conflict resolution is concerned. On the other hand, the fact that states were conceived 
of as the only actors in the international scene, or that they were unitary and rational 
in their international affairs, further complicated matters not only for the emergence 
of practices that would allow conflicts to be resolved, but also for the emergence of 
research that could grasp the idea that such a vision – the resolution of a conflict – is 
indeed possible. The principles of the Westphalian order can clearly be reflected in 
the realist view of international relations. Of course, the same can be said of the 
assumption that the national interest is the highest good27 and that states have no other 
option but to take great care of that interest, since the anarchical nature of the system 
itself compels them to do so.28  
 
…and the Practice 
During this period, international politics is dominated by one word: 
sovereignty. Since the Treaty of Westphalia, its respect was the norm; its violation 
would most probably carry a heavy penalty. States were the main protagonists in the 
international arena, every state was a nation, it was sovereign, and conflict (in the 
international context) was considered to be harmful only if it took place between 
states. Thus, if war between states was seemingly negatively affecting the security of 
neighbouring countries (as is the case with Cyprus and Turkey, or Lebanon and 
Israel), or that of the entire system of nations (as is currently the threat of ‘rogue 
states’ obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction), it was the states themselves that 
would run to the rescue. First and foremost, responsibility for the resolution of the 
conflict lied with the warring parties themselves. As the UN Charter states,  
 
“The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice”.29  
                                                 
25 Hans Morgenthau, 1960. Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf. 
26 Kenneth Waltz, 1979. Theory of International Politics, London; New York: McGraw-Hill. 
27 Morgenthau, op.cit. 
28 Waltz, op.cit. 
29 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI, Article 33. 
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 The settlement practices described above were usually undertaken by the UN 
but an equally important role was also played by regional agencies, like the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or the Organisation of 
African Union (OAU), and by individual countries willing to offer their services as 
mediators or negotiators to the warring parties. Definitions of mediation and 
negotiation face the same problem as that of ‘nationalism’, ‘terrorism’ and other 
essentially contested concepts discussed in this project: every study offers a different 
perspective. For instance, while some authors argue that mediation and negotiation 
should not be anything other than the mere facilitation of communication between the 
conflictive parties by a third party,30 others have called for a more active and 
involving role of the third party, where “leverage is the ticket to mediation”,31 while 
others have stressed that the mediator’s role is not as important as that of the 
conflictive parties.32 Certain attributes, however, have been identified as recurring to 
all mediation processes33: it is a form of negotiation, it is non-coercive and non 
violent and it is voluntary, in that the parties retain control over the outcome and, 
more often than not, over the process.34  
Although much ink has been spent on separate and in-depth analysis of the 
above named practices (for instance on techniques and methods of successful 
mediation and negotiation), they both seem to fall under the broader spectrum of 
peacekeeping efforts. Peacekeeping was another form in which international 
intervention materialised, and it aimed at detaining the levels of violence “by 
separating the belligerents as much as possible through the interposition of a military 
or police units”.35 These units were unarmed or lightly armed and would only use 
                                                 
30 Oran Young, 1967. The Intermediaries: Third Parties in international Crisis, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
31 Saadia Touval and William Zartman, 1989. “Mediation in International Conflicts” in Kenneth 
Kressel and Dean Pruitt (eds.), Mediation Research: the Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party 
Intervention, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 115-137. Quote at page 129. 
32 M., Ott, 1972. “Mediation as  a Method of Conflict Resolution”, International Organisation, Vol. 26, 
pp. 595-618. See also M. Harbottle, 1979. “The strategy of Third-Party Intervention in Conflict 
Situations”, International Journal, Vol. 35, pp. 118-131. 
33 Jacob Berkovitch, 1997. “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of 
Practice” in William Zartman and Louis Rasmussen (eds), Peacemaking in International Conflict: 
Methods and Techniques, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 125-113. Quote at pp. 127-
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34 Oliver Richmond, 1998. “Devious objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A 
Theoretical Framework”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 707-722. 
35 Stephen Ryan, 1990. “Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution”, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 54-71. Quote at p. 66. 
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force when their security was threatened. However, while these units would observe 
the freezing of the status quo, mediations and negotiations would run in parallel with 
peacekeeping operations in an attempt to promote a breakthrough that would lead to a 
kind of compromise between the parties. But, no matter how well combined these 
methods were, peacekeeping did not manage to escape from the notional, as well as 
operational restraints of conflict management. As the late UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Sergio Vieira de Mello noted, “peacekeeping has been perceived as an 
ad hoc response […] to contain fighting, prevent the resumption of hostilities and 
restore international peace and security”.36
Interventions made by the international community were very rarely based on 
its genuine wish to intervene. The norm of non-intervention did not only mean that 
internal conflicts were to be dealt exclusively by the state itself, but also that no 
intervention by outsiders could take place without the warring parties asking for it. 
Neither the UN nor any country that might have been willing to play a third-party’s 
role could enforce peace on the belligerents. They had to be ‘invited’.37 A common 
scenario for that period would see international intervention unrolling only after a 
ceasefire agreement was reached by the parties themselves, or by what scholars have 
termed a ‘ripe moment’ in the conflict38 (for example, one where both or all parties 
have been exhausted by the conflict and are not in a position to continue with their 
hostilities) that would allow for a successful intervention. The consent of the warring 
parties to such multinational efforts automatically granted the latter with the necessary 
legitimacy to intervene in the conflict. On the other hand, the very nature of these 
missions, that is, the fact that they were multi-national, or better put, comprised of 
individuals whose identity was ‘indifferent’ to the conflict dynamics, carried a sense 
of neutrality and impartiality. Furthermore, their military equipment was so minimal 
that it was quite difficult for the peacekeeping units to be perceived of as a threat by 
either party.  
Keeping always in mind that the foundational reason for the UN’s creation and 
existence was to seek peace and stability, Chapter VII seems like a logical 
                                                 
36 Sergio Vieira De Mello, 2001. “The Evolution of UN Humanitarian Operations” in D. S. Gordon and 
F. H. Toase (eds.), Aspects of Peacekeeping, London: Frank Cass, pp. 115-124. Quote at p. 115. 
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continuation of the peacekeeping operations of the previous Chapter, in that it allows 
the UN to intervene militarily in order to prevent escalation of the conflict, and 
everything that comes as a direct consequence of that, be it a humanitarian crisis in 
the country, for instance, or that the conflict seriously threatens regional security and 
stability. Article 42 of Chapter VII states: “Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”  
The unrolling of the Cold War was another factor that impeded the 
development of theories capable of taking interventions into conflicts one step further 
than simply containing them. Despite the euphemistic name of the period, the 
situation was pretty ‘hot’, as it were, in regions outside the western world. The two 
superpowers were themselves involved directly or indirectly in several of these 
conflicts, and that alone would render (and in some cases has rendered) any effort to 
meaningfully resolve a conflict impossible. Furthermore, the bipolarity and the arms 
race climate that had dominated the international scene were calling for, indeed very 
cold, calculated and strategic moves by either side, whose interest was limited to the 
avoidance of a major (global and/or nuclear) war. This approach only reinforced the 
pre-existing attitudes of managing rather than resolving conflict. In Mearsheimer’s 
famous words, “simplicity breeds certainty; certainty bolsters peace”.39  
In a sense, then, the foundations of the international system that carried 
through since the 17th Century did not leave much scope for states, as well as 
statesmen, to deal effectively with international conflict. This is reflected in the 
mechanisms adopted for such crises, all of which were guided by the Westphalian 
principles mentioned above. As Aall notes, there were only fifteen peacekeeping 
missions between 1945 and 1988, “all of them reflecting a consensus that these 
operations should play an impartial role vis-à-vis the conflict and should avoid 
exposing the peacekeepers to risk”.40 The problems posed by such approaches can be 
discerned today. The cases of Cyprus, the Middle East, Kashmir, and many others 
around the world have become protracted, partially because they were not developed 
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121-141. Quote, p. 122. 
 117
to a point past that of conflict. Conflict has frozen, and with it the attitudes and the 
behaviours of its parties.  
 
The Liberal voices 
 Despite the poor frameworks on which the practical aspects of conflict 
regulation of the pre-1990 era were founded, there started to emerge voices which 
raised questions about the validity, the orthodoxy and the functionality of such 
approaches. Those waves of revolutionary thinking begun to emerge in the 1960s and 
were developed incrementally for the thirty years that followed. Galtung’s voice was 
certainly one of those that questioned the Realist assumptions, and his contribution to 
the field is not limited solely to his studies and writings, as was indicated above, but 
also to the influence he generated and the spiritual heritage he left for future 
generations of conflict scholars that followed.  
The Australian John Burton was another scholar who has written extensively 
on the importance of change in the direction of the field. His thinking was 
revolutionary because it distanced itself from the power-related approaches of the 
realist legacies and instead examined the inner self of individuals and groups, the 
‘human needs theory’ as it came to be known.41 It was this more esoteric dimension 
in his examinations that made him bring forward his theory of international relations 
not through the analysis of states, but one centred on the global and multidimensional 
cobweb of religious, linguistic, commercial and other social relationships.42 Burton’s 
was a theory “based upon individual needs and the system of issue-related linkages 
established by such needs”.43  
Burton’s basic argument is that humans are not driven only by material 
interests and needs, such as power, resources or territory. The human psyche, for 
Burton, consisted of inner drives and needs that the realist explanations could not 
account for, for example security, identity and recognition. For Burton this was the 
only way to explain protracted conflicts.44 What made people not to reach an 
                                                 
41 John Burton (ed.), 1990a. Conflict: Human Needs Theory, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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agreement with the opposite site, and thus not to compromise, was not the inherent 
malleability of the human gene, as Morgenthau claimed;45 it was the fact that these 
needs were a) tantamount for and common to every human being, and b) in the cases 
where conflict had broken out, they were obviously violated/unsatisfied.  
Burton argues that the use of power or force was a common measure taken 
against severe disobedience or disagreement with the institutions, in all levels, from 
the family to the international.46 Nevertheless, in all of those levels, power had failed 
to prove an efficient suppressive measure against the manifestation of conflict. 
Certain conflicts were recurrent no matter how much force was applied to them, 
which highlighted the deficiencies of power-related theories. Their insolvability 
should therefore be sought elsewhere, and in particular within the human self. As he 
noted elsewhere:   
 
“What we are referring to in this context are needs that are always present: 
individual needs that are as basic to harmonious social relationship as food and shelter 
are to the individual. They do not depend on stages of development. The argument is 
that without the satisfaction of these needs the individual will find the norms of society 
in which he behaves – primitive, traditional or industrial – to be inappropriate because 
these norms cannot be used by him to secure his needs. He will invent his own norms 
and be labelled deviant, or disrupt himself as a person, rather than forego these 
needs”47  
 
It is in this context that Burton differentiates between disputes and conflicts. 
The former refers to physical resources and a compromise can be negotiated; but 
conflicts point to human needs, which are non-negotiable and thus cannot be 
compromised. Burton argues that it is the failure of the distinction by earlier theories 
that blurred our vision towards the true dynamics of conflict, and this failure he 
attributes directly to Morgenthau.48 This wrongful impression has left its stamp on the 
organisation and function of domestic as well as international institutions, who still 
operate with policies designed around and on the use of power as a suppressive 
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measure. Unless these institutions begin to fulfil and accomplish the unmet human 
needs of groups in conflict, conflict as such, will never be effectively dealt with.  
As a dedicated scholar of conflict resolution, Burton is a strong supporter of 
the problem-solving workshops, a form of informal diplomacy organised and directed 
by academics like himself.49 His view was that the parties to the conflict bear all of 
the responsibility for its resolution. However, in order to do so successfully, there has 
to exist some form of communication which facilitates the mutual definitions of the 
conflict and enhances the understanding of the other party’s views on the situation. 
The establishment and facilitation of communication depends on the third party 
whose responsibility is to make sure that the relationship disposes of the 
confrontational context that has as its main element in the past. These workshops were 
unofficial and secret, keeping all information exclusive to the academics/facilitators 
themselves. Burton asserts that this kind of communication does not stop at the 
moment when the conflict is terminated.50 He speaks of provention as the most 
appropriate response to conflictive behaviour. A framework that takes into account 
the conflict issues and attitudes, and sets up a mechanism that keeps conflict 
manifestations in a rather controlled, ‘healthy’ environment. As he himself put it, 
“provention implies the promotion of an environment conducive to harmonious 
relationships”51 whereas “prevention has a negative connotation”.52
Burton’s views and similar liberal voices were paid more attention with the 
end of the Cold War that changed dramatically the academic as well as the practical 
field of international relations. The major change for the scholars of conflict was that 
they found themselves in a new phase where identities are inextricably woven into 
conflicts. The more the world was heading towards the 21st century, the less the states 
were involved in stereotypical conflict. From 1989 to 1994, only four of the ninety-
four identified conflicts studied by Wallensteen and Sollenberg were conventional 
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inter-state conflicts.53 That meant many of the assumptions adopted until then, such as 
the prevalence of the state or that of consent, were rendered obsolete in a very short 
period of time. By 1992, according to Goulding,54 the number of United Nations 
peacekeeping operations increased five-fold, and along with that came the 
complexities and the necessities of different approaches to ending conflict. Many of 
these conflicts were not new, but the change in the system of International Relations 
brought forward a different, somewhat more pragmatic face of these conflicts. Azar 
has termed “protracted social conflicts” those conflicts that are long, on-going and 
seemingly unresolvable.55 These are social conflicts, in which the marginalisation of 
one of the parties took place along the lines of the communal and/or regional 
spheres.56
 
Post-Cold War Approaches  
As the post-Cold War order became used to as the norm, academic thinking 
begun to flourish with regards to the causes of conflict, and consequently of conflict 
resolution. In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali provided the official 
recognition that conflicts in the post-Cold War world were different, and as such they 
required different treatment from that applied since then.57 In his report “An Agenda 
for Peace”, it is recognised that conflicts between ideological blocks is no longer the 
sole genre of conflict but rather a new wave of ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and 
social factors was becoming predominant in the eruption of conflicts. Disease, 
malnutrition and environmental imprudence tend both to strengthen and also to 
conflict. The Agenda for Peace was the first official claim that the until then scope of 
the widely accepted peace-keeping operations needed to be defined in a broader way, 
and in order for them to achieve the aims of the Organisation, they had to be 
accompanied by strategies and policies that would enhance not only the cessation of 
hostilities, but also the development of policies and practices that would indicate 
when a conflict was imminent and measures and policies that would stabilise 
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effectively the region where conflict erupted. The Secretary’s proposal focused on 
peacemaking and peacebuilding (albeit post-conflict) as practices that should go hand 
in hand with peacekeeping. In the Supplement to the agenda for Peace, published 
three years after the original report, the Secretary General further highlights the 
change in the nature of conflict, and especially the way the UN should confront them.  
The criticism that the realist assumptions were seen as too mono-dimensional 
in their approach was also applied to the human needs theories. These were too 
fixated on the socio-biological aspects of the individual that left no room for the 
exploration of their psychological traits. One such criticism comes from Avruch, who 
claims that Burton’s conception of the problem-solving workshops is essentially 
flawed.58 The reason for this is because every individual has his/her own perception 
of reality, which is in turn shaped by every one’s different customs and habits. As 
such, two parties in a conflict have different pictures for the same conflict. The same 
goes for the mediator/facilitator who cannot leave his culture outside the workshop.59 
Thus, the argument goes, one should not shut culture outside the conflict resolution 
room, but rather accept it and utilise it in order to find the common understandings 
needed for the initiation of a solution. Avruch and Black60 coined the term 
ethnoconflict theories to denote the analyses of conflicts viewed through the cultural 
prism. Ethnopraxis, on the other hand, takes place when culture is utilised by the 
conflict resolution processes.  
Tarja Vayrynen shapes her argument along the same lines and strongly 
criticises Burton’s work.61 By following theorists of phenomenology, Vayrynen 
criticises almost every aspect of his work. As she informs us, phenomenology was 
born as a science in order to criticise the increasing positivist tendency in social and 
philosophical sciences. Phenomenologists set out to observe the world as it is through 
the eyes, and consequently through the actions, of the actor. However, the researcher 
or interpreter of those actions “never comprehends the meaning in its totality, because 
the other’s stream of consciousness always eludes that of the interpreter”.62 This is 
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sharply contrasted to Burton’s assumptions that the human needs are universal for all, 
hence there is a basis for common understanding. Phenomenology holds that the 
realities we live are socially constructed and our natural attitude is to accept these 
realities as “unquestionably given until further notice”.63 According to her study, 
some of Burton’s assumptions are not fruitful because needs are also socially 
constructed realities and attention should be paid on the context in which they arise.64 
Culture has a great potential of offering insight to the way conflicts develop, arise and 
are handled, because “the ‘identity’ of a person is created through the social groups 
and in accordance with the cultural patterns which prevail in the groups the person 
belongs to”.65 More explicitly: 
 
“Any society considers itself as a little cosmos, and the maintenance of the 
cosmos requires symbols to keep it together. Societies, social groups, need their central 
myths, or dominant ideologies, to justify and to establish foundations for self-
interpretation. Social groups can be distinguished by virtue of their commonly held 
relevance system from which typifications arise”.66  
 
Typification indicates a certain way of behaviour, different in every culture, because it 
is precisely governed by that culture. That means, not only do the parties have to find 
a point where their respective cultures meet, it does not only mean that the 
responsibility for the emergence of this point lies with the facilitator, but it also 
implies that the facilitator must be aware of his culture vis-à-vis those of the 
belligerents. 
The very nature of the technique of the problem-solving workshops, the fact 
that they originated in North America by middle class whites, has been increasingly 
questioned. Avruch wonders to what extent the problem solving workshops, 
advocated by Burton and others, have done just as much damage as the realists, in that 
they complicated further the relationship between the conflictive parties by 
considering them and projecting them back to themselves as equal.67 A criticism also 
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espoused by Jabri, who notes that the approach creates a ‘myth of equals’ by 
‘negating power asymmetry’.68
While Avruch’s might be a harsh criticism, the insights he offers are useful in 
that they help re-locate the context of the conflict closer to the perceptions and culture 
of the parties. Nonetheless, and as it will be seen in the case study, the ‘human needs’ 
framework is the most suited to explain not only the emergence of violence as 
political communication of grievances but also to explain the necessity for peace and 
dialogue in the Basque region that the civil community itself, unaided by the political 
protagonists, has raised. The formation of peace groups and NGOs in the Basque 
country emerged as an apolitical initiative by members of the local civil society and 
targeted other members of that society who disagreed with the manifestation of the 
use of violence.69 The incremental participation of the local population in anti-violent 
manifestations and projects shows that Avruch’s criticisms do not take into account 
societies’ ability to adapt to change. In the Basque case, the basic human need of 
being a member of an independent state is subordinated to that of pursuing the very 
same objective but in a total absence of violence. It is an interesting element to 
highlight since, anthropological fieldwork has identified both, cultures that dispose of 
conflict-resolution systems70 and cultures where such frameworks are inexistent, thus 
rendering conflict endemic.71 This has made commentators turn to those mechanisms 
that are products of the local society and its culture, “models that emerge from the 
resources present in a particular setting and respond to needs in that context”.72  
 Agnew’s analysis, for instance, is very reminiscent of A. D. Smith’s 
ethnosymbolic model, in that he recognises the role and significance symbolism can 
have in conflicts, particularly those of a nationalist nature.73 He asserts that intractable 
social conflicts generate practices, interests, goals and symbols that cannot be 
mediated discursively and it is only through the transformation of the above 
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conditions that an intractable conflict can be resolved.74 In ethnic conflicts, more 
particularly, Agnew recognises the role that territory plays, and even becomes the 
very source of intractability of the conflict. First, because conflict tends to encourage 
definition of group membership in mutually exclusive terms.75 Thus a shared living 
space becomes divided and serves as an evident factor of differentiation. Second, 
ethnic conflict is usually sustained by the performance of rituals that make reference 
to a past while at the same time point to a wanted future. Territory is an indispensable 
feature of these rituals. Finally, the situation is aggravated by the competition between 
the ethnic groups over the spatial distribution of political-economic benefits.76 The 
previous chapter has shown how terrorist conflicts utilise the symbolism of nationalist 
ideology. Agnew’s rituals are not much different from those, considering a case, like 
the Basque, where virtually all accounts of the past are filled with words on heroes, 
martyrs, fighters, freedom, etc. What Agnew describes as the transformation of the 
rituals, the goals and the strategies, in the Basque case took place as a transformation 
of the local culture with regards to this very symbolisms. The violence of the 
extremists succumbed to the need of peace of the moderates. 
Agnew identifies three factors in the rise of ethnic conflicts: a) “the degree of 
geographical-economic differentiation within a country and its relationship to ethnic 
divisions; b) the increased bureaucratisation of the state and the growth of the welfare 
state; c) the growing internationalisation of economic and political activity”.77 
Clearly, one must take into consideration the fact that conflicts are not fixed, when 
one examines the possible temporal causes of conflict; rather, they are dynamic and 
fluid precisely because they are the product of social interaction, which is itself a 
process of continuous change. According to Agnew, ethnic conflicts usually produce 
new material stakes in the perpetuation of conflict and they constantly produce new 
symbolic issues. At the same time, and as observed in terrorist conflicts, this 
symbolism is expressed by “war-talk”: the dehumanisation of the other and its 
transformation into an enemy. Also, ethnic conflicts involve sacrifices, for which 
reason they tend to mobilise people in terms of principles rather than interests. 
Interests can be negotiated; principles cannot.78 “Intractable ethnic conflicts are ones 
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which are dynamically reproduced through the mutual exclusivity of competing 
territorial claims and the constant production of new causes as the conflict 
continues”.79 It is worth remembering here that there is no universal type of 
intractable ethnic conflicts, or a universal form of their resolution. The only 
possibility to identify and achieve common ground is the crystal-clear identification 
of the sources of intractability, the root causes of the conflict.  
Lederach calls this approach ‘elicitive’, whereas Burton’s model is merely 
prescriptive. The elicitive model indicates that the conflict resolution phase has started 
from below. Lederach identifies three main levels of peacebuilding: top-level, middle 
range and grassroots. The first refers to those individuals who assume the role of the 
peacemaker. These are the actors whose role is most important when it comes to the 
management of conflict. Lederach argues that the potential for successful conflict 
resolution offered from this level is insufficient because peace is often negotiated 
between the third party and the leaderships of the conflictive parties. Thus, the 
public’s condescension for the ending of the conflict is more often assumed than real. 
The middle level “holds the potential for helping to establish a relationship- and skill-
based infrastructure for sustaining the peacebuilding process”80 because it is 
addressed to individuals who have a key role in the conflict and are in a position of 
influencing its outcome. The last level refers to the masses of people who constitute 
the conflictive parties broadly. But, like the top level, its contribution to the realisation 
of an effective framework for conflict resolution is limited, often because it is the very 
same people who pay the disastrous consequences of the conflict. It is the middle 
level that holds the key to the transformation of the conflict.  
As the next chapters will show, the transformation of the Basque conflict 
dynamics was definitely affected by the role of the middle level actors. But it must 
also be underlined that the transformation of the conflict attitudes originated by the 
grassroots level and the key players of the middle level acted because they succumbed 
to the enormous pressure raised by the grassroots level.81 The posture of the central 
government until 2004, which recognised no political problem but rather only a 
problem of violence,82 did not prove to be flexible enough for those members of the 
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Basque society that were repelled by violence but were not prepared to abandon 
nationalist politics. The same circles, of non-violent nationalists, experienced a 
similar frustration by the posture of the constant re-generation of the extremists bands 
of the nationalist movement. The reaction of the Basque society therefore, when 
viewed under these circumstances, seems quite logical when it comes to the 
elimination of violence as an accepted social response and norm. And as such, it 
clashes directly with Lederach’s theory that the grassroots level is weaker than the 
actors present in other levels. 
While efforts to create a stable and efficient framework that will support 
actions of conflict resolutions from all levels (where possible), Lederach also warns 
against mono-dimensional analyses of the conflict situation. He talks of the subsystem 
and explains that it is not only the issues that can fuel conflict, but also systemic 
changes that need to be made if conflict is to be transformed. Lederach’s argument is 
better understood when represented in a linear time-span: at the short-term end, 
responses to conflict aim at alleviating the latter’s most evident consequences 
(emergency relief, food supplies, etc); at the other end, the long-term end, responses 
to conflict should be concentrating on picturing a common future. But for that to 
happen, one needs to transform the conflict dynamics. “Reconciliation-as-encounter 
suggests that space for the acknowledging of the past and envisioning of the future is 
the necessary ingredient for reframing the present”.83 Transformation of the conflict 
lies at the very middle of the time-line, and links crisis (short-term response) with 
change (long-term goal). His insight is that “an infrastructure for peacebuilding 
should be understood as a process-structure, […] made up of systems that maintain 
form over time yet have no hard rigidity of structure”.84 As he argues, such an 
infrastructure should originate from the conflict in question, thus taking into 
consideration cultures and contexts. In the Basque case, as it was mentioned earlier, 
the transformation of the conflict was prompted by the needs of the vast majority of 
the Basque society, the grassroots level in Lederach’s terminology. As such, it would 
have been difficult to ignore the local culture and the context in which the conflict 
was placed. In that sense, then, it may be argued that where the conflict is addressed 
not only by its key actors but by the victims that find themselves in the middle of the 
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key players’ violence, the cultural encodings and the broader context of the conflict 
will be embedded in the attempts to transform it. 
The contributions discussed so far reveal the perception of some of the 
scholars that peace is just another dimension that can be accessible yet, for a number 
of reasons, its attainment has proved elusive. Some have even gone so far as to imply 
that peace is the normative dimension and that “warfare is only an invention”.85 More 
contemporary studies on peace have increasingly criticised this perception, that peace 
can be readily established if only one is educated about its benefits. For start, ‘peace’ 
is another essentially contested concept that has attracted multiple interpretations.86 
Its understanding, particularly in the West, was so far focused on the violence that 
must precede it. “[M]ilitarisation or force has normally been a key mechanism for its 
attainment”.87 Furthermore, it is a liberal understanding that originated in the West 
and is reflected in Western attitudes and behaviours in the international system,88 for 
example through humanitarian interventions, human rights establishment, and 
democratisation.89 Despite their (usually) benevolent aims, even the peacebuilding 
approaches of the 1990s, according to Richmond, could not shake off some aspects of 
the victor’s peace, primarily because the non-state actors’ activity would be regulated 
by the dominant actors, the states.90  
The most recent theoretical block91 concentrates on an emancipatory 
dimension of peace that is built on consensus, “rather than an assumption of 
consensus tinged with moral superiority”.92 The poststructuralist and critical theory 
literature envisages a peace that is achievable once the necessary reforms are 
introduced that will allow, or even guarantee, representation and participation to those 
actors and discourses that have been hegemonically overlooked.93 If war is seen to 
derive “from purposive human conduct situated within deeply embedded institutional 
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frameworks”94, then, peace too should be conceptualised as a counter-discourse, 
seeking “to understand the structurated legitimation of violence and challenge the 
militarist order and exclusionist identities which encompass it”.95 However, just like 
with ‘nationalism’ or ‘terrorism’, a consensus on the definition of ‘peace’ will be too 
difficult to attain. Richmond identifies nine typologies of peace as it is conceived of, 
theorised and practiced,96 and Reychler identifies three areas that will constitute a 
challenge to peace research: a) the extensive oscillation of violence in social 
relationships; b) the reactive nature of virtually all preventive efforts in the 
international level; and c) the vast gap between the perceived and the preferred world 
order.97 Nonetheless, according to the findings of Gurr and Marshall, armed inter- as 
well as intra-state conflict has not reached such low levels since the late 1950s,98 
which is perhaps the best manifestation of the accumulation of knowledge in the field, 
if not an indication of the capacity of practice to keep up to date with theory. 
Particularly with regards to self-determination conflicts, findings suggest that, where 
autonomy is provided, “most parties to conflict accept and work within the framework 
of autonomy while a few spoilers may continue to fight in the hope of forcing greater 
concessions”.99  
And it is in this spirit that this thesis insists that the causes of the Basque 
conflict as presented by the violent minority have long ceased to exist, as was shown 
by the retirement and re-socialisation of thousands of its members shortly after the 
transition to democracy.100 What persists and is observed to our days, at least since 
the establishment of democracy in Spain, is the reproduction of a conflict that finds it 
increasingly difficult to persuade not only its audience(s) but its very key-players 
about the validity of its intractability. The social attitude towards the behaviour of the 
conflictive parties, as will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters, is the 
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catalyst of the transformation of the Basque conflict, precisely because it has 
successfully transformed the perceptions held about one or the other party of the 
conflict. ‘Peace’ therefore, in the Basque context, should signify not only the absence 
of violence, or threats of violence, from both sides of the conflict, but also the right to 
pursue self-determination through the political and constitutional means available to 
both parties.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the literature on conflict resolution provided for an 
understanding of what processes and mechanisms are in the disposal of political 
figures that are the protagonists in a conflict. The end of the Cold War facilitated the 
spread of liberal ideas concerning the generation, emergence and protractability of 
conflicts, and highlighted their complex nature. The significance of the cultural 
context of the conflict contributed to the improvement of the understanding of 
different conflicts and at the same time equipped the mediators and negotiators with 
the necessary tools to address the relevant grievances. Furthermore, the development 
of the human needs framework has provided another starting point in the 
understanding of conflict in general. If the human needs thesis is false, if it is human 
aggression that is the problem, then there must be reliance on coercive means of 
social control to avoid conflict. As Burton claims, it is only if needs satisfaction is the 
problem that conflict resolution can be justified as a process.101
Yet, in the Basque case, the attitude of the state was precisely a reliance on its 
security forces and little more than that. There was never a ‘peace process’ initiated in 
the conflict,102 and several talks occasioned between the central government and the 
terrorist organisation were constantly undermined by both sides, either with false 
promises or because they were a strategic move by either player in the greater 
conflict. Furthermore, as it will be explained in the following sections, the 
ambivalence of the regional political players with regards to their petty-political plans 
and contrary to the human need for peace the local society was demanding, has 
constituted a further obstacle to the transformation of attitudes and conflict in general, 
despite the often used rhetoric that they are working for the resolution of the conflict.  
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Basque civil society organised itself through workshops, which were catalytic 
for the commencement of dialogue between the local societies themselves, 
considering the dictatorship, as well as the conflict, have left their marks on its 
capacity to communicate.103 The relative thriving of non-governmental organisations 
in the Basque country dealing with the conflict is at once, an expression of the society 
which has become frustrated with the inability of the key-players to move beyond the 
management of the conflict, and it is directed to all levels, from the grassroots, to the 
players to the negotiators/mediators. The most significant observation, however, is the 
transformation of the conflict itself. In a small country where everyone is relative to 
someone who was targeted by the conflict (that is, by either of the sides), and where 
everyone lives with the fear of being the next target, society decided to change its 
attitude towards the symbolisms that flamed the conflict. Effectively, it accepted that 
what was taking place in its name was not heroic, and certainly not worthy of the 
future that they were ready to demand. The reasons to recycle such discourses and 
persisting beliefs on the local societal values had virtually ceased to exist, and the 
incremental state of autonomy provided by the democratic regime made the vast 
majority accept that violence was now an obstacle to the very objective it set to 
achieve.  
In terms of the literature, then, the human needs approach seems to be the 
most appropriate to explain the Basque case, particularly if one considers that 
criticisms concerning the imposing of a foreign culture of mediation do not hold. 
First, because negotiations between the two warring parties in this conflict have 
already taken place, and second, because it is the attitude of civil society itself that 
points at a basic and undisputed need.  However, while the human needs approach 
cannot account for the attitude of the vast majority of the local population, it is not 
very helpful in examining either of the ‘spoilers’104 of the peace: the militant 
nationalist circles on one hand, and the Spanish government on the other. Moreover, 
the War on Terror was another destabilising factor in the conflict, which was seen by 
Aznar’s government as the perfect excuse to radicalise its policies vis-à-vis the 
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nationalist movement and impose a new reality on the conflict.105  But what is 
critically missing from the human needs approach and instead identified by the more 
recent literature on peace and conflict resolution, is that conflict, particularly a 
prolonged and protracted one, tends to adopt its own structures and discourses, and in 
the Basque case this is more than evident.106
Both the human needs approach and the poststructuralist and critical theories 
formulated after it help explain not only how the continuous stalemate of the conflict 
has given rise to the active stand adopted by the local civil society, but also the 
circumstances and the reasons why violence and terrorism were hailed as the political 
solution to a political problem. Furthermore, they are significant in uncovering the 
discourses of the main actors of the conflict, and the patterns they adopted, and the 
reasons why, throughout the entire time span of the conflict. Ultimately, unless these 
factors are examined, an explanation of the case in terms of human needs is elliptical. 
But that shows that post-human needs theoretical frameworks have not necessarily 
rendered Burton’s contribution old or irrelevant. Rather, the Basque case indicates 
that the two literatures are compatible as well as complementary. In this light, and 
also taking into account the findings from the theoretical blocks of Nationalism and 
Terrorism, the following chapter sets out the major hypotheses of this project and 
establishes the theoretical framework on which this thesis is developed.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Framework of Analysis 
 
 
 
In this chapter I present a theoretical model of analysis for my case study, 
which draws on the insights of the academic literature presented in the previous 
chapters. In those, I have presented the approaches followed by scholars in their 
attempt to explain the emergence of nationalism and political violence, the different 
facets of both phenomena, as well as the diverse trajectories they may potentially 
adopt. Moreover, the previous chapter presented the different techniques of conflict 
resolution and how, where and if those have made a difference in the lives of 
individuals that found themselves in the middle of a conflict, or whether they became 
just another part of the problem. This chapter will present a theoretical framework for 
the analysis of the Basque case, which represents an advancement on previous 
theoretical approaches. With the exception of Smith’s ethno-symbolic model, it has 
already been seen that the theories of terrorism and those of conflict resolution are 
insufficient to explain satisfactorily the persistence of violence manifested in the 
Basque case. Orthodox theories of terrorism contribute to our understanding of the 
Basque case only insofar as the violence of Basque insurgency constituted a response 
to the oppression of the Franco’s dictatorial regime. Yet, they fail to provide sufficient 
insights as to why that violence is still manifested despite the transition to democracy 
and the incremental provision of autonomy by the central institutions. On the other 
hand, conflict resolution approaches according to which the grassroots level is too 
weak to effectively guide conflict resolution initiatives,1 do not coincide with the 
research conducted for this thesis, which claims that the local civil society’s role in 
the rejection of violence and any stereotypes or symbolisms connected to it was 
paramount for the alteration of perceptions with regards to violence’s usefulness in 
achieving a political aim. 
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The ultimate objective of this thesis is to make use of the more recent findings 
of conflict resolution scholars that have explained ethno-nationalist violence in a 
framework of identity clash, combined with the insights that the human needs 
approach has offered. This was the reason this project begun, yet the research for the 
root causes of the violence, at least as it manifested in the Basque country and Spain 
in general, constantly pointed at best to nationalism and at worst to the mere 
dichotomy ‘us vs. them’. Even though the form of violence observed in the conflict 
has been isolated and is studied on its own, the Basque case showed that the conflict 
dynamics evolved around problems located in the ‘nationalist’ sphere.  
Therefore, in order to trace possibilities of resolution in such a conflict, one 
need not concentrate in the type of violence used, but the cause behind such violence. 
Consequently, one needs to re-examine any relation that exists between nationalism, 
as an ideological movement of particular origins and with concrete aims, and 
terrorism, as the former’s manifestation and only one element of the former’s strategy 
and tactics, rather than a transformation from means to an end. This hypothesis has 
more implications for the school of terrorism studies than that of nationalism, in that it 
does not need to aspire to build a grand and all-inclusive theory. It is also contributing 
to previous theories of conflict resolution for which the civic society is merely a pawn 
in the discourses of the conflictive parties, irrespective of whether that conflict has 
been identified as one based on claims of identity or not. Ultimately, this thesis aims 
at the understanding of a particular type of violence, as it is generated by another set 
of beliefs and principles, and how one’s understanding of the latter can be substantial 
for the transformation or elimination of the former. It will do so by addressing the 
weaknesses of the theories of the three different schools, with regards to the Basque 
case.  
 
Nationalism 
The third chapter has demonstrated the different approaches that were used to 
explain the nationalist phenomenon and the terminological chaos that was inherited 
from the totality of those. With the exception of Anthony Smith’s ‘ethno-symbolic’ 
model, the remaining schools of thought are not as inclusive in their explanations of 
nationalism in general, as well as the Basque nationalism in particular. Using 
primordialist theories to explain nationalism, for example, would resemble the 
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nationalist discourse itself, although, as Jenkins observed,2 it also represents a 
widespread view among the public. Nonetheless, national feelings cannot be ineffable 
because, as we shall see in the following chapter, the Basques came close to shifting 
their identities and loyalties and, in that, they were aided by Basque intellectuals, like 
Miguel de Unamuno, who regarded Euskera an obstacle to human progress.3
The above example seems to be rather more suited to the instrumentalist 
theories, where a change of identity may take place if it serves an individual’s or a 
group’s interests. In our case study, Basque identity had almost been assimilated into 
the Spanish culture, with the urban settings (where the elites were predominant) 
leading the transformation. However, as it has been already explained, these theories 
lack the necessary historical and ethnographic context, which, in the Basque case, 
helps highlight the revival of local culture, this time to the detriment of the Spanish 
one. And on the other hand they cannot account for the persistence of the 
phenomenon examined in this project: nationalist violence, the fervour with which 
individuals and groups will invoke their culture in an attempt to justify their use of 
violence.  
Modernist theories of nationalism,4 on the other hand, seem better equipped 
than either primordialist or instrumentalist theories of nationalism when it comes to 
the study of the Basque case. Basque nationalism is certainly a modern phenomenon 
that emerged in the 19th C, after a wave of industrialisation that brought with it large 
waves of migration from the rest of Spain. As it will be explained in the following 
chapter, in its first steps, Basque nationalism rejected industrialisation as the motor 
behind the elimination of Basque culture and targeted the immigrants for the same 
reason. As was common with other nationalisms of the time, early Basque nationalism 
was heavily influenced by the Romantics’ discourse. This became evident in its 
posture towards the immigrants and anything that was related to the rest of Spain. 
Furthermore, invention and fabrication also took place in the development of Basque 
nationalism.  
                                                 
2 Richard Jenkins, 1996a, “Ethinicity etcetera: social anthropological points of view”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies, Vol. 19, No.4, pp. 807-822. Quote at p. 811. 
3 Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 12. 
4 Elie Kedourie, 2000 (4th Ed.), Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell; Ernest Gellner, 1983. Nations and 
Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell; Eric Hobsbawm, 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Michael Mann, 1992. “The 
emergence of modern European nationalism”, in John Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Transition to 
Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;  
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However, unlike the prescription given by economic theories of nationalism, 
such as those brought forward by Hechter5 or Nairn,6 the Basques were far richer than 
the rest of Spain and to our days this balance has remained unchanged. Moreover, 
during the second wave of industrialisation in the Basque country (1950s and 1060s), 
many of the immigrants adopted, and were assimilated to, the local culture.7 And 
while the Romanticist movement might have influenced the manifestation of the 
phenomenon, it certainly does not suffice to produce a mobilisation of the masses, 
such that would even entail use of violence. On the other hand, the modernist 
separation between cultural and civic nationalism poses more problems than it 
actually solves, mainly because of the connotations it carries. As seen, the ethnic 
model is regarded as backward and manipulative, often leading to secessions, clashes, 
wars and therefore being quite horrific as well as costly. On the contrary, the political 
model is considered more modern, overlooking the cultural heritages and traditions, 
as it aims to unite a group under true democratic values (equality before the law, basic 
freedoms, etc) and promote the common objective(s) through political channels that 
are not so menacing for the regime’s existence. However, a culture-founded 
nationalist group, is perfectly entitled to use its diachritica to differentiate itself from 
others and, if given the opportunity through the exercise and experience of democratic 
government, it can mature enough and communicate its grievances and pursue its 
objectives in a way that not only is consistent and compatible with democratic means 
but also capable of enhancing democratic procedures because, in a sense, the above is 
what democracy itself presupposes. This is clearly the case in the Basque country. 
Since 1979, when the autonomous Constitution was adopted, the region’s levels of 
autonomy have been rising and the same also holds true for the movements against 
the use of violence. These two characteristics seem paradoxical when looked upon 
from the point of view of ‘modernism vs. backwardness’.   
As stressed in the earlier chapters, Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolist 
paradigm8 is the one that encompasses most elements from theories developed to 
explain nationalism. Smith’s focus on the symbolic nature of cultural interactions that, 
in pre-modern times, were the ones that helped differentiate socio-ethnic groups, 
                                                 
5 Michael Hechter, 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 
London: Routledge. See also Michael Hechter and Margaret Levi, 1979. “The Comparative Analysis of 
Ethnoregional Movements”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 260-274. 
6 Tom Nairn, 1977. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism, London: NLB. 
7 Daniele Conversi, 1997.The Basques, the Catalans and Spain, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 206-207. 
8 Anthony D. Smith, 1998. Nationalism and Modernism, London; N.Y.: Routledge 
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departs fundamentally from the pre-existing modernist approach, and sheds more light 
on the ineffable feelings the primordialists had put forward as a case. Briefly, Smith 
accepts nationalism is a very recent historic phenomenon that, nonetheless, requires 
an image from the past that will help it move forward. In other words, the common 
objective that underlines any nationalism’s future does not suffice to mobilise the 
masses, whereas appeals to ancestors, heritage and centuries-old cultural identities are 
essential in marking out the individual character of an ethnic group. Social memory 
thus is more powerful and more useful in achieving nationalistic aims. As we shall see 
in the following historical chapter, the claim is verified in the case of Basque 
nationalism in both its modern and contemporary phases.  
Nonetheless, and despite the fact that there seems to be some kind of 
verification for the primordialist claims by Smith’s theory, the extent or rigidity of the 
social memory is not the only force behind the development of a nationalist 
movement. Other factors must be examined as well, most of which have been raised 
by the majority of theories brought forward so far: the role and nature of the 
opponent-state (strong and centralist, like the French, or weak and centrifugal like the 
Spanish), international developments of global repercussions (spread of nationalist 
ideology, anti-colonisation), the interests of the elites. Nonetheless, Smith’s model is 
the only one that is all encompassing, highlighting those elements common to all 
nationalisms, yet at the same time allowing room for the particularities of each case to 
show. It is this theoretical capacity that allows it to be verified in cases of violent 
nationalisms, like the Basque, and non-violent nationalisms, like the Catalan. 
Violent nationalisms almost invariably seem to justify use of violence as a 
reaction to an aggressive action perpetrated by an already established state. 
Republican nationalists in Northern Ireland, for example, have always regarded their 
militant posture as a reaction to the social and political discrimination against them 
from the part of the protestant state and elites. Thus, the role of the state also needs to 
be examined, and in particular the extent to which it impedes the existence and/or 
fulfilment of the ethnic group(s) in question. Although the above statement seems to 
be playing in the hands of the nationalists, it would be an error to view the state 
uncritically, just as it would be an error to equate nationalist extremists to freedom 
fighters. In the Basque case, the role of the state is highly significant, both in the 19th 
C proto-nationalist movement and the emergence of ETA in the 1960s. In the first 
instance, it is the weakness of the Spanish Crown to assimilate the different ethnic 
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groups into one Spanish nation, thus the centrifugal tendencies. In the latter instance, 
nationalist violence is seen as a reaction to the oppression imposed by the Francoist 
regime.  
The aforementioned indicates that the only successful way to study 
nationalism is to do so in a proper context. The conclusions brought forward by many 
a scholar of the field of nationalism are all valid but they cannot single-handedly 
explain any and every nationalism. It is possible to encounter a number of different 
theories evolving through a case study, but when these are specifically tested on a 
different nationalist movement, may prove to be inadequate. As Smith has observed, 
the rivalry between the different theories might be more apparent than real, but the 
comparisons are not easy to be drawn since they all seek to answer different 
questions.9 It is for this reason that this project claims that the study of nationalism 
must be contextual, evolving from the analysis and explanation of a case study and 
taking into account details that help identify the differentiating processes between 
similar movements. 
One more factor that advocates for the contextualisation of the study of ethno-
nationalist movements is the posture of the international community and international 
law with regards to claims for independence and self-determination. The reasons for 
this are that, from the point of view of the international law, self-determination of a 
people is just as sacred as the inviolability of a state’s territorial integrity. Since the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 
1960, the United Nations accepts self-determination as a “legal principle”, 
establishing that “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development”.10 Equal importance to the principle of self-
determination is given by other international bodies like the Organisation for the 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which accepts that  
“by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, 
their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to 
pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development”11  
 
                                                 
9 Smith, op.cit, p. 222. 
10 UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 December 1960; see also, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 16 December 1966. 
11 Principle VIII (2) of the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. 
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The anomalies of the international system of states and International Law become 
evident, however, in UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 
1970. Under its principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, it is stated 
that “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or 
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status 
freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people”. Nonetheless, this generalization of the right to self-
determination, understood in the Resolutions to mean the right of a people to found a 
State because it was designed as a response to the anti-colonial rather than ethno-
political movements12, would have a profoundly destabilizing effect, which is 
obviously inconceivable for an international community comprised first and foremost 
of sovereign States. Thus, in the same resolution of 24 October 1970 it is clarified that 
the modes of attaining self-determination described above do not "authoris[e] or 
encourag[e] any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity and unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples". As described previously, the caution not to equate the right to self-
determination with a right to secession is based not only in practical problems that 
would arise (indefinite divisibility, unviable states), but also on normative aspects 
(minorities entrapped within the seceding groups, as is the case with the remaining 
Serb population in Kosovo).13 
Even though self-determination became a principle during a particular context, 
in the post-Cold War era, where most colonies have already achieved independence 
and even though some ethno-political movements still present their case as one of 
‘colonisation’, as is the case for example with the Basques, the ambiguities 
surrounding both principles of self-determination and territorial integrity have yet to 
prove worthy of inciting a common stand on behalf of the UN and the rest of the 
international community. Richmond  has explained this paradox by analysing the 
international system in three levels14: that of the civic society, where notions of 
justice, humanitarianism and independence are eminent; the state level, where 
                                                 
12 Pakistan’s independence from the UK in 1947, for this purpose, is of a different context from the 
secession of Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971.  
13 Lee C. Buchheit, 1996 [1978]. Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press pp. 20-30. See also Alexis Heraclides, 1991. The Self-Determination of 
Minorities in International Politics, London: Cass, p. 28. 
14 Oliver Richmond, 2002. Maintaining Order, Making Peace, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave. 
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traditional realist theories of power and sovereignty lie and; the international level, 
which increasingly adopts the same notions and values as those engulfed in the first 
level. The paradox seems to stem from the third level where the input of the 
international civic society and the formulation of the states’ policy concerning their 
security meet. It has already been seen that in international humanitarian crises and/or 
instances where the international stability and security are endangered, as for example 
with Kosovo, public opinion in conjunction with humanitarian NGOs and pressure 
groups have achieved the intervention of the international community and hence the 
disruption of the principle of inviolability. It seems that the international society is 
more likely to adopt this stand when the aggrieved group in question has minimal 
chances and modes of defence, whereas in cases like the Kurdish movement or even 
the Basques, where terrorism has been employed as a method to achieve self-
determination, the international community is far more hesitant. Other commentators 
stress that even if “self-determination is not an authorization of secession by 
minorities, there is nothing in international law that prohibits secession or the 
formation of new states”.15  
This point is quite important when analysing the case of Basque nationalism 
and self-determination. Since Spain is a liberal democratic state and, as such, upholds 
all democratic values set forth and defended by International Organisations, it will be 
extremely difficult for the Basques to earn the international community’s sympathy 
and aegis by pointing to their ‘unbearable’ situation due to their gross violation of 
human rights from the part of the Central Spanish State. While no one claims that the 
Spanish authorities perform their tasks in an angelic way, it is certainly not the case 
that there is a humanitarian crisis in the Basque Country, or that the losses suffered 
can be equated to that of the Palestinians or the ethnic wars in the Balkans. However, 
it seems appropriate to speculate that if the UN’s, and indeed every international 
organisation’s, objective is stability and promotion of peace, secession can indeed be 
acquired through entirely civilised and democratic means and institutions, such as 
those provided by a liberal democratic state like Spain. Since there is no international 
law impeding secession, and as long as the ‘divorce’ is by mutual consent, as was the 
case with the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslovakia, then the result stands high 
chances of being accepted by the international community and a new status quo 
                                                 
15 Rosalyn Higgins, 1994. Problems and Process: International Law and How we Use It, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, p. 125; emphasis in the original. 
 140
established and recognised. With that in mind, the formulation of the first hypothesis 
can be brought forward: If Basque nationalism’s objective is more self-determination, 
the Basques will pursue that goal, primarily with the political means available to them 
through the existing democratic institutions. That is, through the election of parties 
favouring further autonomy or independence, or through a plebiscite, if that is granted 
to them by the central state. In the case where the majority of the Basques perceive 
their political status as well as cultural heritage (identity, language, customs) to be 
threatened by actions of the central government, political violence will be seen as a 
justified measure of self-defence and will be included in their means to attain more 
self-determination.  
The implications of this hypothesis are multiple. Firstly, although it is highly 
unlikely to see a high-scale war between the Spanish and the Basques, the mere 
presence of the terrorist organisation ETA, and in particular the circles from which it 
draws its support, denote the will to justify violence when the situation concerning 
their objective is unfavourable. On the other hand, while the organisation’s activities 
are condemned by a broad spectrum of the Basque population, which recognise the 
achievements in the extended degree of autonomy they enjoy are due largely to the 
democratic procedures and institutions, a large part of that majority considers it 
natural, when “push comes to shove”, to defend their separate identity by defending 
their country. This, in turn, implies that any nationalism can adopt both violent and 
non-violent facets, depending on the political environment and the circumstances it 
generates. Furthermore, it implies that there are no ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalisms but, 
rather, all nationalisms can be both at different stages of their evolution.16 In the 
Basque case, where a degree of autonomy is already in place and basic freedoms are 
far from being threatened, the struggle for more self-determination will take place 
through the already existing political and democratic institutions, local or national. In 
the Basque country this is evident, on the one hand, by the political activities of the 
ruling moderate PNV. While it condemns the violence adopted by ETA, the 
consolidation of further autonomy and independence forms a basic pillar of its 
political programme. The most recent manifestation of this is the initiative of the 
Lehendakari (Basque Prime Minister) Juan Jose Ibarretxe to bring forward a plan 
(known as the ‘Ibarretxe Plan’) that would transform the relationship between the 
                                                 
16 Peter Alter, 1994. Nationalism, London: Arnold, p. 2. See also, Daniele Conversi, 1997, op.cit. 
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Basque country and the rest of Spain into one of “freely associated States”.17 
Abandoning and condemning violence does not mean that the “national” project is 
impeded and that the central state has secured its integrity (although such analysis 
should carefully examine the motives of the local leadership behind such ‘grand-
visions’).  
On the other hand, the Basque society itself has become increasingly an actor 
in the conflict with both anti-violence as well as pro-independence demonstrations. In 
the former camp, there are a number of NGO and citizen initiatives that reject 
violence and develop strategies and activities that evolve around the promotion of 
peace in the Basque country and the condemnation of ETA’s terrorist actions. 
However, only Elkarri, possibly the biggest in terms of support and participation, and 
the most active, attempts to promote peace in parallel with dialogue and agreement, 
because it recognises that the core of the conflict is the popular support for 
independence. Indicative of its two-fold objective and the appeal it finds among the 
local population are the 251.323 signatures gathered from May 1993 until May 1994 
in a campaign calling for “dialogue and agreement through peaceful resolution”.18
With regards to the pro-independence circles and the defensive reflexes of the 
Basque society, these were manifested as early as November 2004, when the banned 
(since 2002) political party Batasuna gathered thousands of supporters in a party rally. 
Its supporters also made their presence felt with manifestation and protests directed 
against the government and its initiative to ban the party on the grounds that it 
maintained links with the organisaiton and for failing to condemn ETA’s actions and 
the loss of life it caused. Finally, the disclosure that between 1983 and 1987 a 
mysterious ‘death squad’ group, known as GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de 
Liberación – Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups), was claimed to have abducted and 
killed around twenty-nine ETA activists and sympathisers provoked a massive 
condemnation throughout the country and strengthened Basque popular support for 
the movement. The case, known in Spain as guerra sucia (dirty war), was tried in the 
                                                 
17 Basque Government, “Propuesta del Gobierno Vasco para la Convivencia en Euskadi” (Proposal for 
Coexistence in the Basque Country), 
http://www.nuevoestatutodeeuskadi.net/docs/comparecencia_lehendakari_20050202_2_cas.pdf, 
accessed 12/10/2004. The plan, which is in effect an alteration/update of the Basque constitution, was 
approved by the Basque Parliament on December 30, 2004 but was rejected by the Cortes, the Spanish 
national Assembly in January 2005 because it violates the Spanish constitution, which prohibits 
unilateral secession.  
18 Elkarri, “What is Elkarri”, http://elkarri.org/en/pdf/WhatisElkarri.pdf, accessed 12/10/2006. 
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late 1990s and has resulted in the imprisonment of six highly positioned ministers, 
police commanders, local politicians and political parties’ figures.19  
In order to test the hypothesis, the case study will seek to identify not only the 
nationalist actors (political parties, syndicates, intelligentsia, NGOs, social 
movements and civic society) but also the role of the central state in the development 
of Basque nationalism. In other words, I argue that the development of a nationalist 
movement does not solely depend on its members’ drives and objectives or the 
rigidity and validity of its symbolism, but is susceptible to, hence shaped by, its 
environment, immediate as well as international. One such instance that has been 
highlighted in the Basque case is the radicalisation of the anti-nationalist, rather than 
counter-terrorist, policies adopted by the centre-right government of José Maria 
Aznar, who, in light of the War on Terror appeared to radicalise further the nationalist 
sentiment in the Basque country and provoke even the moderate nationalist circles.20 
While the adoption of such policies against Basque nationalism are located in the state 
level, the international circumstances that provoked it have been accounted for by 
Conversi for derailing the “powerful, spontaneous and hugely popular movement” of 
the Basque civil society against the use of nationalist violence.21
The definition of nationalism used here is borrowed from Smith’s work and 
denotes “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of self-
government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members 
conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation”.22 Smith argues that the 
definition of the “nation” should not depart fundamentally from that of nationalism 
and should be based on its etymology, according to which, nation should be defined 
as “a group of human beings, possessing common and distinctive elements of culture, 
a unified economic system, citizenship rights for all members, a sentiment of 
solidarity arising out of common experiences, and occupying a common terrirtory”.23 
However, the infusion of the notion of the state (“a unifying economic system, 
                                                 
19 http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/guerrasucia.html, last accessed 25/11/2001. 
20 Daniele Conversi, 2006. “Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-
spoilers perspective” in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: 
Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
pp.173-199. See also, Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash 
of Identities, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 115 for an analysis of the official state 
discourse vis-à-vis ETA in the late 1990s. 
21 Conversi, 2006, op.cit., p. 195. 
22 Anthony Smith, 1983. Theories of Nationalism, 2nd ed., London: Duckworth, p. 171. 
23 Ibid., p. 18. 
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common citizenship) into that of the nation often leads to complex definitions that do 
not necessarily reflect reality. For, although it is already known that states are in their 
majority multi-ethnic or multi-national, the current typology identifies as nations both 
groups that are stateless as well as ethnic groups that have evolved into a state. In the 
case of Spain, the matter is further complicated since the Spanish constitution 
recognises that it is the different ‘nationalities’ (nacionalidades) in their totality that 
constitute the Spanish nation. It is necessary to differentiate between a ‘nation-state’ 
and a ‘nation’. The former will be defined as the association of the people of one or 
more ethnic groups, possessing common cultural characteristics, shared experiences 
and memories, common citizenship rights, and occupying a unified, sovereign 
territory. What differentiates a nation-state from a nation is that the latter refers to a 
human population with shared history, memory and culture, associated with a specific 
territory and is the constitutive part of a broader nation-state, whether it is the 
dominant nation in that nation-state or not.  
It is evident from the above that the Basque case is an identity-based, as well 
as identity-driven, conflict. The dynamics and processes behind nationalism ought to 
be analysed in order to understand the dynamics and processes behind the 
participation in militant groups of nationalist ideology. What the above discussion on 
self-determination has revealed is the reason for which nationalist movements adopt 
violent methods. In general terms, every human holds something that is dear to 
him/her, and in the contemporary world it seems that the family and the patria are the 
two most common things that people confess they would fight for (although, 
currently, religion too seems to be gaining ground fast). Prior to the formation of 
nation- and national-states, the protection of kin in order to ensure survival drove 
people to protect their families; in the modern world, it is nationalism that drives 
people to fight for their country because the country is the imagined family and the 
extended kin of our era.24 And it is at this point that the so-called ‘sovereignty trap’ 
appears. The establishment of a territorially integral State has been set as the best way 
for an ethnic group to protect and pursue its needs and interests. When an ethnic 
group suffers oppression, denial and/or violation of human rights because its mere 
existence is against the interests of the state of which it is part, it is highly likely that 
                                                 
24 Benedict Anderson, 1991. Imagined Communities, London: Verso. Homi Bhabha, 1990. 
“Dissemination: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation” in Homi Bhabha (ed.), Nation 
and Narration, London; New York: Routledge. 
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if the necessary means are available, the group will mount a mechanism of defence. 
Terrorism, as already explained, is the intention of the weak to mount an attack 
against the mighty. In line with the concept of ‘ethno-nationalism’, which has been 
used to describe stateless nationalisms,25 and considering that the concept of 
‘terrorism’ has been applied indiscriminately to religious, ethno-nationalist and other 
groups, this thesis, will refer to the Basque violence as ethno-terrorism in order to 
make explicit that the particular use of violence emanates from a greater objective, 
which is the attainment and formation of an independent and sovereign Basque state. 
However, even though conditions of repression and state-terrorism apply to 
the early phases and justify the emergence of the Basque movement, they do not 
account for the persistence of the terrorist phenomenon under the democratic regime. 
Even at the turn of the century, when the centre-right government of Madrid 
radicalised its policies against the Basques and almost alienated the moderate 
nationalists as well as the popular anti-violence movement, ethno-terrorist violence is 
hardly justified when the political and social institutions and structures exist for the 
promotion of autonomic concessions. Besides the need to fulfil the deed and realise 
the objective, there are a number of reasons that arm the nationalist hand. One of 
these is the internal politics of the terrorist organisations or the liberation movement 
in general. Fractions of the movement can also be the target audience of particular 
terrorist actions, as was the case with ETA during the period of its continuous splits. 
Furthermore, great attention should be paid on the balance between the political and 
the military fractions of the movement. Subordination of the latter to the former 
extents the possibilities of a political solution to a political problem, as the Good 
Friday Agreement has shown in Northern Ireland. On the contrary, Batasuna’s 
subordination to the demands and strategies of ETA have taken away its opportunities 
to initiate a breakthrough in the stalemate. Moreover, the general climate that emerged 
post September 11, 2001 and the impact the Madrid bombings had on a nation already 
familiarised with terrorism, are principal factors in the formation and execution of 
militant nationalist politics. The fact that the leader of Batasuna condemned the 
attacks of March 11, 2004 is more than interesting. Last but not least the policies of 
the liberal state must also be examined, particularly when that state has only recently 
emerged from almost half a century of dictatorial regime. While the persons and the 
                                                 
25 Ma Shu Yan, 1990. “Ethnonationalism, ethnic nationalism, and mini-nationalism: a comparison of 
Connor, Smith and Snyder”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 527-541.  
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faces may change, the structures, especially those burdened with the security of the 
state, need more time to adjust to the political changes. 
All this points to the need for a closer examination of the terrorist branches of 
nationalist movements. For, even though nationalism is the motor that drives 
terrorism, in the Basque case at least, terrorism can obtain a momentum of its own 
and impede, instead of advance, the wishes of the majority. The following section 
describes how terrorism can be used as a method of nationalist movements to achieve 
their self-determination and provides the definitions adopted in the analysis and 
explanation of terrorism. 
 
Terrorism 
While there seems to be great discord among the scholars of the terrorism field 
about substantial and foundational issues regarding the subject, some common 
characteristics can be drawn. The principal of those is that terrorism carries political 
connotations. Every terrorist act is politically motivated and can emanate from a state, 
embedded in its policies, as well as from individuals or groups that seek to 
delegitimise an already established political economy. It is not synonymous to 
political violence, but rather a subcategory of it. On the other hand, the etymology of 
the word underlines one of its main characteristics: the unpredictability of a terrorist 
attack and the fear it generates are more valuable to the terrorists than the attack itself. 
The fear is also part of the symbolism that terrorist acts carry, as it immediately 
differentiates between target audience and target of violence and it is again this 
symbolism that obscures the asymmetry of the warring parties and makes terrorism 
resemble war. Furthermore, a terrorist group is often seen as a microcosm, the internal 
dynamics of which make it harder for its members to abandon it altogether and, thus, 
perpetuate violence. 
A common theme in both the nationalism and terrorism literature was the 
explanation of the phenomena through the instrumental and the behavioural approach. 
Individuals, and/or groups, promote nationalism or use terrorism because that is what 
serves their interests for achieving a particular objective. Similarly, in instrumental 
terms, those individuals/groups that actively participate in conflict will cease their 
activities if they feel that a specific conflict resolution does not harm their interests. 
Indeed, as we have seen, some parties may use conflict resolution attempts in order to 
promote further their interest in conflict (see Richmond 1998). On the other hand, 
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behavioural approaches have insisted that the nature of nationalist and/or terrorist 
organisations is such that cannot be fully accounted for by instrumental explanations. 
Such organisations are usually comprised of large numbers of individuals with diverse 
experience, motives and mentality. Hence, claiming that all members of a terrorist 
group share the same interest in all of the organisation’s activities and manifestations 
could be mistaken. Behavioural approaches bring forward the idea that every 
individual has its own motives and expectations from his membership in nationalist 
and/or terrorist movements.  
Recent analyses on terrorist organisations stress that a combination of both 
approaches offers more potential for structurally sound explanations on the 
phenomenon. Irvin, for example, combined the two approaches in her examination of 
ETA in Spain and PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) in N. Ireland.26 Her 
findings suggest that the strategies adopted by militant nationalist movements are the 
result of endless debates between the different subcategories of the movements’ 
activists. While the movement as a whole has a broadly defined and commonly agreed 
desired objective, for instance independence, not all members agree on a single 
strategy that will materialise said objective. A minimum standard of agreement 
between the sub-coalitions of a movement is required if such a movement is to be 
successful in the pursuit of its interests. Alternatively, the discords and disagreements 
between the subgroups will lead to the dissatisfaction of members, which in turn may 
provoke a split in the ranks or, simply, the degeneration of the movement itself.  
Splits in the ranks of ETA have taken place in numerous occasions since its 
emergence. ETA‘s persistence in the use of violence is largely attributed to those 
splits, with, on the one hand, moderates advocating the cessation, or at least limitation 
of the use of violence, particularly after 1981 when the Socialist Party PSOE won the 
elections (an indication that the country had surpassed the danger of the political 
right), and, on the other, the hardcore extremists who saw in violence the only 
potential to bring forward the cause. Every time, the story ended with the latter 
subgroup taking full control of the organisation. Nonetheless, it has been pointed 
out27 that the debates and the type of strategy ultimately adopted by a movement 
depend largely on its capacity to mobilise the necessary resources (from popular 
                                                 
26 Cynthia Irvin, 1999. Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque 
Country, London; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
27 Paul Wilkinson, 2001. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Portland; London: 
Frank Cass, pp. 16-17; Irvin, 1999, op.cit, p. 38-39. 
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support to access to warfare material); on the ability of its leadership to sustain a flow 
in the ranks and repel competition from other ethnonationalist organisations; and 
finally, on the nature of the state the terrorists attack and its policies towards their 
organisation as well as their cause. 
What the above shows is that, while most of the assumptions that have been 
made about terrorism are true, they all do possess a weakness: they attempt to build a 
separate school of thought, one that focuses very narrowly on what we call ‘terrorism’ 
(even though we have no agreement about what it is), but forgetting at the same time 
that object of their study is not a stand-alone practice and certainly not disconnected 
from other phenomena like nationalism or religion that put it to use. While I accept 
the different classifications and typologies of terrorism, I focus on ethno-nationalist 
political violence, with terrorism being only one of its manifestations. It defines 
terrorism as the incitement of, or threat to incite, terror by killing innocents in an 
attempt to maximise gains in a conflicting political relationship. This definition 
describes both types of state-terrorism as well as anti-state terrorism, since terror is 
inherent in both scenarios, and points to the nature of terrorism as a method. The 
thesis regards terrorism as one method of conducting ethno-nationalist conflicts; a 
method to incite the kind of violence encountered in war, with all the symbolism that 
war carries, but lacking the appropriate means to reach the scale. By symbolism of 
war, I mean that, if war is the ultimate solution and the cause is deemed as significant, 
men will go on and fight. Indeed, if I may paraphrase Clausewitz, terrorism is politics 
by other means. It might be war on the cheap, as classic terrorism theory informs, but 
that does not move away the intention, which in turn is promoted by a greater cause. 
Besides, terrorism is terrorism because it feeds on political and social stability. The 
greater the stability, the bigger the impact a terrorist attack will provoke. In other 
words, terrorism in war is not as useful since the horror of war is already too great to 
let the horrors of terrorism exceed it. Moreover, terrorism also makes use of and 
projects the symbols that emanate from the greater cause it claims to be fighting for, 
be it the proletariat, the nationalist, or the fundamentalist. Rather than just make use 
of a standardised language, common to all terrorist organisations of all sorts of causes, 
each one employs discourses that emanate from the cause the terrorist organisation 
has set out to protect and promote. It is hard to explain how some authors dismiss 
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such discourses as “fantastical”,28 especially when these are formed against a liberal 
democracy. Instead, one should keep in mind the conclusions brought forward by 
Crenshaw, that terrorism cannot be fully understood, nor explained, when detached 
from its historical, social, economic and political background.29
One argument why terrorism is a method put in the service of higher 
ideologies is that there are so many variations of it, ranging from political 
assassinations to mass terrorism. The choice of violence depends not only on the 
internal dynamics of the terrorist group but also on the general environment this group 
finds itself, namely the objectives and support of the broader ideological movement, 
the nature of the state, the group’s capacity to mobilise, and so on. Furthermore, some 
groups use warnings or try to provoke not as big a damage because the creation of 
fear works better than when threats are materialised. Again, it would be impossible to 
explain a particular choice by focusing solely on the group. Even in instances of state 
terrorism, it is self-evident that terrorism is a method to preserve power, order, to 
dilute any attempts of delegitimisation, and so forth. The fact that terrorism can be 
encountered in several levels, for example local, state and international, strengthens 
the view that it is used as a means to achieve higher ends.  
Some will be quick to refute the argument by claiming that it equates to 
terrorist propaganda. However, if terrorism were a one-way option for nationalists, 
every single nationalist would be automatically filling the ranks of the terrorist 
organisations. Yet, there are people who have opted not to use violence when 
promoting their political interests, and furthermore, people who were once members 
of terrorist organisations but have since renounced violence, even former terrorists 
that are now accepted and legitimate politicians. To do that, it means that one is of the 
opinion that under specific circumstances violence is necessary. That type of 
justification is what needs to be examined. 
A widespread view on this matter is that in instances where the state uses and 
directs terror towards its citizens, the violence used by them is seen as a legitimate 
means of defence. However, in liberal democracies terrorists have been branded as 
                                                 
28 Paul Gilbert, 1994. Terrorism, Security and Nationality: An Introductory Study in Applied Political 
Philosophy, London; New York: Routledge, p. 5. 
29 Martha Crenshaw, 1995. Terrorism in Context, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
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“petty minorities”30 and criminals, as is the preferred term for the authorities. Yet, one 
must not uncritically accept the role of the state, even if that state is a liberal 
democracy. Because, even though they brand them as criminals, liberal democratic 
states do adopt a different and harsher attitude towards terrorists than towards mere 
criminals, indicating perhaps with their behaviour that these criminals are somewhat 
more dangerous for the state than any other criminal. Here is where Crenshaw’s claim 
about terrorism’s agenda-setting function31 is important: if ethno-nationalist terrorism 
is political and it is taking place in a liberal democracy, not only is it not criminal, but 
it also manifests a grievance that has most certainly been overlooked. And the fact 
that it takes place in a liberal democracy should not necessarily qualify it either as 
criminal or irrational, or even “fantastical”. Instead, one should question the nature 
and behaviour of that liberal democratic setting towards the satisfaction of the 
demands of the aggrieved group. 
 If we accept that terrorism is a method, then it is evident that one must ask 
how did this method become established/agreed? In the case of Spain, terrorism first 
developed as an answer to the oppression of the dictatorial regime. But, with the 
establishment of democracy, it has not been eliminated, albeit it has certainly been 
limited in the last few years. But for that explanation to emerge, one must not only 
look at the structure and organisation of the group. It is certain that the numerous 
splits and long discords in the circles of ETA provide a partial answer as to why 
violence still persists.  
Nonetheless, it would be wise to examine the nature and behaviour of the state 
the terrorist claims to oppose. In the case of Spain, as it has been referred to in earlier 
chapters, there are plenty of examples of state-terrorism and a bleak period in Spanish 
counter-terrorist operations that became known as “the dirty war”. However, such 
practices not only have been abandoned but the perpetrators of the crimes were tried 
and convicted. Yet Basque ethno-nationalist terrorism is still there, refusing to 
abandon weapons, mentalities and attitudes. Maybe, then, one should ask what has the 
state done in terms of not merely terrorism but ethno-nationalist terrorism. That is, try 
                                                 
30 Paul Wilkinson, 1990. “Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom” in 
Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds.), Terrorism, Protest and Power, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp 44-
53. Quote at p. 48. 
31 Martha Crenshaw, 1990. “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic 
choice”, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of 
Mind, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-24. Quote at p. 17. 
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and analyse the greater cause the terrorists project and intervene in the process where 
a nationalist is transformed into an extremist and decides it is time to pick up the gun. 
Unless the deeper roots of the problem are analysed and unless the state refrains from 
re-evaluating its superficial anti-terrorist policies, either the liberal state will cross the 
line of authoritarianism, as terrorism theory informs, or it risks the possibility that 
terrorism is here to stay. 
So far, the Spanish State recognises violence and terrorism as the only 
dimension to the Basque problem. The political demands of the Basques for self-
determination and their political and institutional efforts to promote change are not 
viewed positively by Madrid. The recent successes of the security agencies and the 
international co-operation have certainly dealt some blows to the organisational 
ability of ETA but have not succeeded in cutting out the umbilical chord that feeds its 
ranks. There seems to be no educational initiative that addresses ways in which to 
transform political conflict into constructive dialogue. Indeed the only two measures 
the central State relies on are the regulation of the granted autonomy – which serves 
as an appeasement for the nationalists – and police and intelligence efficacy – which 
in effect act as the main deterrent for wanna-be terrorists. From the nationalist point 
of view, the former is more like a treat since it stops short of the grand objective and 
is always dependent on the state, thus there is great imbalance when it comes to 
expressing demands and having them satisfied. On the other hand, police and 
intelligence operations may result in errors, while imprisonment policies like the ones 
currently in force in Spain (where the convicted terrorists are transferred in prisons all 
over Spain, thus impeding contacts with their families) achieve everything but the 
State’s plan to reassure the members of the minority that their needs and interests can 
be looked and dealt with. Indeed, in such instances, these policies have the adverse 
effect of what they set out to achieve and it is the state that is accused as an instigator 
of terror. It seems that the most important deterrent in the use of violence comes from 
the public itself: everyone in the Basque Country knows of or is related to a victim of 
terrorism. And what is more, the social movement would not have been so strong if 
the need for peace was not there.  
 
Conflict Resolution 
The above helps bring forward the third hypothesis of this project: if terrorism 
in liberal democratic states is there to stay, those states have a limited gamut of 
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counter-measures at their disposal, particularly due to the openness of their societies. 
A successful strategy would be, on the one hand, to employ counter terrorist methods 
directed towards the particular individuals and organisations that propagate the spread 
of political violence; and on the other, to adopt measures that facilitate the 
communication, and to a certain extent the alleviation, of the group’s grievances 
through the political and democratic institutions.  
A liberal state’s mission in the fight against militant ethnonationalism is 
threefold. First, it must protect its citizens and those under threat by terrorist 
organisations. This implies that counter-terrorist measures and operations must be 
very precise in their targeting, and not to be extended to large masses of the 
population. In Spain, this has been recently achieved by a reformulation of strategy in 
conducting security and intelligence on Basque terrorism that would avoid the failures 
and the extremisms of the GAL plan. Aided also by close collaboration with foreign 
agencies, the result was the detainment of several high-ranked ETA members, whose 
absence became evident in the organisation’s strategic capability. Second, the state 
must prove itself to be a truly open and democratic state not only by welcoming 
communication of grievances and injustices, but also by rectifying them where they 
exist. This is clearly more of a conflict resolution, rather than counter-terrorist, 
approach and the Statute of Autonomies (that divides Spain in autonomous regions) 
was the first step, from the central authority’s side, for repairing the wrongs. The fact 
that the Basques (along with the Catalans) enjoy a greater deal of autonomy than other 
states within Spain, shows both the persistence and focus of Basque politics as well as 
the commitment of the central state to policies of appeasement. The third pillar of a 
liberal state’s fight against militant ethnonationalism should be the provision of 
assurances that the political institutions are more beneficial to the social group itself, 
and its relationship with the central authority, than the systematic use of violence. As 
it was mentioned earlier, terrorists have turned politicians.  
The problem that should be of concern, however, is those people that have still 
to renounce violence. We have seen that a decline of a movement depends on its 
degeneration, the loss of support from its broader movement, as well as the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures and policies. However, when the problem 
is seen as not the manifestation of violence but rather as the broader movement that 
creates spaces and allows for violent subgroups to emerge from its ranks, then 
violence cannot be dealt with effective policing and intelligence only. The state 
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should not look how to arrest and imprison those who use violence and those who 
support them, but also provide proofs and guarantees to the whole movement that 
their goals stand a better chance of being materialised without violence. Nonetheless, 
as it will be shown in the chapters that deal with the case study, in Spain this role 
seems to have been undertaken by the civic movement, particularly that of the Basque 
country, whereas the state seems to have been limited to effective, yet at the same 
time inadequate, policing. 
How does all this help us bring forward a framework for analysis of the 
Basque conflict in order to better understand why is it that terrorism persists despite 
the existence of the most favourable of conditions for the resolution, or even 
transformation, of this conflict? Earlier, it was explained how nationalism can be 
transformed into terrorism, that is, how violence can become part of the nationalist 
agenda. In a schematic way, and where N denotes Nationalism and T denotes 
Terrorism, this can be explained as  
N T 
 
Figure 1 
 
As explained earlier, the problem of comprehension does not lie in the fact 
that people find refuge in violence when it comes to protecting their ethnic group and 
everything that comes associated with it (primarily identity, but also language, 
culture, customs, etc.); rather, the question is why do they still opt for violence when 
democratic institutions are there and can be used for the acquisition of the same 
objective. At this point however, it must be noted that the functionality as well as the 
operability of said institutions might be perceived to be insufficient to democratically 
promote the demands of the minority. In the Basque case for instance, shortly after the 
transition, both the extremists as well as the moderate nationalist circles, including the 
PNV,32 rejected the central government’s concessions for autonomy because they 
perceived it to be simply another way in which the Spanish state would continue to 
violate the rights of the Basques.33
                                                 
32 PNV Communiqué of 19 November 1978, quoted in Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and 
Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 38 
33 Conversi, 1997, op.cit, pp. 148-149. Mees, 2003, op.cit., p.34; See also Robert Clark, 1979. The 
Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. The 
Triumph of Democracy in Spain, London: Methuen 
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The central authorities have accepted the nationalist dimension of the problem, 
but only insofar as autonomy is concerned; for them, the problem has already been 
solved. Therefore violence, which is what hurts the state both in terms of functionality 
(for example, a weakness to protect its citizens), as well as in terms of 
prestige/legitimisation, is criminal. What this points to is, as explained repeatedly 
throughout the text, that the central state has efficiently intervened in the process 
where nationalism is transformed into terrorism, but has failed to do so successfully 
precisely because it has failed to identify the ideology that gives rise to nationalist 
violence.  
 
Ideology      N /ct/ T 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
The state’s role in this schema is highlighted by its counter-terrorist (c-t) policies and 
strategies. Yet, police and intelligence efficiency are not conflict resolution-oriented 
approaches (CR). That would involve not only tactics that aim to eliminate violence 
but also educational and communicative approaches like workshops in every socio-
political level (grassroots, informal political, formal political), institution building that 
reflects the remedy of grievances of the particular minority rather than an enforcement 
or imposition of a solution, and negotiations between political parties as well as 
between administrations. If then, the root cause (RC) of a terrorist conflict is 
identified correctly by the conflict resolution approaches, then, not only is there a 
possibility to stop nationalism from adopting terrorism but also to enhance the civic 
and democratic elements within that nationalist movement.  
 
RC    N ¦¦ T /CR/ 
 
Figure 3 
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Up to a certain extent, this has already taken place in the Basque Country, primarily 
because of the local NGOs and the will of the people to see an end to violence. In 
Burton’s terms, while a separate identity, and perhaps independence, is certainly a 
need for the vast majority of the Basque citizens, peace is just as important a human 
need to them. The difference, as shown by the peace movement in the Basque 
country, lies in the prioritisation between the two: for the majority, peace comes 
before the nationalist objective. Peace, as the local movement has shown, is not 
simply the absence of violence of the extreme nationalist circles, but also the absence 
of violence and provocation from the part of the central authorities who want to 
impose their realities on the local population. The state, in parallel with the local 
peace movement, should target those individuals or groups that seem to invert that 
prioritisation and place violence above peace.  
This hypothesis has strong implications about the theoretical aspects of 
conflict resolution theory and is, again, closely linked with Burton’s writings on 
provention: By identifying the mechanisms with which the process from ‘moderate’ 
to ‘militant’ nationalist takes place, one automatically knows of ways and instances in 
which to intervene and change such processes. And, in order to identify those 
mechanisms correctly, one must be certain that it is the original root of the conflict 
(RC) that is accounted for. Certainly, the violence encountered in the Basque Country 
emanates from a nationalist cause. Yet, nationalism itself and in its totality is not the 
root of this conflict. Rather, it is those sectors of ideology that include violence in 
their nationalistic aspirations. Provention, hence, would include the development of 
systems and processes that are conducive to a form of civic nationalism (for example, 
through education and enhancement of social values engulfing peace; simultaneously, 
through strong political will to part with violent structures) that does not give up its 
objective or ideology but also unreservedly rejects any form of violence that seeks to 
accompany the nationalist drive. At the same time, the state should guarantee to the 
nationalist group that the necessary political and institutional framework will be 
granted in order for that group to safeguard its interests and diversity. It is only by 
orchestrating a combined effort of all actors – the local population, since it is they 
who are primarily concerned with and affected by any political decision regarding 
their status quo; the local political forces, since it is they who have access to the 
central state’s structure and institutional means; and the state itself since it has the 
monopoly of violence and, most importantly, sovereignty – that a transformation of 
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the conflict can occur. Considered as such, terrorism is eliminated from the equation 
as a concept, and therefore as practice or even tautology, of nationalist ideology.  
 
RC N T /   / /    /  
CR 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
The major drawback of the argument depicted in fig. 4 is that it depends 
heavily on an ideal political climate of consociationalism. A general climate where 
both parties must accept that being together is proved more fruitful than being apart, 
even though they are different. I consider this to be a serious theoretical flaw because 
it has its foundation on a limited, undefined and, maybe, unpredictable moment of 
time. It is also unaided by the fact that it fails to recognise there is scope for the 
manipulation of the scenery by the promotion of personal or partisan agendas.34 
However, the examples of Quebec35 and Catalonia36 have proven that constitutional 
nationalism can bring greater results when it comes to the protection of the nation and 
the promotion of different identity. While that very moment in which all conditions 
are favourable for the transformation of the conflict is unpredictable, both the Quebec 
and the Catalan case (hopes are constantly on the rise for Northern Ireland) prove that 
without this moment there is no foundation which will allow, through time, the 
necessary alteration of socio-political behaviours and mentalities to take place. 
Systems take time to evolve and, taking into consideration the particularities of each 
individual case, the development of such a strategy is just as unpredictable.  
                                                 
34 Oliver Richmond, 1998. “Devious objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A 
Theoretical Framework”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 707-722; Michel Wieviorka, 
1993 (trans. by David White), The Making of Terrorism, Chicago : University of Chicago Press; Irvin, 
1999, op.cit., pp. 38-39; Wilkinson, 2001, op.cit., pp 16-17. 
35 Michael Keating, 2001 (2nd ed.). Nations Against The State: The New Politics of Nationalism in 
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, pp. 77-139. 
36 Keating, 2001, op.cit, pp. 141-198; Conversi, 1997, op.cit. 
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 Conclusion 
In order to determine whether Basque terrorism is indeed dying out or whether 
it will continue to lie somewhere on the surface of Spanish politics, only to remind to 
the Basques, as well as to Madrid, that the problem remains unsolved, a variety of 
institutions, actors and sets of beliefs need to be analysed and explained. This thesis 
will seek to identify the institutions that facilitated the transformation of the majority 
of the population’s stance towards ETA, as well as the changes of the central state 
towards the nationalist movement, particularly since the establishment of democracy. 
More concretely it will seek to address the changes that these institutions (Spanish 
political parties, Basque political parties, central legal system, central and local 
security forces and, incrementally, non-governmental organisations) have undergone, 
and how and if they have affected popular support for violent tactics. At the same 
time, the case study will seek to identify the extent to which the general shift of the 
Basques from a violent to a non-violent strategy can be attributed to a set of beliefs 
widely shared among the population (whether, for instance, violence is justified in a 
hostile and violent political environment but not in a democracy), or whether every 
individual had its own particular motives for abandoning militant activities (ranging 
from a non-belief to violence, to dissatisfaction with the organisation). In sum, the 
answer as to how did this transformation in popular support took place, and whether it 
has indeed been successful, can only be brought forward by an examination of the 
influence of the central state towards the disaffected social group and vice versa, as 
well as the interests and motives of both to bring forward and sustain such 
transformation. 
The above lines will certainly prove very useful in the examination of the case 
study in question in this project, but they also highlight the complexity of 
ethnonationalist insurgent movements. For a totally accurate picture of the motives of 
individuals belonging in terrorist organisations, an examination of the desired goal 
only, and how the lack of it drives people towards a wish, or even will, to wage war, 
does not suffice. Examination of the drives, the wishes, the needs and experiences of 
every individual member would be needed for a fuller picture to come forward. And 
when that is achieved, it will then be necessary to proceed to further analyses of and 
observations on the social, political and economic environment that surround 
ethnonationalist movements and the terrorist organisations that spring from them. The 
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complexity of this framework might serve as an analogy to the difficulty of building 
an effective approach to the understanding and explanation of nationalist violence in 
this study, without giving prominence to either the nationalist or the centralist 
discourses and, most importantly, without being trapped in sketching who is the 
terrorist and who is the freedom-fighter (even though this dichotomy will never cease 
to exist).  
The three basic tenets of this project, nationalism, terrorism and conflict 
resolution, are at the core of the Basque question. The first two depict the nature of 
the problem, while the third, if applied carefully, highlights the possibilities for a 
solution to that problem. In order to comprehend the dynamics and forces behind 
phenomena such as nationalism and terrorism, one must view and examine each of 
them separately. However, if one is to fully explain and at the same time understand 
the particular peculiarities of the Basque problem, one must build a more complex 
image consisting of both the nationalist and the terrorist dimensions. Comprehension 
of nationalist discourses, and how they give rise to politically violent movements, 
complements the understanding of the dynamics of terrorism. Terrorism and political 
violence are employed as a method that is supposed to eventually satisfy a nationalist, 
and not terrorist, desire. For, even though the means might seem to transform into 
ends, as classical terrorism theory informs, one must not forget that for the few still 
believing in the power of the gun, their motive continues to be the very same 
objective they set out achieving in the beginning. Using the nationalist sentiment as a 
path to explain militant activity and behaviour can, in turn, provide the foundation for 
past conflict resolution initiatives to be assessed and future ones to be designed. The 
following chapter aims to highlight the instances whereby Basque nationalist 
discourse has given rise to, and justified, ethno-terrorist practices, while chapter 
Seven will explain the ways in which Basque civil society stole the conflict resolution 
initiative from the two main actors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Ethno-Terrorism and the Basques 
 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has offered a historical account of the emergence and 
perseverance of Basque nationalism and the different paths the nationalist movement 
has followed since its creation. Although accounts of the earlier phase of Basque 
nationalism, or Aranist period, seem too distant to enable us to understand and explain 
the dynamics of the contemporary movement and the individuals behind it, it is highly 
relevant to our examination because it is understood as part of the Basque tradition in 
general, its people’s customs, and national and cultural identity. Despite the 
transformations in his discourse, Sabino Arana is celebrated in the Basque Country as 
the father of the nation. The largest and most powerful nationalist party in the country 
is the one founded by him. Most importantly, and despite the differences in their 
approach, Arana and ETA were equally fierce in their defence of anything Basque not 
only vis-à-vis the Spanish, but also against Basques themselves who considered 
anything Spanish (language, customs, modus vivendi) to be either superior or 
convenient for their bourgeois interests. Had it not been for Sabino Arana, the literary 
works read and analysed in the congregations and meetings of groups like Ekin and 
EGI would have probably been very different, if not solely confined to purely folk 
material. And this is precisely what links Arana’s period with the contemporary 
matters: it is the nationalistic feeling. It is the sentiment that this group of people 
called Basques share and which they wish to transform into the foundation of an 
entity that allows them to govern themselves and hold themselves responsible for their 
prosperity, their misfortunes, their successes and failures in all spheres of politics.  
This chapter’s aim is to highlight the nationalist nature of the violence that has 
engulfed Spain in the last four decades. In doing so, it will provide the reader with the 
reasons that permitted violence to perpetuate and, unlike orthodox theories of 
terrorism, it will argue that it is impossible to understand the (Basque) terrorists’ 
motives, strategies and broader militant mentality without making direct references to 
the nationalist doctrine, which they themselves claim is their most fundamental 
inspiration. The argument moves along the lines of the broader critique that study of 
 159
terrorism as an isolated phenomenon cannot provide us with a sufficient explanation 
as to why it emerges or why and when can it be as persistent as in the Basque case.  
Terrorism in the Basque country has only been used as a method by the 
Basque radical elements of the nationalist circles, with the objective of achieving 
something that was not terrorist, namely self-determination and independence. The 
political behaviour of the Francoist State towards the ethnic elements of the Basque 
life provided a justification to the Basques, as well as the rest of Spain, that militant 
action was the only measure capable of dealing a blow to the regime. In fact, as we 
have seen, during the early years of the conflict and until well into the transition in 
Spain, independence and self-determination of colonised nations enjoyed the support 
of the UN. At that moment, the Basque movement was dually legitimised: as a self-
determination movement in the eyes of the Basques, and as the only movement 
capable of mounting a credible resistance to the regime, in the eyes of the Spanish. 
The latter view, combined with the fact that in its very beginning, ETA only targeted 
individuals that had direct connections to the regime itself (police and military cadres, 
judges and members of the government), facilitated the establishment of credibility 
towards the movement and, consequently, afforded them with high levels of support. 
Of course, the movement was branded a terrorist one by the Francoist State, and as it 
was explained in the theoretical section of this thesis, it is mainly the State (any State) 
that shows no or very little restraint in the use of the term, particularly in 
circumstances where its legitimacy is disputed and its monopoly of violence is 
duplicated by a non-mainstream political and violent actor. However, the definition of 
“terrorism” in this project and the theoretical clarification that terrorism is only one of 
many manifestations of ethno-nationalist violence, automatically imply the fluidity of 
objectives and tactics in a nationalist movement. In 1962, the general command of 
ETA, Zutik, was  verifying the above claim by stating that “between Ghandi’s non-
violence and a civil war there are intermediate methods of struggle”.1
The causes behind such a change of tactics and objectives are certainly 
important because they help highlight the links between a movement of self-
determination and the utilisation of terrorist violence for the promotion of the 
movements primary objective. The reaction of the public, however, is equally 
                                                 
1 Documentos Y, vol 2, p. 229. Most of the earlier publications and pamphlets by ETA and its 
commands are extremely rare. Between 1979 and 1981, the Hordago editorial amassed the vast 
majority of such publications and published them in 18 volumes, titled Documentos Y, and covering the 
period from 1954 to 1977. 
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relevant, because it defines the moment in which that transformation began.  In the 
Basque country, the failure of the movement to abandon its violence towards state 
mechanisms and actors after the regime’s fall and during the transition discredited the 
movement in the eyes of the general public. What is more, during that same period, 
ETA never sought to assure the general public that its enemies lie solely in the 
aforementioned categories.2 Rather, it escalated its violent attacks and broadened its 
targets to include party members in both sides of the border, making sure that there 
will be no misunderstanding of its aims or its persistence from the part of those that 
opposed it. Therefore, with regards to the terminological transition, it would not be far 
from the truth to claim that it was ETA’s actions, which in turn transformed the 
general public’s reaction and view on the movement’s efforts (the Spanish as well as 
that of moderate Basque nationalists who abandoned ETA’s ranks with the end of the 
dictatorship) that equalled Basque nationalism with terrorism. Because, unlike the 
dictatorship era, when governmental claims of fighting terrorists were discredited in 
the eyes of the Spanish citizenry, during and after the transition it was that very same 
public that supported anti-terrorist initiatives and policies from the part of central 
government.  
The description of the political and social circumstances during the transition 
set the context in which Basque extremism verified its supremacy inside the entire 
movement and the path it followed thereafter, with a discourse still very much under 
the light of colonialism despite the alteration in the rules of the game. This is followed 
by an analysis of the reasons why terrorist tactics obtained such a paramount role in 
the development of the movement’s strategy. The latter part of this chapter will look 
at the cultural structures that facilitated the consecration and perpetuation of violence. 
As stressed in earlier chapters, the Basque case is, on the one hand, an identity-based 
conflict and, on the other, it is a protracted one that has been on the fore for more than 
forty years. As such, it is worth uncovering circumstances where the violence has 
become part of the nationalist culture, not only exhibited by terrorist acts but also by 
those social circles who continue to support ETA, and often provide a fertile ground 
for its recruitment.3
                                                 
2 One may also ask whether it was not only ETA’s selection of targets linked to the regime, but also the 
(mis-) perception of the Spanish public that the regime itself was the only reason for ETA’s existence, 
and that the former’s disappearance implied the automatic disappearance of the latter as well. 
3 Daniele Conversi, 2006. “Why do peace processes collapse? The Basque conflict and the three-
spoilers perspective” in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), Challenges to Peacebuilding: 
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 The Transition and the Democracy 
The transition to democracy was a generally smooth process and, along with 
Greece and Portugal, it is recalled as one of the successful models for substituting 
authoritarianism with democracy.4 For most Spanish regions, transition equalled the 
transformation of a dictatorial regime into a parliamentary democracy. As was 
explained in the historical chapter, the moderate government of Adolfo Suárez had 
contributed greatly to the smoothness of the change. It established free elections and a 
bi-cameral parliamentary system, and legalised all trade unions and political parties 
(including the Communist and the nationalist parties). Shortly after the first free 
elections of June 1977, the Suárez government responded to the (until then 
suppressed) nationalist claims of Catalonia and the Basque Country by establishing 
provisional regional governments and institutions. In Catalonia, the political parties 
responded to that gesture by abandoning their offensive against the monarchy (which 
until then was seen as illegitimate) and the state apparatus, which was still manned by 
Francoist cadres.5 What is more important, all Catalan political parties present in the 
Parliament campaigned for the proposed Constitution of 1978. 
In contrast, the situation in the Basque Country was more confrontational due 
to the fact that it was more complex. As Mees describes, democracy for the Basques 
equalled self-government, and there is no self-government when there is three-
dimensional violence:  
 
“violence used as an instrument of the defenders of the dictatorship – including the 
anti-ETA terror commandos from the extreme right – against the Basque (nationalist and 
non-nationalist) opposition, violence as a consequence of the lack of democracy and self-
government, and violence as a means of political pressure and intimidation in the hands of 
the ‘armed vanguard’ of ETA”.6
 
 
As many other commentators have noted, the transition was perceived in the Basque 
country as just another way in which the Spanish state would continue to violate 
                                                                                                                                            
Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, New York; Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
pp.173-199. Quote at p. 187. 
4 J. Tussell and A. Soto (eds.), 1995, Historia de la Transición 1975-1986, Madrid: Alianza. See also 
A. Soto, 1998, La transición a la Democracia, Madrid: Alianza.  
5 Albert Balcells, 1992. Historia del nacionalisme català, dels origins al nostre temps, Barcelona: 
Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 204 
6 Ludger Mees, 2003. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities, 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.34. Author’s brackets. 
 162
Basque rights and customs.7 Indeed, the transitional government did not do much to 
reassure the Basque population of its commitment to the reforms programme. The 
same police units that operated in the Basque Country during Franco remained 
unchanged, and their massive presence did not help any political reform efforts to be 
seen favourably. A police assassination of five workers who were on strike on March 
1976, further aggravated the situation and triggered support demonstrations and 
strikes all over Spain.8  
On the political front, the situation was the complete opposite of what took 
place in Catalonia. PNV had declared that reinstatement of the Foral system was the 
only way the Constitution could be accepted by the Basques, but it had no means of 
promoting it as a clause in the text, since, due to its small party-size, it was left out of 
the parliamentary committee responsible for the drafting. And although the “historic 
rights” (the Fueros) of the Basques were mentioned in the document, the party 
continued to view reforms as “nothing but a simple act of delegation put into effect by 
the central power of the state itself”.9 It is in this context that one must view the low 
turnout of the Basques in the referendum for the Constitution in December 1978 
(Table 1).  
The sheer number of abstentions has been incorporated as an argument into 
the nationalist discourse – not only that of the labour & nationalist left (izquierda 
abertzale) but also that of the PNV –, pointing to the fact that a Constitution that has 
not been voted for by the people can only be imposed. Thus, any notion of autonomy 
is fake. One must also take into account a second, perhaps more mental and less 
practical, dimension of imposition: the fact that ETA, as it has been described in 
previous chapters, grew out of a discourse which was very much based on the 
decolonisation struggles taking place all over the world, and as such, it viewed 
violence as its legitimate protection. Although it is very difficult to measure the extent 
to which it could have been effective – mainly due to the levels of the Basque  
Table 1 Referendum on the Spanish Constitution (1978) in the four Basque provinces.10
                                                 
7 Daniele Conversi, 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist 
Mobilisation, London: Hurst & Co, pp. 148-149. See also Robert Clark, 1979. The Basques: The 
Franco Years and Beyond, Reno: University of Nevada Press; Paul Preston, 1986. The Triumph of 
Democracy in Spain, London: Methuen 
8 Mees, 2003, p. 35; Clark 1979, p. 269-271; Preston 1986, p. 82-83. 
9 PNV Communiqué of 19 November 1978, quoted in Mees 2003, p. 38 
10 Figures from different sources differ: according to the Basque Government, the abstention reached 
55.4% (Yes = 74.6%; No= 25.4%; Blank & Null= 7.3%) (See 
http://www9.euskadi.net/q93TodoWar/q93Desplegar.jsp). Fusi and Palafox, on the other hand, report a 
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 Votes % 
Yes 480.175 68,8 
No 166.461 23,8 
Blank/Null 51.692 7,4 
Voters 698.328 100 
Abstention 836.048 54,5 
Census 1.534.376 -- 
Source: Euskobarometer, University of the Basque Country, 
http://www.ehu.es/cpvweb/pags_directas/resultadosFR.html 
 
society in general getting accustomed to violence11 – deterrence of violent actions by 
the official cadres of the PNV during the transition period was totally absent. PNV’s 
older generation (those in and close to the leadership circles) showed the same 
inaction as they did during the dictatorship. ETA was the main protagonist of Basque 
nationalism and the PNV leadership seemed to consider that violence was justified 
since it was reactive to the violence experienced by the central institutions – although 
it was quite aware of the disadvantages this stand would accrue on its relationship 
with the central government. In fact, the party was entangled in an ambivalent 
position not only with regards to violence, but also on the political level: whereas it 
manifested its pragmatism under the circumstances by participating in negotiations for 
the establishment of the Basque Statute of Autonomy with the government of Madrid, 
at the same time the party was ascertaining that whatever the degree of autonomy, the 
end goal is always independence, presenting thus a radicalism usually found in the 
more extreme circles.12  
This general climate was to solidify into the main blocs that have characterised 
the Basque nationalist movement since then: mainstream political actors who wanted 
a piecemeal but nevertheless steady and stabilised process of autonomy, leading to 
independence, (PNV, socialist parties like Euskadiko Ezkerra – Basque Left, social 
                                                                                                                                            
46,7% abstention. See Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, 2003. España: 1808-1996. El Desafío de la 
Modernidad, Madrid: Espasa. 
11 Gurutz Jáuregui, “Consolidación y crecimiento de ETA (1969 – 1975)”, in Antonio Elorza (ed.), 
2000, La Historia de ETA, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, pp. 253-274, p. 261 . This is also what Horowitz 
describes as “the routinization of terrorism”. See Irving Horowitz, “The Routinization of Terrorism and 
its Unanticipated Consequences” in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), 1983. Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: 
the Consequences of Political Violence, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, pp. 38-51.  
12 S. de Pablo, L. Mees and J. A. Rodríguez Ranz, 2001. El Péndulo Patriótico: Historia del Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco, vol. II: 1936-1979, Barcelona: Crítica. 
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democrats like Eusko Alkartasuna) and, on the other hand, radicals and extremists 
such as the Basque National Liberation Movement (MLNV), headed by ETA and 
including parties and trade unions of the nationalist ambit (LAB, HB) as well as other 
organisations not so much related to the nationalist claim but rather more appropriate 
to the era (feminists, ecologists, youth movements etc)13. The clash between the two 
groups was not confined to the issue of how fake the autonomy is but also on the issue 
of territoriality. It was unthinkable for the members of the extremist factions to accept 
any autonomy offers by the Spanish government, so long as it granted Navarra 
separate autonomy and made no reference to Iparralde (the three Basque provinces in 
French territory).14 The moderates were accused of betraying the Basque nation by 
effectively burying the last chance for its salvation, and the extremists, with ETA at 
the vanguard, tried to destabilise the transition process by perpetrating more attacks 
and killing even more people. During the dictatorship, ETA did not cause more than 
forty fatalities in a year. Between 1978, when the Spanish Constitution was voted, and 
1980, when the Basque Constitution was upheld, two hundred and forty seven people 
died as a direct result of ETA’s actions (Table 2). 
 
       Table 2: ETA’s terrorist attacks since the transition 
YEAR ATTACKS MORTALITIES INJURIES
1978 261 67 92 
1979 232 80 173 
1980 219 100 94 
1981 219 33 36 
1982 254 39 48 
1983 237 40 66 
1984 222 33 52 
1985 152 37 66 
1986 128 40 164 
1987 74 50 211 
1988 78 19 98 
1989 104 19 39 
1990 108 25 111 
1991 126 45 286 
1992 48 26 69 
1993 49 14 58 
1994 45 13 28 
1995 57 15 96 
1996 78 5 55 
                                                 
13 Mees 2003, pp. 42-43. For a discussion on the organisations constituting the MLNV see José Mata, 
1993. El Nacionalismo Vasco Radical: Discurso, Organización y Expresiones, Bilbao: Universidad del 
Pais Vasco. 
14 Ibid., p.52. 
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1997 68 13 21 
1998 30 6 4 
1999 ETA ceasefire 
2000 47 23 54 
2001 45 15 67 
2002 24 5 63 
2003 21 4 17 
TOTAL 2926 766 2068 
Source: Colectivo de Víctimas de Terrorismo en el País Vasco (www.covite.org) 
 
The polarisation inside the circles of the nationalist ambit was transfused to 
the Basque society in general, where the population was divided in two fronts: those 
in favour of independence at any cost despite the change of regime (independistas), 
and those who saw the transition as a change in the rules of the game and either 
favoured a political negotiation towards independence, or even accepted autonomy in 
a Spanish context (españolistas). Mees’ description of the situation is most 
appropriate for the evolution of the two sides of Basque nationalism, not least because 
it brings forward the moment of transfusion of the nationalist symbols into the violent 
strategy:  
 
“Political violence became consecrated and the celebration of ETA activists, dead, 
imprisoned or alive, produced a mystical and emotional aureole around the movement, 
which penetrated even into the smallest rural area and destroyed familiar and friendship ties 
between those who joined the movement and those who did not”.15
 
The idea of violent reaction first emerged in the years after the Second World 
War, and although it never materialised, it was left as a legacy – almost as if it was 
part of the Basque tradition, that violent confrontation is what the ancestors would 
have done – until the mid-1950s when ETA was born out of the fusion between the 
two youth movements, Ekin and EGI.16 Even though ETA only started its violent 
attacks in 1968, the discourse about its usefulness and the potential benefits had 
started with the publication of Krutwig’s Vasconia, in 1963. From then on, as it was 
explained in the previous chapter, ETA built the theoretical model of “action-
repression-action”17 until the convention of its Fifth Assembly (1966-67), when the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p.57. 
16 José Maria Garmendia, 2000. “ETA: Nacimiento, desarollo y crisis (1959-1978), in Antonio Elorza 
(ed.), La Historia de ETA, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, pp. 77-168. 
17 See José María Garmendia, 1996, Historia de ETA, San Sebastian: Aramburu, p.242, for a report 
from ETA’s Fourth Assembly.  
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first schism took place between the advocates of mass insurgency and those of a more 
anti-capitalist focus. The latter would be the first group to abandon the organisation 
and form anew, which is also what happened to the Trotskiyist faction during the 
Sixth Assembly (1970), after a failed attempt to convince the militants that the 
organisation should move closer to the workers’ movement and utilise its capacity 
through their ranks.18 Both instances verified that the militants’ supremacy would 
guarantee the continuation of violence, although they would not abandon the class-
struggle rhetoric, since it was a social issue most felt by the vast immigrant 
communities in the Basque Country19 and it maintained the centuries’ old traditions 
of equality and social justice.20 That moment, according to many commentators, was 
the last moment of ideological debate inside ETA.21  
From that moment on, the only debate was how to combine the armed-struggle 
with the worker’s movement. That brought about a new division, between the 
majority of the organisation’s members who wanted a legal political platform but 
were prepared to couple it with violence in order for their efforts to be successful – 
ETA politico-militar (pm) –, and those whose focus lay solely with the armed struggle 
– ETA militar (m).22 While they both escalated their attacks and caused significantly 
higher casualties and damages than before, it was the latter that was the more 
militarily prepared, while the former endured the State’s wrath in the form of mass 
detentions, torture and further oppression in the Basque country. The response of the 
central security forces led to its demise from as early as 1976, until its complete 
dissolution and transformation into EE (Euskadiko Ezkerra – Basque Left) in 1982.23 
Some of its more extreme elements that avoided arrests joined forces with ETA (m). 
Once again, the hardcore elements of an entire movement were presented with the 
opportunity to take complete control of violence, during the transition and for the 
following thirty years.24 This branch of the organisation, ETA(m), is the one that still 
                                                 
18 Gurutz Jáuregui, op. cit., p. 261. 
19 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p.102 
20 Ibid., p.106 
21 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., p. 148; Jáuregui, op.cit, p. 260. 
22 Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, 2001. ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo, Barcelona: 
Tusquets, p. 56. While both subgroups agreed on the usefulness of violence alongside politics, their 
differences concerned the direction and organisation of violence.  
23 Jáuregui, op. cit., p. 266. 
24 For a detailed account of the internal schisms and debates in ETA, and an excellent analysis on the 
predominance of the extremist fractions inside the organisation see Cynthia Irvin, 1999. Militant 
Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press.  
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exists to this day, and references in this thesis to ETA will imply the aforementioned 
group.  
Virtually uncontrolled by the exiled members of the PNV, the strength of the 
organisation grew in terms of sympathy and support, fuelled mainly by the success of 
its attacks. ETA’s first-ever assassination of Melitón Manzanas, a well-known police 
interrogator and torturer in the Basque Country, the abduction of the German Consul 
in San Sebastian, which made Franco revoke the death sentences of the sixteen 
individuals captured and tried in Burgos for Manzanas’ death, and the assassination of 
Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco’s top aide and successor, all contributed to the 
establishment of heroic and powerful images for the organisation. For the Spanish 
audience, it was because ETA functioned as a vehicle of mobilisation against the 
regime. The Spanish general public had an opportunity to attach itself to ETA’s 
violent vehicle in order to defy the regime. It is the only way one can explain the state 
of civil disobedience that grasped the entire country during the Burgos trial25, and the 
many strikes that took place, both in Euskadi as well as in the rest of Spain. In the 
Basque country, on the other hand, it was not just that the organisation was fighting 
an oppressive regime, but a foreign one at that. Even though ETA’s every action 
would guarantee a state of emergency declared in the Basque Country, “open 
criticism of ETA was judged as open support for the regime”.26 The international 
attention and recognition received after the Burgos trial and assassination of Admiral 
Blanco automatically disqualified the regime’s claims of fighting a terrorist 
organisation and, in a sense, also cleared the path for the successors of General 
Franco.  
ETA maintained the members of the security forces as its primary targets, but 
from 1986 it made frequent use of car-bombs, which were more indiscriminate than 
the assassinations and caused many fatalities against civilians. The reasons for this, as 
explained by several authors,27 are the activity of the paramilitary group GAL that 
formed part of the State’s anti-terrorist policies, the beginning of collaboration 
between the French and the Spanish authorities, which put an end to the safe-heavens 
                                                 
25 Conversi, 1997, op.cit., pp. 100-101. 
26 Marianne Heiberg, “External and internal nationalism: The case of the Spanish Basques” in 
Raymond Hall (ed.), 1979, Ethnic Autonomy, Comparative Dynamics, New York, Pergamon, pp. 180-
200. 
27 Florencio Domínguez Irribarren, 1998, De la Negociación a la Tregua ¿El final de ETA?, Madrid: 
Taurus, p.56; Francisco Letamendía, 1994, Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de ETA, San Sebastian: 
R & B Ediciones, Vol. 3, p.27; Cuenca, 2001, op.cit., p. 98. 
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and the amnesty enjoyed by Basque activists, and finally the disarticulation of ETA’s 
leadership during 1985 and 1986. The collaboration between the French and the 
Spanish administrations proved an invaluable weapon in the fight against ETA, as it is 
explained in greater detail in the following chapter. During the 1990s, and in a period 
where all political forces in the Basque Country, with the exception of HB (ETA’s 
political wing), were united against terrorist violence,28 ETA’s reaction was to 
perceive such actions as a threat not only to itself, but also to the grand plan of 
national independence. And since the threat was now identified as political, ETA 
broadened its targets to include members of the Socialist and, in particular, the 
Conservative party, university professors, journalists and businessmen.  
With the arrest and detention of its leadership again in 1992, the result was 
further escalation of violence, both in terms of number of actions as well as nature of 
targets, and a rise in the kidnappings and robberies that guaranteed resources to ETA. 
As Mees points out, that “provoked generalised popular stupefaction” and a feeling 
that “nobody, except the group’s own followers, could exclude the possibility of 
becoming a target of political violence with complete certainty”.29 Despite the general 
negative feeling of the same people that the organisation claimed it represented, ETA 
showed its real aspiration by targeting the then President of the PP (Partido Popular – 
Popular Party), José Maria Aznar and King Juan Carlos in 1995. Both attempts failed, 
but are indicative of the degree to which ETA was prepared to utilise violence.  
In 1997, two of its kidnappings had an important repercussion in the public’s 
perception of and stand against ETA. In the first case, the victim (a prison worker) 
was held for 532 days and the plan was to starve him to death unless the central 
authorities agreed to the transfer of Basque prisoners into Basque prisons. The image 
of a skinny and extremely debilitated young man that emerged from a cellar room 
brought back memories of Nazi concentration camps and generated great antipathy, 
even among the organisation’s followers.30 A week after his release, the organisation 
kidnapped Miguel Ángel Blanco, a young town-councillor belonging to PP, and gave 
the authorities 48 hours for all ETA prisoners to be moved to Basque prisons. The 
                                                 
28 The political collaboration was agreed in the Pact of Ajuria Enea, in January 1988. The text can be 
accessed at 
http://www.diariodirecto.com/mm/14509.pdf#search=%22pacto%20de%20ajuria%20enea%22, last 
accessed on 2/8/2006.  
29 Mees, op.cit., p. 73. 
30 Belén Delgado Soto and Antonio José Mencía Gallón, 1998, Diario de un Secuestro: Ortega Lara, 
532 Días en un zulo, Madrid: Alianza. 
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small period of time given to the government to complete the task almost made 
certain the victim’s execution. His death provoked massive, multiple and, most 
importantly, spontaneous demonstrations with the message directed both towards 
ETA, to put an end to its attacks, as well as “to the policy makers to start working 
seriously on a solution to the conflict”.31 Despite the unpopular environment they 
found themselves in, HB officials blamed the central government’s inaction and the 
moderate nationalists’ stand for Blanco’s execution. The result, as Mees notes, was 
the identification of the party by the public as nothing more than ETA itself.32
Taking into account the building up of the violence and the change in the 
strategy and selection of targets, that social spontaneity can be interpreted as the final 
reaction to a feeling that has been growing in parallel with the organisation’s 
attacks.33 The Spirit of Ermua, as it was to become known and which takes its name 
from Blanco’s township, is a clear verification of the transformation of the 
organisation from a revolutionary one to a terrorist, since a) democracy has already 
been established both in Spain and in the Basque Country with its extensive 
Autonomy, and para-state activities with regards to anti-terrorist policies no longer 
occurred; b) the selection of targets does not verify the claims of occupation, but, 
rather the dictatorial style of a petty minority;34 and c) any activity is condemned by 
the very people that the terrorists claim to represent. The fact that the arrest of HB’s 
leadership, a few months after Blanco’s execution, did not provoke any protests or 
solidarity manifestations35 should be indicative of the disapproval of the tactics and 
the de-legitimisation of violence in the nationalist context.  
From that moment on, ETA found itself increasingly isolated. Despite the end 
of the ceasefire in January 2000, arrests and detentions of key-individuals inside the 
organisation, and closer co-operation with the French authorities, led to the 
dismemberment of the leadership once again in 2004 and a new, indefinite ceasefire 
was declared by ETA in March 2006. So far I have described the social and political 
circumstances, both in the legal as well as the clandestine ambits, under which 
violence was first introduced and favoured as a choice. I have also described the 
effect the lack of political consensus from the part of Basque nationalists had on 
                                                 
31 Mees, op.cit., pp. 74-75.  
32 Ibid., p. 80. 
33 For a historical categorisation of the public’s attitude to ETA see Jáuregui, op.cit., p. 272 
34 Paul Wilkinson, 1990, “Some observation on the relationship between terrorism and freedom” in 
Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (eds), Terrorism, Protest and Power, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 48. 
35 Mees, op.cit., p.80. 
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Spanish and Basque society, and its acceptance and support, respectively, of 
manifestations of violence. Finally, I have explained the reasons behind the changes 
in strategy and target selection, and the reverberations they had on the local and 
national society, the organisation and the nationalist movement in general.  
This analysis is fundamental and must be taken into consideration before 
exploring the reasons why violence became so strong an idea that it divided the entire 
community over its selection, and over such a large period of time. Furthermore, such 
analysis explains the reason why violence was still accepted and supported was 
because the political ambiguities and social uncertainties were not replaced by a 
much-sought stability by the end of the transition and with the establishment of 
democracy. It is also helpful in uncovering the links behind nationalism and terrorist 
violence; the fact that nationalist rhetoric can be dynamic enough to usurp the 
notion(s) of violence, virtually purify it from negative connotations and present it as a 
noble gesture, particularly in a strong, cultural context.  
 
The consecration of violence 
The majority of commentators recognise three phases in ETA’s history. The 
first, situated roughly between 1968 and 1978, reflects the organisation’s attempts to 
generate a revolutionary mass-movement that would be conducive to independence; 
the second, between 1978 and 1998, highlights ETA’s strategy of engaging into a war 
of attrition against the Spanish State; the last period, which began with the ceasefire in 
September 1998, lasts until our days, despite the fact that that ceasefire ended 14 
months later and another one was announced by ETA in March 2006.36 This last 
period focuses on the nationalist front, with non-nationalist civilians (politicians, 
journalists, academics) as the main targets and its principal objective is to pressure the 
Basque moderate nationalist political parties to include ETA and its political branches 
in the political process, rather than to form alliances with non-nationalist parties.37
These categorisations do not only constitute an academic theoretical 
framework which will contribute to the understanding of the terrorist dimension of an 
organisation but are the very views of many ex-militants interviewed in a study 
                                                 
36 Cuenca, 2001; Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, 2000, “El enfrentamiento de ETA con la democracia” 
in Elorza, op.cit.; for the first two periods see also Pedro Ibarra, 1987. La Evolución Estratégica de 
ETA (1963-1987), San Sebastian: Griselu; Patxo Unzueta, 1997, El Terrorismo. ETA y el País Vasco, 
Barcelona: Destino. 
37 Cuenca, op.cit., p. 64. 
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conducted by Reinares.38 Other wars of independence by colonised nations, notably 
Algeria,39 showed them that, at least at that moment, violence was the only way to 
achieve something, which was unattainable by any other means.40 That view was 
strengthened by the fact that the only element present in the relationship of the State 
towards the Basque nation was violence.41 The fact that the authoritarian as well as 
the democratic regime had succumbed to ETA’s pressure, the first through numerous 
occasions and the latter through negotiation rounds and secret talks, showed to them 
that ETA was the only force that could bring independence closer for the Basques.  
 
“Support to ETA does not depend as much on the successes or failures, the 
wise moves or the mistakes of the organisation, but rather it has profound psycho-
sociological roots that are connected to elements of personal and political self-
superiority. A self-superiority that is projected trough ETA.”42
 
There are two things the above quote makes obvious, one of which is the fact 
that ETA seemed to be acquiring a life of its own, despite – or, precisely because of – 
the numerous disagreements and schisms. Whether it is the ideological supremacy of 
the more extreme factions, or whether it is the departure of the organisation’s less 
radical members, ETA’s name is always linked to violence. Despite the vacillations 
between labour and secessionist discourses, Juan José Echave, one of ETA’s leaders, 
admitted that “ETA has never been defined by an ideology (in the strict sense), but by 
its spirit of struggle”.43 In the same line of spirit, Douglass and Zulaika claim that 
ETA draws its strength because it is a structure as much as it is a concept, and the 
constant supremacy of violent fractions is attributed to the nationalist legends that 
have surrounded ETA itself.44 The fact that everyone, from academic scholars to 
people in the street, has referred to and continues to refer to the organisation as ETA, 
despite its schisms and divisions through the years, verifies its conceptual nature.45
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In a study which provides an analysis into ETA’s strategies, Cuenca notes that 
for ETArras, an independent Euskadi is more important than a socialist Euskadi.46 His 
claim is that ETA is a rational actor, precisely because the changes in its strategy 
always reflect an attempt to balance the power(s) of the enemy, the Central State, but 
never disturb the centrality of the issue of independence. He also refutes the argument 
that all violence has taken place for the sake of ETA’s survival, even as a concept. To 
think otherwise, he notes, “would not explain why ETA would adjust its strategies 
through the years with the clear objective of gaining independence”.47 Besides, the 
fact that there are factions who have abandoned the organisation and formed new 
political and non-violent groups shows precisely that the survival of the organisation 
is not the basic tenet for its members. 
Despite the anti-imperialist discourse ETA adopted after the Sixth Assembly, 
Jáuregui attributes the prevalence of the organisation over the last thirty years to the 
francoist regime, not so much as the cause of ETA’s apparition but rather its 
condition. As he elaborates, the basic tenet of Basque (extreme) nationalism is that 
anything Basque is automatically and naturally opposed to anything Spanish.48 The 
two cannot be reconciled, for, in such instance, what is Basque is automatically under 
threat. That, as Jáuregui explains, is the main motor behind the feeling of the Basques 
being occupied by a foreign country and the Francoist regime served to verify the 
‘reality’ experienced by those Basque nationalist circles.  
The second observation with regards to the quote given earlier is very much 
linked with Jáuregui’s analysis and makes evident the Aranist model of exclusivist 
nationalism: the self-superiority of the Basques against the Spanish that is manifested 
through ETA’s actions. The past (myths, realities, circumstances) never disengages 
from the present when it comes to Basque nationalist discourse. In fact, what 
strengthens the argument of this thesis, that in the Basque case it is the nationalist 
sentiment that fuels the violence, is that the violence of the ETA militants follows the 
same pattern as the triadic structure of nationalist rhetorics,49 explained in the 
theoretical part of this study. The glorious past in the Basque case was so because 
Euskadi was independent and that was purely because the Basques fought for their 
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independence.50 It is the same principle as the one advocated by Arana; as is the 
second principle, concerned with the current degeneration of the nation, and the third, 
with the projection of a future which depends largely on the (pro-active) attitude of its 
members. The difference between the two discourses is the element and dimension of 
violence. As Muro explains, in the contemporary version of the movement “the 
nationalist triad legitimises the use of political violence as it is only the latter that will 
ultimately restore the nation’s original purity”.51  
In the Aranist period, the idea of independence was equally valued by the few 
proto-nationalists and the sympathisers of ETA, but the circumstances that led 
violence to become the trident of Basque nationalism differ between the two phases. 
In the early stages, and despite his racist cronies against the maketos, Arana did not 
advocate any more violence than the description of the Basques’ past as one of 
fighters and heroes. His primary concern was independence but first he had to awake 
that lacking national consciousness of the Basque people and, second, separate them 
from the maketos. Mobilisation for his cause was difficult and his audience was very 
limited. In ETA’s years, however, the circumstances that favoured violence are 
different. First, the study of the Basque past had now become more extensive and 
more systematised than when Arana first started working on it. Invariably with other 
nationalist movements around the world, the historicists’ legacy was treated as true 
existing historical references that proved the Basque’s glorious past and served as a 
measure of comparison with the degenerative present. ETA was born from such a 
group of students. Second, the anti-colonisation struggles and the admiration they 
generated among Basque nationalists, in a context where ‘colonialism’ and 
‘occupation’ would be the only regimes mentioned by Basques in order to describe 
the situation in Euskadi. But third, and most important, the violence exerted by the 
authoritarian (and later corrupt, in the case of the GAL) State, and which legitimised 
the feelings and discourse about anti-colonial efforts, and strengthened the myths that 
came to surround the entire movement first, and ETA later, once it was evident that it 
is the strongest and most ruthless actor in the game.  
Further ethnographic examination of the transfusion of violence into the 
nationalist discourse makes discernable certain cultural elements that serve as a link 
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between the present and the past both in terms of identity, and also in terms of 
guidance and action. The word ekintza means precisely that (action), and it was used 
during the first moments of ETA and is used until today to describe any violent 
actions of the organisation. Its verb form, Ekin (to do), was the name of ETA’s 
forerunner and its “founders conceived it as opposed to the static, outdated and 
passive attitude of the old […] generation”.52 The meaning of action in the Basque 
life has been attributed to the religious doctrine of living a life strictly dictated by the 
religious belief,53 and it has come to represent Basques virtually as a national 
definition.54 As in the Aranist discourse, a true Basque is one who fights for 
Euskadi’s liberation55 and defends the symbols of the nation’s cohesion and 
differentiation.56  
After four decades of existence, “ETA has acquired its own legends, myths 
and martyrs” and “each ekintza has the potential of becoming a morality tale with its 
own heroes and villains”.57 Certainly, this view is shared by many of Reinares’ 
interviewees, who claim that the mysticism and ritualism that surrounded the 
organisation and, to a certain extent the entire movement, aided their nationalist 
sentiment and contributed to their decision to become active members.58 The social 
prestige, however, that comes with heroic acts is a fallible justification, because, as 
Cuenca notes, in a society where the notion of national independence is so strong, no-
one will be accorded the status of a hero if it is perceived that gaining recognition was 
the ultimate objective of their actions.59 And while social prestige and admiration are 
closely linked with ethno-nationalist conflicts, in the Basque case they seemed to 
enforce, rather than generate de novo, the pre-existing motivations on the issue of 
violence and its utility.60
Even during the nineties, when public support for ETA, principally in the 
Basque country, began to erode, the justifications for the continuation of violent 
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actions were found in the treatment of prisoners, which generated in the prisoners 
themselves, as well as their friends and relatives, a strong feeling of hate for anything 
Spanish and a sense of revenge.61 Independence was felt as the only way to channel 
that revenge and the only cure for the Spanish ‘occupation’. In his study, Reinares 
makes particular reference of the fact that independence comes before everything else 
for ETA’s militants, even before the type of regime a future Euskadi would have.62 
The issue of independence is not just an occasion for ETA, because if it is merely a 
pretext, then, the very moment that the pretext disappears, ETA will have no reasons 
to utilise violence.63 Interestingly at this point, Preston notes that the abandonment of 
violence was not an easy process for the ex-members of ETA(pm) and that the 
decision generated “internal division, schisms and a nostalgic longing for armed 
action”64, which makes Conversi highlight the violence’s role as “a functional 
unifying imperative”65, thus verifying theories of moral disconnection, which allow 
for justification of violent actions in the context of a just war,66 and/or processes of 
inversion, whereby the means become the ends.67  
While discussions of moral disengagement have been brought forward by 
orthodox terrorism theories in order to justify the ways in which terrorists operate and, 
ultimately, justify violence in order to utilise it, the fact that violence is abandoned by 
the very actors who advocated its usefulness, ultimately proves that they ceased to 
believe in its instrumentality.68 The continuation of violence as a method to reach the 
desirable goal, by those who maintained a belief in its utility, stems from the 
perception that the goal itself is obtainable. ETA is the product of a broader set of 
myths and it is also the vehicle that generates the perception around the success of 
achieving the objective. It is the same sentiment that transformed ETA into a symbol 
and an emblem in the first place, for those circles of Basque nationalism that 
considered the organisation to be not only the first throughout Spain to have 
effectively opposed the Forces of General Franco, but also the first to actively defend 
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Basque interests and promote a solution to the problem of ‘occupation’, since the 
establishment of the Second Republic in the 1930s. It is this feeling of ‘occupation’ 
and every negative element that it brought forward, and which facilitated the further 
dichotomisation of identities, that generate such an expression of nationalism that 
allows violence to continue.  
Nevertheless, that does not equal the academic descriptions of individuals 
being violent simply for the sake of it, or instances where violence substitutes the end 
goal, because the latter is no longer realistically attainable. The instrumental character 
of the violence in the Basque case is always present and the higher drive or cause is 
readily identifiable. The fact that for most observers, as well as members of the 
communities involved, it is reasonable to assume that under the current liberal 
institutions on which the Spanish state is founded, and with such a broad political 
agreement between local and central political parties, the end goal is very unlikely to 
materialise through the use of violence, it does not necessarily mean that the same 
image is shared by militants. For, even if their actions are for revenge, or hide other, 
more complex personal justifications, the desire for an independent or, better put, the 
discourse of an occupied Euskadi, is always behind their strategies. This argument, 
along with the existence of a concept of strategy (guerrilla war, war of attrition, 
avoidance of political exclusion), verify the tenet of this thesis that when one speaks 
of or studies political violence, one cannot separate the ‘political’ from the ‘violence’ 
and examine the latter irrespectively of the former.  
 
The Radicalisation of Counter-terrorism 
Throughout the conflict, there was little effort from the Central authorities to 
co-ordinate a serious counter-terrorist strategy. What little was done, reflected the 
attempts of other nations that were faced with terrorism. It was in that context that the 
GAR (Grupos Antiterroristas Rurales – Rural Anti-terrorist Groups) were formed and 
their primary objective was to guard against a transformation of ETA’s urban warfare 
into a rural guerrilla and the elimination of the possibility that ETA might want to 
create “liberated zones” where the State would have to fight to regain control of.69 
Furthermore, the speed of the political transition did not equal the reform of the 
                                                 
69 Florencio Domínguez Iribarren, 2000. “El enfrentamiento de ETA con la democracia” in Antonio 
Elorza (ed.), La Historia de ETA, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, p. 310. 
 177
security forces and other civic aspects of the state apparatus.70 As a result, violation of 
human rights by these agencies was frequent. 
The first systematic attempt to combat terrorism was made in 1981, when the 
Minister of the Interior – also responsible for the initiation of the re-insertion 
procedures in 1982 – decided for the creation of a single and centralised system of 
intelligence exclusively on matters of terrorism (Mando Único para la lucha 
Contraterrorista). It was under this set of initiatives that social reinsertion of the 
terrorists was allowed and its major effect was the self-dissolution of ETA(pm).71 
Towards the mid-1980s, the collaboration between Spain’s Socialists that were in 
office and their French counterparts deprived ETA of its sanctuary, since France not 
only stopped granting political refuge to ETA members, but also actively participated 
in the uncovering of ETA’s commandos and high cadres hiding in its territory.72 
Iribarren also claims that the changing in the French posture coincided with a period 
in which the organisation had visibly stopped growing; the arrests totalled more than 
the new memberships/insertions.73 Furthermore, the special status the ETA prisoners 
enjoyed, that is, isolated from other criminals and grouped together, was reformed in 
the mid-1980s, and ETA prisoners are now dispersed all over Spain – an issue that is 
of great importance to their families as well as the nationalist circles who view this 
policy as a violation of the prisoners’ and their families’ human rights. 
During the 1990s, the civil society throughout Spain, and particularly in the 
Basque Country, began to actively participate in rallies and protests against ETA’s 
acts, which in 2000 – ETA’s deadliest year since 1992 – reached a million 
participants in Madrid only.74 ETA’s increasing violence contributed to the adoption 
of that stand by the civil society, and José Maria Aznar’s centre-right Partido Popular 
election in 1996 picked up the social pulse and adopted a quite tough stance against 
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terrorism. As Prime Minister Aznar himself declared, appeasement was not a viable 
solution to the problem of violence,75 and the police efficacy in arresting Etarras and 
dismembering the local cells of the organisation proved to him that this was indeed 
the only viable way. During his first period in office (1996-2000), Aznar’s party 
depended on the collaboration with Basque and Catalan moderate nationalists in order 
to form a government. Despite that fact, however, his centre-right government did not 
reconsider the demands of the Basque parties for a re-examination of the penal 
policies that were in place since the Transition, and which allowed for the dispersion 
of prisoners throughout Spain.76
Inspired by the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland77 the nationalist 
parties in the Basque Country agreed to bring forward an agreement – the Pact of 
Lizarra of September 1998 – which, among others, called for the continuation of 
negotiation without the exclusion of any of the implicated parties, even though direct 
mention of ETA was avoided in the document.78 Furthermore, the agreement defined 
the Basque conflict as a purely political one, it called for the continuation of agenda-
less negotiations for the resolution of the conflict and, more crucially, it recognised 
the sovereignty of the citizens of the Basque Country.79 Even though the Pact brought 
forward the first indefinite and unilateral ceasefire announced by ETA, Conversi 
argues that the clause on sovereignty gave Aznar’s government the excuse it needed 
in order to criminalise the entire nationalist block in the Basque Country.80 As Mees 
states, Aznar’s commitment to the cease-fire as well as to a potential process of 
resolution through the ceasefire was questionable, considering how in 1999, during a 
round of negotiations with two of ETA’s negotiators in Zurich, the Spanish 
government leaked the names of the mediators with the arrest of one of the two 
interlocutors as a result.  
Aznar’s hard-line, non-collaborative stand during his first election in office, as 
well as the police efficiency and trans-border co-operation with the French agencies, 
resulted in an increasing membership for the party, even in regions like Guipuzcoa 
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that until then had been the most nationalist province in the Basque country.81 The 
profitability of the party’s discourse that the core problem of the Basque conflict is 
terrorism rather than nationalism,82 peaked in 2000, when the party won the elections 
with an absolute majority. Until then, Aznar based his counter-terrorist policy on a 
cessation of negotiations, a refusal to give in to blackmail, as his Minister of the 
Interior confirmed.83 But the absolute majority with which the PP was elected in 
office seemed to be the perfect opportunity for Aznar to promote a set of policies that 
signalled to the Basque nationalist block that, again, terrorism was not the problem for 
the central State, but rather the will of the local population to differentiate itself 
culturally. The ban of the political party Batasuna in August 2002, and the closure of 
Egunkaria, the only Basque newspaper, in 2003 and the arrests of its staff were 
perceived as an attack to the freedom of speech and verified to the local population 
(particularly to the moderate nationalists) their fears that originated in the beginning 
of transition: that the State was against the cultural differentiation of the Basque 
Country. “The very Francoist roots of [PP] were now laid bare to see and were 
rediscovered as an argument of popular polemics”.84 The result of these policies were 
the radicalisation of the nationalist block, not only of the extremist circles but also of 
the more moderate ones who now felt as threatened as the individuals that utilised 
violence and as such posed an obstacle to the wishes of the more moderate, more 
liberal nationalist sectors. This chronography of counter-terrorist context manifests, at 
the very least, not just the alignment of Aznar’s government with orthodox theories of 
terrorism, where the terrorists must be fought in every possible way in order for the 
state’s liberal structures to survive, but also the failure to prevent complicating the 
conflict further and, thus, making the stalemate impenetrable.  
 
Conclusion 
What the latter part of the 1990s shows us, at least from the part of the public 
reaction towards ETA’s activities, from the dictatorship until into the new century, is 
that ETA must be seen as a product of Basque nationalism in order to understand how 
it usurped its myths and symbols and used them, ultimately, against itself and the 
people it claimed to be part of. Unless this connection is achieved, it will be 
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impossible to incorporate a framework of conflict transformation, and ultimately 
resolution, that identifies correctly the roots of ethnoterrorist activity. Far from 
espousing the terrorists’ discourse, this thesis seeks to understand their motivations. 
As I have shown, the belief in independence was very much the motor behind the 
violence experienced in Spain and Euskadi, and any attempts to resolve such a 
conflict must identify and focus in that root cause. That identification should 
concentrate on both the discourse of the ethno-terrorists as well as the actions and 
discourse of the State. In the first case, the authoritative nature of the dictatorial 
regime made evident that the only way the Basques could defend themselves was by 
achieving self-determination. In other words, break every link and association with a 
state that manifested violently that the Basque Country had no legitimate right to 
claim its past and difference of culture. Different, that is, from the culture of the 
central State. This is the very moment that self-determination as an objective is linked 
to ethno-terrorism, which is the means to achieve the objective. Furthermore, the 
myths and historicisms of the different culture become the very justification not only 
of the end-objective but, most crucially, of the means for its attainment. 
On the other hand, the State contributed greatly at instilling the feeling of 
difference and the need for separation in the Basque population, not only during its 
dictatorial phase, but also later, when democracy was well established. As a result, not 
only did it not impede the association of violence with the objective of self-
determination but it provided further justification for the Basques that, whether in a 
dictatorship or in a democracy, the Spanish State did not wish to understand and work 
with the local population in order to remedy its grievances. In other words, both the 
State and the nationalist movement (with extremist as well as moderate circles) 
became locked into the paradigm offered by the orthodox terrorism theories that the 
State was defending its survival by fighting the terrorists, whereas the nationalists 
were fighting the ‘terrorist’ State in order to gain their freedom. Under these 
circumstances, therefore, and despite the numerous meetings and negotiation rounds 
between the State and ETA, it becomes evident that there is little scope for conflict 
resolution approaches to have a significant impact in the transformation of the attitude 
of either side. This is the point where my thesis’ argument becomes relevant, because 
the active involvement of the local civil society manifests that it is the only actor that 
is ignored by both the State and the organisation and it highlights that ethno-terrorist 
violence as well as the violence exhibited by the State only manage to reinforce the 
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dead-end conceptions of the nature of the conflict. The implications for the orthodox 
theories of terrorism are that dichotomisations of such nature inhibit, rather than 
contribute, an understanding of the root causes of ethno-nationalist violence. On the 
other hand, the very attitude of the local civil society also has implications for theories 
of peace-building and conflict resolution according to which the grassroots level is 
incapable of initiating an entire process of conflict transformation that can lead to the 
rejection of violence, first, and the adoption of liberal institutions for the promotion of 
the end objective, even if that seemingly contravenes the structures of the State and, 
seemingly again, poses a threat to its survival. 
The following chapter will analyse the counter-terrorist methods employed by 
the Spanish state, both in political as well as security terms, and is based on the fact 
that such perceptions, if analysed correctly, can be useful in the drawing of a 
resolution, and perhaps pro-vention,85 framework that will see the links between the 
ideology and the selected method collapse. That was certainly the reaction of a large 
part of the Basque public and its role as a civil society will be of equal importance to 
the State’s practices in bringing forward such a framework. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conflict Resolution and the Basques: 
The Human Need for Peace. 
 
 
 
The previous chapter has shown how the internal dynamics as well as the 
external circumstances have favoured the perpetuation of violence. It was also seen 
how the violence experienced in the Basque country is generated by the perception 
and/or belief for certain groups of the Basque population that violence is justified by 
their part, as long as the objective remains to make the central State succumb to the 
extremists’ demands. It is logical to assume that these groups of people consisted not 
only of the active members of the organisation, but also by a circle of supporters, who 
provided invaluable help with the logistical aspects of the organisation (funding, hide-
outs, etc), even though the general stand of the broader Basque society was 
incrementally distancing itself from any type of nationalist violence, and at the same 
time, the efficacy of the security forces, the cross-border collaboration with France, 
and international circumstances like September 11th and the subsequent War on Terror 
have verified that the organisation was nowhere near winning the war of attrition and 
imposing itself and its demands on the central authorities. It was also shown in the 
previous chapter how that perception was reinforced, in the beginning and until the 
early 1990s, by the anti-terrorist practices of the State which were conducive to the 
idea that it is not the terrorists that are sought, but rather an elimination of the 
Basques.  
This chapter will explain the lack of political initiative for the generation of a 
viable solution to the Basque conflict. It will show how this absence of serious 
political dialogue that would actively seek to marginalise the terrorist organisation 
and the social networks on which it finds support, was not the fruit of political 
deliberation and party negotiations. Rather, the Basque society itself was the main 
motor behind the anti-violent machine that started emerging in the Basque Country at 
the end of the 1980s and has gained such momentum that it is now inconceivable to 
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speak about attempts to resolve the conflict, or even kick-start a political dialogue, 
without social organisations and civic platforms taking part. More than anything, it 
was these organisations that showed the parties what the social bases really wanted 
from them and paved the way to a ‘normalisation’ of political life in Euskadi. That is, 
an adherence from the part of the extremists to the liberal institutions established with 
the Statute of Autonomy for the local community as well as an adherence from the 
part of the state to its pluralist nature and the cessation of undermining of the very 
institutions that it conceded to the Basque Country.  
The previous chapter offered an analysis of the major characteristics of 
counter-terrorist policies and strategies as they were deployed by the central state 
from the end of the transition until the first year of the new century. Such analysis is 
useful, not only because it highlights the administrative transition from an 
authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy, but also because it underlines the 
principal discourse of the state that there is no conflict with the Basques any more but 
rather with elements of the Basque nationalist movement who are unnecessarily more 
violent than other individuals of the same ambit. 
In order to analyse the resolving tendencies (or lack thereof) of the principal 
actors in this conflict, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first lists the major 
ceasefires that the organisation has announced since the end of the transition and 
explains the reasons and the circumstances that led to their cancellation. The 
persistence of the organisation until now does raise suspicions as to whether they 
were indeed ready to lay down their weapons and to what extent these ceasefires were 
genuine or in fact part of a broader strategy of devious objectives,1 primarily that of 
engaging with the state in a war of attrition. This part also details the most critical of 
the several attempts that were made for a negotiation to take place between the two 
actors and the reasons that led to their cancellation. 
The second part of this chapter looks at the social initiatives that led to the 
mass mobilisations experienced in Euskadi, the establishment of a strong anti-
violence conscience and the repercussions that the new civic movement had on the 
design of the political discourse and the emergence of political alliances that focused 
not on electoral gains and discourse supremacy but rather on the end of violence and 
the promotion of the same objectives with categorical non-violent means. The very 
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nature of these movements and their social, as well as political, behaviour is the key 
to understanding the basic thesis of this project. Non-violent nationalist discourses 
and political designs can exist in a liberal democracy even when independence and 
secession are the ultimate objectives. The possibility that no central authority will 
commit political (and territorial) ‘suicide’ and allow for such a decision to be made by 
the minority group that claims to be entitled to such a decision, is almost irrelevant, so 
long as such decision rests on constitutional means and, evidently, expresses the 
wishes of a large part of the population affected by such decision.  
The question this chapter raises is how can the violent variable be eliminated 
from the entire nationalist equation, irrespective of the degree of success of the end 
objective or not. The exploration of the aforementioned factors will lead to an 
understanding of such circumstances and will throw further light on the possibilities 
that self-determination can be debated upon in a liberal democracy and, in the absence 
of violence and where the circumstances are favourable (political and social will, an 
unquestionable rejection of all forms of violence related to the end objectives, and a 
commitment to dialogue both among the diverse political forces of the region as well 
as those of the rest of the country), the benefits of such an approach can be superior to 
and more easily accessible as well as achievable, than those of a terrorist strategy.  
 
Failed ceasefires, incomplete negotiations 
The first ceasefire was announced in 1981 by ETA(pm), even though they 
were to resume activities one year later, which gave the green light to the leader of the 
Euzkadiko Ezkerra (EE) party to enter into negotiation with the then minister of the 
Interior.2 No substantial political matters were discussed, as Mees records, but that 
was due to the fact that the Basque negotiators were not in a position to push their 
demands, at the time when the acceptance of the Statute of Autonomy was already 
causing serious reaction to right-wing and military circles of the Spanish society. The 
attempted military coup in February 1981 was a verification of that reaction.3 And 
secondly, the implementation of the Statue and the electoral success of EE in its first 
year were received by some militant nationalist sectors as a first-class opportunity to 
the normalisation of their lives and their re-integration in society and (nationalist) 
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Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 65. 
3 Ibid. 
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constitutional politics.4 The result of the negotiation was the amnesty, albeit 
bureaucratically slow, to around 200 of ETApm’s paramilitaries.5 The plan’s success 
was manifested with the dissolution of ETA(pm) in 1982.  
From that moment on, the only protagonist in the violent game would be 
ETA(m), strengthened by the infiltration of former ETA(pm) members who disagreed 
either with the softness of the negotiations, or with the organisation’s dissolution and 
still wanted to be active members in the fight for independence.6 It is interesting, 
however, to point that the re-integration of former activists was not received well by 
ETA(m), who considered these individuals to be co-operating with the enemy. That 
gave the organisation the perfect excuse to turn the weapons against its former 
members, as a result of which, very few activists came forward to petition for 
pardon.7 ETA had dealt a blow to the State’s anti-terrorist policies by obtaining full 
control of its imprisoned members. 
Despite that ferocity, it was the political and strategic aspects that led ETA, in 
1986, to start a new round of negotiations in Algeria. With regards to the former, 
PSOE’s (Spanish Socialist Party) government for two consecutive mandates was an 
indication of the political stability enjoyed nationally and the westernisation of the 
economy (and politics) of the country. On the other hand, the change of practices 
from the part of the French authorities, who extradited Basque activists to Third 
World countries and kept them incommunicado from their comrades, significantly 
damaged ETA’s re-organisational capability and, hence, negotiations could at least 
buy them some time.  
During the Algerian round, ETA’s ceasefires were somewhat theoretical, since 
neither the killings nor the kidnappings and the robberies stopped. When the 
negotiations broke down in 1989, it is assumed that the main reason was the belief of 
both parties that a military win against the enemy is still possible.8 In the case of 
ETA, its negotiators were of the Old Guard and hence, they had a pragmatic view on 
the possible gains of such meetings. Their pragmatism, however, was in direct 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 63. 
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Reno: University of Nevada Press, p. 109. 
6 Mees, 2003, op.cit., p. 66. 
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contrast to the views held by the leadership of the organisation, which originated from 
the hardcore elements of ETA(m) and was based in France, something that denotes 
the distance between them and the speed and character of the events. What is more, 
there was a natural discord between the two factions, with the latter claiming that they 
are negotiating from a powerful position and can afford to torpedo the talks; more 
violence, as a cause of the breaking-down, would push the state into new rounds and 
hence help ETA achieve its principal objective.9  
On the other hand, the negotiators of the Socialist party were in a similar 
situation. As Mees explains, they were not in a powerful position that offered them 
influence within government circles, nor did they command a prestigious position in 
the party’s circles.10 Furthermore, the involvement of the Secret Service annulled the 
efforts of the negotiators and put further pressure back in Madrid to not succumb to 
any terrorist demands. Judging by ETA’s communiqué, in which it blamed the 
government for not sticking to the terms of the final agreement, make commentators 
assume that it is possible that the terms to which the government’s negotiators agreed 
were not accepted by their superiors in the Ministry or the Presidency.11  
The beginning of the peace process in the nineties was nowhere near 
promoting a sustainable, or better still, a self-sustaining peace. The coming to power 
of PP brought with it a change in counter-terrorist policies. Whereas the PSOE had 
inherited some policies brought forward by the transition government (for example, 
the social re-insertion schemes) and its public discourse was always one of 
exploration of possible ways out of the violent path, PP came to power virtually 
because of its pre-electoral campaign which was based on tough measures against 
terrorism and almost no concessions in the political field. The objective of the two 
parties, therefore, was diametrically opposed, with ETA having independence as the 
top priority and the government unwilling to talk about anything other than security 
issues and prison policies.12  
It is true that despite these difficulties, it was at the end of that decade and 
with PP in power that ETA announced its most important ceasefire and the one that 
lasted longer than any other before. In 1998, and following a contact made by ETA, 
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11 Ibid., p. 70. 
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PNV came to an agreement with the organisation and the radical nationalist parties to 
redefine the rules of the game. In line with the progressive and exemplary events 
taking place in Northern Ireland, the organisation announced an indefinite ceasefire. 
While a more elaborate explanation of the comparison between the Basque and the 
Northern Irish case, with regards to the ceasefire, is given further below, suffice it to 
say here that HB was not as empowered as Sinn Fein was, and that the agreement for 
the ceasefire was between the moderate political forces and the terrorists themselves, 
rather than their political leaders. Some commentators highlight the importance of the 
social reaction to ETA’s mounting attacks, which at the time focused almost 
exclusively on councillors and members of the PP. The kidnapping and cold-blooded 
assassination of Miguel Ángel Blanco in 1997 is one of the instances recognised by 
commentators as catalytic to ETA’s decision,13 not least because it manifested to both 
ETA and PNV that the principal debate for the Basque citizenry was the usefulness of 
terrorism, not that of nationalism.14 The instances of arson and general attacks to the 
political offices of HB throughout the Basque Country were the most vivid trace of 
the popular sentiment towards nationalist extremism.15  
However, the negotiations between PNV and ETA that led to the declaration 
of the ceasefire were not made public until ETA announced its cancellation and 
blamed both the PNV and EA for having broken their promises as they were set in the 
agreement.16 Thus, the public was justified in believing that the Northern Irish case 
was in fact the very example that ETA chose to follow.17 Furthermore, as it was 
explained in the previous chapter, the most important actor missing from this 
agreement was the state itself, represented by the state-wide political parties. The 
implications of this are that the base for a political dialogue between the 
aforementioned and the moderate nationalist parties had been condemned,18 since 
such an initiative by the nationalist ambit was seen as a populist tool that would 
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18 Interview with Gorka Espiau, Director of Elkarri, Bilbao, 22/11/2004. 
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guarantee them the image of peace-makers19 and would bring them the necessary 
votes of the extremists parties, thus securing their political and constitutional 
supremacy in the Basque Country.20
With the collapse of the ceasefire fourteen months after its announcement, the 
situation returned to the previous state of efficient police and intelligence efforts 
focused exclusively on the violent elements of the movement, while the political 
initiatives have been scarce. It must also be noted that, aside from the social reactions, 
it is also the changes in the international set of circumstances (September 11, 2001; 
the Madrid train bombings and the political game of blindly blaming ETA; and the 
repeated successes of both the French and the Spanish security agencies in the 
dismemberment of the organisation’s leadership) that have debilitated significantly 
the organisation and have provided the Basque country with a normalisation of the 
situation where actions still take place, but they are limited in causing material 
damage. On the other hand, this was the preferred method for the State to claim that 
the only dimension there is in the Basque conflict is that of violence and there are no 
political problems since the Basques enjoy a degree of autonomy that equals virtual 
independence.21 Furthermore, seeing how ETA and its violence were used by the 
moderate circles in the past in dealings with the central State, perhaps it makes sense 
to assume that it is in the benefit of the latter to eliminate ETA in order to then have 
an advantage in its negotiations with the Basque nationalist parties. 
The greatest contribution, however, to the transformation of the conflict would 
come from the very actor that both the State and eTA claimed to represent, the civil 
society. Although it obtained a massive momentum in the 1990s, the reaction of the 
civil society in the Basque Country began expressing its rejection of violence since 
the end of the previous decade. The initiative of the Association of Human Rights 
(Asociación Pro derechos Humanos) to help people express their indignation and 
rejection of violence culminated in a move that involved the sending of letters to the 
offices of HB with the words “Ya no me callo”, which is literally translated into “I 
will not shut up any more”.22 400.000 people participated in that form of protest and 
the numbers were bound to swell, particularly after the foundation of more a-political, 
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 189
citizen-based initiatives that transformed into NGOs with the aim to bring together the 
vast sectors of the local community for whom violence could not be justified, and for 
whom its elimination and substitution with a state of self-sustainable was of 
paramount importance.  
 
Political and Social Transformations  
The previous chapter has demonstrated the inability of the nationalist parties, 
and particularly the PNV, to reject totally and directly ETA and its actions. The 
benefits of the organisation’s activity had come in handy many a time for the 
moderate nationalists, who often presented Madrid with the dilemma “You can 
negotiate with us or cope with ETA”.23 This posture often attracted the criticisms and 
open accusations of the Spanish state-wide parties active in Euskadi (mainly PSOE 
and PP). The political ambivalence of the nationalist ambit ended, for the first time, in 
1985 when, following the assassination of an Ertzaintza (Basque Police) 
Superintendent, the PNV justified police and judicial action against terrorist acts.24 
This transformation was not only a reaction to the indiscriminate violence of ETA, but 
also a product of political collaboration between parties and driven by the social 
demands for peace.  
The year 1987 was the bloodiest in ETA’s history. A bomb in a Barcelona 
supermarket left 21 shoppers dead and later in the year, when the organisation 
targeted one of the Civil Guard’s barracks in Zaragoza, 5 of the 12 victims were 
children. This type of ekintzas produced massive social repulsion nationally as well as 
in the Basque country. As Llera put it, it took ten years and hundreds of deaths for the 
Basque society to realise that ETA is more of an obstacle than anything else.25 Basque 
society’s attitude had made it imperative for the Basque political parties to explore 
any points, in a strategy against ETA’s violence, that were shared among them. The 
result of these discussions was the Pact of Ajuria Enea,26 brought forward by the 
Basque Prime Minister on the 12th of January 1988, and whose signatories were the 
members of all Basque parties with the exception of HB, even though the latter 
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participated in the preliminary rounds of the negotiated text.27 The Pact’s main 
elements were that it differentiated between the problem of violence (which needed to 
be resolved) and the constitutional politics of nationalism (which could survive 
without the violent dimension); it accepted the necessity of action by the security 
forces and judicial services, and their legitimacy, in order to achieve resolution to the 
problem of violence, but it also pressed for dialogue and commitment to further the 
status of Autonomy; in that context, it also negated to ETA the excuse of territoriality 
and the question of Navarre, by recognising Navarre’s constitutional and provincial 
status; and it accepted that  there can be dialogue with the extremists, but that it would 
not be on political issues and only after violence was renounced.  
However, despite the unanimity and collaboration expressed in the Pact, the 
problem of political violence was made the central theme of the 1996 pre-electoral 
campaign by PP and, as a result, it was not long before political discords and 
confusions arose anew. The electoral victory of PP and its establishment in office 
brought with it a revision in and of anti-terrorist policies, which were further 
strengthened during the party’s second term. In the Basque country, a renewed effort 
from lehendakari Ardanza to revive the Pact was rejected by both PP and PSOE, 
which left little room for the PNV to move, other than attempt to build bridges with 
HB. From that moment on, whether local, national or international, the only reactions 
to the manifestations of political violence were those of the Security and Intelligence 
Agencies.  
Nevertheless, the political and social significance of the Pact should not be 
undermined, for its contributions and the reverberations of its spirit laid the 
foundation of something even more valuable and, probably, more tenable than any of 
the counter-terrorist tactics. In essence, the Pact was a manifestation that the political 
world in Euskadi was ready to isolate ETA and those around it, and remove any link 
they attempt to express to politics and ideology. As Mees observes, Ajuria Enea 
moved the identity clash away from the old cleavage present until that moment in 
Euskadi (‘nationalist vs. non-nationalist’) and substituted it with the ‘violent vs. non-
violent nationalist’.28 The most important contribution, however, to the fight against 
violence was that, on the one hand, it transmitted a sense of legitimacy and, on the 
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other, it gave the necessary momentum to the few but persisting 
organisations/platforms that allowed citizens to voice their opposition to the violence 
that was exerted in their names. Iribarren and other authors branded this period as the 
“time of silence”, referring to the ten years where public disagreement or protest 
against ETA was scarce.29 Besides, the disparity of interests of the political parties 
with regards to nationalism and nationalist violence was one of the primary causes of 
the public’s disorientation and limited mobilisation during the 1980s.30
Midway through the 1980s, the cleavage between nationalists and non-
nationalists had been transformed to one of extremists versus pacifist nationalists, 
with the non-nationalists siding with the pacifist movement. Prior to the establishment 
of democracy, most ekintzas happened outside the Basque Country, mostly in Madrid, 
but also the rest of Spain. After the democratic consolidation, and with the broadening 
of the organisation’s targets, the conflict moved closer to home, with ETA’s actions 
rising significantly in Euskadi. The proximity of the conflict is one reason, according 
to Mees, that has taken away the romantic value the Basques held for ETA’s actions 
and substituted it with disbelief at first, and later rejection.31 Rincón, too, recognises 
the importance of physical distance but also highlights that the murder for alleged 
drug-dealing of two unrelated but highly esteemed members of their respective 
communities, was the catalytic moment for the transformation of Basque social 
attitudes towards (Basque) political violence: the social posture that followed after 
every assassination (“he must have done something to deserve it”), could no longer be 
justified in the cases of Eibar and Egoibar (the two villages where the murders took 
place).32
The first platform that brought together several small pacifist groups was 
Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz en Euskal Herria (Co-ordination of a Gesture for 
Peace in the Basque Country) in 1987. As the name suggests, the organisation began 
as the infusion into one of several smaller organisations that wanted to make a public 
reaction to the nationalist violence. As the organisation itself proclaims, “the attitude 
and message of Gesto focus on the violence that is born out of presumed political 
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motivations with respect to the Basque Country”.33 The “gesture” refers to the silent 
manifestations following the perpetration of murderous terrorist attacks and its 
principal aims were and still are to reinforce the social mobilisation and to promote a 
culture of peace. A culture that is not simply present due to the absence of violence, 
but a more positive peace, which makes certain that violent phenomena are dealt by 
the instinctive pacifist social response.34 In a way, and judging also by the massive 
protests the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 have caused, the organisation has 
succeeded in instigating that spirit of social responsibility. After the train bombings, 
when the first assumptions focused on ETA rather than Islamist activists, the 
manifestation of social reflexes and the mass protests throughout the Spanish state 
attracted equal, if not more, attention by the media covering the attacks. It must be 
noted, however, that despite its a-political nature, the organisation has suffered splits 
and divisions similar to those of the political parties,35 even though none of the 
splinter-groups had a debilitating effect on Gesto’s ability to mobilise the masses on 
such a particular issue. 
A second organisation whose involvement lies more on the political sphere, 
rather than Gesto’s ethical approach, is Elkarri. Unlike Gesto, Elkarri’s work goes 
much further than the simple, yet unambiguous, rejection of violence because Elkarri 
recognises that there is a political side to the problem of violence. As Gorka Espiau 
explained in a personal interview, this can be seen by the very instances when 
violence ceased, that is, during ceasefires: nationalism is still the centre of the 
political discourse in Euskadi and of the talks between the regional parties and the 
state-wide ones.36 Therefore, it is not enough to simply reject violence. Rather, it must 
first be recognised that the Basque conflict is essentially a political one, and as such 
violence must be substituted with dialogue. Elkarri’s recognition of the political 
nature of the conflict differentiates it from other civil platforms in that it attempts to 
build a response that is equally political, that is, utilise dialogue in order not only to 
transform the attitudes of the local society towards violence but to also highlight that a 
non-violent political solution to the problem is achievable so long as the stereotypes 
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between the nationalists and non-nationalists, as well as between Basques and Spanish 
is very much possible. 
Similarly with Gesto,37 the organisation works on three levels: political social 
and international. On the political level, Elkarri attempts to facilitate and, in certain 
instances, initiate a process of dialogue between the political parties. Espiau indicated 
that the organisation had succeeded in initiating a round table that consisted of all 
political parties in Euskadi, with the exception of PP and Batasuna (although it was 
present at the first ever meeting). On the social level, Elkarri’s objective is to organise 
“dialogue projects” and debates on the local level. At the time I conducted the 
interview, there were 60 to 100 local dialogue fora that brought together people from 
all political shades. The topics of these workshops consist of the same issues that are 
brought by Elkarri to the round tables of the political parties. The conclusions of the 
workshops are then sent by Elkarri to the political parties in an effort to ascertain that 
the public’s view was not ignored by the political parties, as well as the fact that it 
provided a map for them to work on a political solution that would reflect the 
demands and wishes of the popular base. Espiau referred to a petition signed by 
122.000 people urging the political parties of the Basque Country and Navarre to 
initiate a process of dialogue between them for the exploration of possible solutions 
both to the political as well as the violence problem.38 The international level of 
Elkarri’s work consists of mainly informational actions that aim at making known the 
dynamics and dimensions of the Basque conflict and, at the same time, attract support 
and consultation for conflict resolution projects that can guarantee the institutional 
stability and development of the Basque country.  
The main reason for Elkarri’s emergence was the absence of a serious political 
actor that would occupy the space between nationalist and state-wide party 
discourses: the former constantly pointing at the political roots of the violence and the 
latter permanently refusing to accept the political aspect, due to the existence of the 
Statute of Autonomy. Even where platforms like Gesto por la Paz were, to a certain 
extent, already covering the grey area, there was no institution or initiative that would 
act politically on the problem. The immediate consequence of the political bi-polarity 
was reflected in the Basque society, for which violence had become a taboo, aided in 
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that by the lack of educational policies or social initiatives that indicated the 
irrationality of violence and projected alternative constitutional paths to the 
achievement of political objectives. What made Elkarri popular in the Basque society 
was that, like other anti-violent platforms, it recognised the faults39 of the state yet, at 
the same time, recognised that neither terrorism nor the kale borroka could right the 
wrongs of the central structures. Hence, the need for a political dialogue that, for 
Elkarri, should necessarily include some form of communication with ETA, because 
negotiating with ETA does not necessarily mean that the state will automatically cede 
to the organisation’s demands. Furthermore, the issues that ETA raises can certainly 
be put on the table of the negotiations conducted by the political parties (for example, 
the prisoners). 
It must be noted at this point, however, that Elkarri and Gesto por la Paz are 
not only the largest and most active of the existing platforms; they are also the only 
ones that have located themselves between both discourses. This strengthens my 
argument that, while use of ethno-terrorism is justified as the only option for most 
ethno-nationalist movements who suffer grievances, here is a case of a group of 
citizens who feel that their nationalist sentiment does not only express the wish for 
cultural differentiation that will lead to self-determination. Placing themselves 
between the two nationalist discourses, that is, between that of the State which intends 
to superimpose its own nationalism on a culturally different minority, and that of the 
minority which copies the State in that it uses violence to promote its own minority 
nationalism, manifests the identification of a path that makes the elimination of 
violence possible, but at the same time intends to utilise the liberal institutions 
currently in place in order to both manifest their ethno-cultural difference as well as to 
communicate any grievances they have. 
Other than Elkarri and Gesto Por La Paz, the map of social platforms and civic 
organisations comprises groups that reflect either of the discourses. After the shock 
and the debilitating morale that spread through the nationalist movement after the 
increasingly popular anti-violent demonstrations and silent protests, the nationalist 
movement responded with a copy-cat move, at first organising counter-manifestations 
in favour of an ekintza, and later establishing and bringing forward platforms and 
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organisations that dealt with the issue of the prisoners (Gestoras Pro Amnistía),40  or 
their relatives (Sanideak). As for the former, it is noted that these counter-
manifestations were frequently intimidating41 and often ended up as the usual 
exhibition of street violence, or kale borrokka. Similarly, at the other end of the 
spectrum, there are organisations who do not consider violence but nationalism in its 
totality to be the problem in the Basque country (Foro de Ermua, ¡Basta Ya!), and 
therefore tend to identify more with the policies that emanate from Madrid and to 
question the political tendencies that originate in Euskadi.  
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the social platforms map resembles closely 
that of the political parties and ideologies, it must be remembered that both the 
nationalist and the anti-nationalist platforms emerged only after the creation of 
organisations of the calibre of Gesto or Elkarri, which, judging by the direct and 
indirect membership they attract, reflect the views of the vast majority of the Basques. 
In other words, the creation and, most critically, the social support these organisations 
attracted, forced the political actors to devolve power to their grassroots and imitate 
the actions of the other two. Whether this action was a genuine mobilisation attempt 
based on the efficiency demonstrated by Gesto and Elkarri, or whether it was a 
reaction that would allow the respective social bases of both nationalist and anti-
nationalist movement to rally around and challenge the rest, the bottom-line is that 
after almost a decade of inaction, all sectors of both the Basque as well as the Spanish 
societies were obtaining a greater say in the theatre of political violence, or rather its 
elimination.  
The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether there are any tangible 
effects of the organisations, particularly those that occupy the middle-ground, on the 
Basque conscience? The answer is yes and it can be observed in a number of ways. A 
set of surveys organised by the University of the Basque Country has been recording 
the social attitudes towards ETA since 1981 (Table 3). Certain elements and 
tendencies are hard to leave unnoticed. First of all, total rejection of ETA has doubled 
since 1987. Second and most importantly, there is a normalisation of the percentage 
of population that does support the same aims as the organisation but not through the 
same means. From nine percent of the population that supported ETA’s aims but not 
                                                 
40 The organisation’s leadership was charged with membership to a terrorist organization in 2001 and 
was incarcerated. See Gara, 5/11/2001.  
41 Domínguez-Iribarren, De la Negociación, p.245. 
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its methods in 1989, the percentage rose to 16 in 2000 and has been pretty much 
stable ever since. That is an unambiguous verification of the vacuum represented only 
by the social platforms. Finally, a similar process is discerned for the percentage of 
population that supported ETA at a previous stage (dictatorship, or during the 1980s) 
but not under the current constitutional framework. This social group rose by seven 
points in ten years (1995-2005). Although the authors of the survey do not make it 
clear whether and how many of those asked in this group do support the objectives of 
ETA under the current constitutional framework. What is important in all cases is that 
the emergence of the social platforms and the diverse organisations in the Basque 
Country and later in the rest of Spain coincides chronologically with the changes in 
the patterns of social attitudes.  
 
Table 3: Social attitudes towards ETA 
 2000 
% 
2001 
% 
2002 
% 
2003 
% 
2004 
% 
2005 
% 
2006 
% 
Total Support 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Critical Support 6 3 3 2 2 3 2 
Aims yes, Means no 16 9 11 12 12 12 13 
Before yes, Now no 15 20 21 16 19 20 17 
Indifferent 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Fear 4 4 3 5 5 4 2 
Total rejection 53 57 60 62 58 58 61 
N/A 4 6 2 2 2 3 2 
 
 1987 
% 
1989 
% 
1995 
% 
1996 
% 
1997 
% 
1998 
% 
1999 
% 
Total Support 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 
Critical Support 6 5 5 5 4 4 9 
Aims yes, Means no 12 9 12 11 10 12 15 
Before yes, Now no 19 15 13 18 12 15 20 
Indifferent 2 3 3 2 2 5 6 
Fear 4 4 6 7 5 6 6 
Total rejection 34 45 55 51 59 53 35 
N/A 22 16 6 5 6 6 7 
Source: Euskobarometro, University of the Basque Country, 
http://www.ehu.es/cpvweb/paginas/series_eusko/series_20.html 
 
Another way in which the stigma of such organisations is evident in the 
Basque population is the study of their very activists. Iribarren42 mentions a 
sociological report which verifies, on the one hand, the absence of the political world 
                                                 
42 Iribarren, De la Negociación, pp. 243-244. 
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in the social demands for peace and dialogue and, on the other, the very youth that 
forms the core of pacifism in the Basque country: almost 40 per cent are less than 20 
years old; 22,2 per cent are between 21 and 24. The majority of the interviewees 
admitted that their group emerged after an agreement between friends (42 per cent) or 
through initiatives of the Church (39 per cent). Only a tenth of the population, 
however, became involved through schools or institutes of education.43 Sociologists 
were quick to point out that according to the data, ETA’s death is in the hands of the 
young, just like its birth.44
 
The Human Need for Peace 
The emergence of this new cleavage verifies the position of this thesis that 
violence is used as a method in a broader clash that is characterised by nationalism. 
Whereas orthodox terrorism theory informs us that more often than not “the means 
become the end”, the social attitude of the Basque civil society that not only is this not 
the case but that the means can be altered in order to accommodate new needs without 
necessarily altering the end. Moreover, it also runs counter to those conflict resolution 
approaches according to which the key to the transformation and/or elimination of a 
conflict is held by the middle and the top level actors in that conflict.45 That is, the 
very actors in the Basque case that totally undermined the conflict, its dynamics, and, 
of course, spoiled any possible efforts for its resolution. Furthering nationalist plans to 
the point of independence is the objective of both divisions of the cleavage; the 
disagreement lies in the means used for the advancement of said goal, not only in its 
moral dimensions, but also in its strategic. The reiteration of the supremacy of 
constitutional means and the dedication of the Basque political life does not only seek 
to delegitimise the myths and legends that ETA carries, but also to highlight that the 
latter’s activity may be hampering the same objectives, sought with different means, 
and which so far have been very effective, considering the Statute of Autonomy, the 
co-operation of the state-wide parties with their nationalist counterparts, and the 
electoral preference for the parties of the Democratic Block since the transition. 
What the analysis of the public attitude, as it was captured by the surveys and 
the initiatives of the social platforms, has made obvious is that, irrespective of their 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 244. 
44 Mees, op.cit., p. 99. 
45 John Paul Lederach, 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 
Washington D. C.: United States Institute for Peace. 
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nationalist or non-nationalist tendencies, the majority of the people are expressing a 
need for peace. Since the mid-1990s, this need has been incrementally verified to be 
as important as the need to have the right to an identity of your choice, and to exercise 
functions that are linked to that identity. The participation of the civil society in 
protests and manifestations shows that the social attitudes reject not only the violence 
of a minority of extremists that claims to represent them, but also the violence of the 
State which seems to be interested in equating every nationalist activity and ideology 
as potentially violent and thus potentially undermining its conceptions, intentions and, 
ultimately, survival. The attitude of the local civil society has shown that the 
safeguarding of a national identity and its further development is the primary issue in 
a region that is laden with violence for precisely the same reasons. As seen, it is not 
only the human cost and social bereavement caused by violence; where there are 
political aspirations whose fruition is closely linked with manifestations of political 
violence, such aspirations may be hampered by the very strategy of terrorism. The 
social stands that have been recorded since the mid-1990s reiterate the need not only 
to create an environment in which violent trends will automatically be disqualified, if 
not restrained before they even surface, but one which will not neglect the second 
most important need, that of national fulfilment. The discourse brought forward by 
organisations of the middle way, like Gesto and Elkarri, point to that spirit of 
provention,46 where non-violent attitudes should unequivocally and uncritically be 
implemented in the social structures and behaviours.  
 
RC N T /   / /    /  
CR 
Civil Society 
 
 
This does not solely depend on the society, although it admittedly bears the 
brunt when it comes to changing attitudes, perceptions and behaviours that are so 
                                                 
46 John Burton, 1990. Conflict: Resolution and Provention, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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fundamental that are used as the very symbolisms that equal the society’s ontology. 
Society seems that it can decide whether violence is a method for obtaining higher 
ends or whether it is an obstacle to such aspirations. The transformation of the social 
attitude from one of support and exaltation of ETA during the dictatorship, into its 
total rejection and isolation, shows precisely that. But the greatest change in attitude 
concerns the state itself. Even in the hypothetical situation where violence is 
completely eliminated in the Basque country, it is hard to imagine a situation in which 
the Basque country will reach its independence with the blessing of the State. Since 
every nationalism is directed against a greater nationalism, a central authority which 
became one due to its nationalism, then, every nationalism will be combated by that 
authority because that’s what the survival instinct implies. In a sense, these are the 
reflexes any state structure would have, if we are to accept that this is an anarchic 
world where the only use of violence lies with the central authority and any other 
violence is illegitimate. On the one hand, these type of structures do not favour the 
appropriate posture, whereby a state would nurture a movement that is directed 
against itself, only to make sure that violence does not emerge. On the other hand, 
proventing violence is a strategic option with great implications on the costs for peace 
– for both sides. 
 
Conclusion 
 What is observed in effect is a transformation of the conflict through the 
transformation of the attitudes that were both based on the ethno-nationalist nature of 
the conflict but also fed the conflict itself when the State manifested its very own 
nationalism by rejecting the minority nationalism. That manifestation of the State’s 
nationalism was not less violent as seen, nor was it perceived to be less violent. 
Persecution, at first, negation of any sets of grievances later, particularly with the 
adoption and concession of the Statue of Autonomy, non-collaboration, and even 
damnation of the nationalist movement in the turn of the century, even if the occasion 
that brought the latter forward was of an international nature and it served primarily 
partisan objectives and micropolitical agendas. The human need for peace, as 
manifested by the civil society, rejects both forms of violence precisely because they 
endanger the primary aspect of this conflict which is the nationalist differentiation.  
 It is the human need for peace that was directed against the janus-faced 
violence: on the one hand, against the ethno-terrorist practices that risked 
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undermining the higher cause of the entire nationalist movement (extremist and 
moderate) because they would attract the wrath of the State which, ultimately, was an 
important actor in conceding to the demands of the local society as a whole; on the 
other, against the violence of the State that seemed to be indifferent towards the 
radicalisation that it caused among the nationalist circles, thus turning violence into a 
vicious circle that did away with any opportunities for resolution. And of course, 
against the State’s indifference towards the general feeling of cultural diversity 
espoused by the local community and the very institutions and social and political 
mechanisms it had received by the very State with the end of dictatorship. In other 
words, then, while violence is the problem in the current situation, it is the violence 
that originates in the nationalist ideology of both parties in the conflict. The alteration 
of the social attitudes of the local society, at least, shows that grievances and the need 
for differentiation from the culture of the central State are still there, but the means for 
the legitimisation of such needs has moved away from the use, and particularly the 
need of use, of violence. If this transformation can take place with regards to the 
minority nationalism, the popular feeling is that such transformation is also possible 
for the central nationalism. The demands of the civil society vis-à-vis the violent 
practices shows that conflict resolution can have an equally legitimising role when it 
comes to grievances, as violence did when it was the only means to fight the 
oppression and dynastic practices of the State. Ultimately, it proves that freedom-
fighters do not necessarily have to be terrorists. In a liberal democratic State that 
respects the legal frameworks which it claims to employ in its fight against terrorism, 
and which are socially acceptable and legitimate,47 the dichotomisation of the well-
worn cliché is possible through the ballot box or, perhaps, through the utilisation of 
pan-European frameworks, such as those employed by the European Union (EU), 
even though there have been expressed concerns as to the effectiveness of those with 
regards to the state-oriented approaches of anti-terrorist policy implementations,48 the 
                                                 
47 Peter Chalk, 2000. “The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs: Cooperation, Anti-terrorist 
Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability” in Fernando Reinares (ed), European 
Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 175-210. Quote at p. 186. 
48 David Bonner, 2000. “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism: the Impact of Decisions of 
European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland ‘Peace Process’” in Fernando Reinares, 
op.cit., pp. 31-71. Quote at p. 57. See also Ronald Crelinsten and Iffet Ozkut, 2000. “Counterterrorism 
Policy in Fortress Europe: Implications for Human Rights” in Fernando Reinares (ed.), op.cit., pp. 245-
271. 
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protection of human rights,49 the concentration of power in one location (Brussels), 
which, in effect, is a copycat move reflecting the typical State behaviour,50 and, 
ultimately, the political will (rather than the legal or policial) necessary for the 
enforcement of any counter-terrorist framework.51
 
                                                 
49 Peter Chalk, 2000, op.cit. 
50 Bruno Frey, 2004. Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot?, Cheltenham; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, p. 88. 
51 Malcolm Anderson, 2000. “Counterterrorism as an Objective of European Police Cooperation” in 
Fernando Reinares (ed), op.cit., pp. 227-243 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
"But let the men of Hartford imagine that they were not in the position of being voters at all, that 
they were governed without their consent being obtained, that the legislature turned an absolutely 
deaf ear to their demands, what would the men of Hartford do then? They couldn't vote the 
legislature out. They would have to either submit indefinitely to an unjust state of affairs, or they 
would have to rise up and adopt some of the antiquated means by which men in the past got their 
grievances remedied"1
 
 
Thus spoke Emmeline Pankhurst, on November 13, 1913, addressing an 
American audience on the women’s right to vote. It is not my intention to bring in 
feminism into a debate over terrorism and its definitions, nor is it to analyse its role in 
ethnonationalist conflicts. However, I have used these words because they are indicative 
of the reaction in situations where a large group of people perceive to suffer a political 
injustice. One of this thesis’ objectives was to establish an understanding of terrorism in 
the Basque case, according to which it – and, indeed, any type of political violence – is a 
method of pressure on the political authorities to look at and rectify any grievance their 
socio-political behaviour might have inflicted on the social group and/or movement that 
utilises violence. The fact that feminist movements, nationalist and religious 
fundamentalist movements make use of terror in order to promote their demands, 
communicate their grievances, or retaliate the injustice suffered certainly provokes 
feelings of disgust and disappointment, but, when analysed objectively and away from 
moral engagements, it clearly constitutes an option that is based on the nature of the 
grievance(s), the objectives of the movement and the resources and nature of the 
authorities it claims to be fighting against.2  
The first chapter of the thesis offered a historical analysis of the emergence and 
development of Basque nationalism. By doing so, it set the context for the understanding 
of the reasons that made violence become a legitimate option according to the perception 
                                                 
1 Emmeline Pankhurst, “Freedom or Death” Speech, Hartford, Connecticut, 13 November 1913, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/greatspeeches/story/0,,2059235,00.html, last accessed, 24 April 2007. My 
emphasis. 
2 Paul Wilkinson, 2001. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, Portland; London: 
Frank Cass, pp. 16-17.  
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of the Basques, a legitimation which eroded slowly as democracy in Spain became more 
and more rooted. In other words, it described the Basque ‘truth’ for the reasons they 
decided to oppose the Spanish State during its darkest years, as well as the truth of the 
increasing, but persistent, extremist minority that seemingly never shook off the 
particular discourse according to which the State has always been the oppressor, despite 
its transformation into a liberal democracy.  
In chapter Two, I critically examined the literature of nationalism and offered an 
analysis into both the contributions of the most significant, yet quite disparate, 
understandings of nationalism. I also highlighted the inefficiencies of these theories and, 
based on the ethno-symbolic paradigm, I brought forward a critical understanding of the 
mechanisms that, on the one hand, are common to all nationalisms and nations through 
the use of symbols and cultural diachritica, and, on the other, I employed that critical 
thinking in order to explain the particular dynamics of Basque nationalism. I have argued 
that the identification of culture and identity, as well as the perceptions of the definitions 
of the in-group and the out-group, by the post-modernist theories highlight not only the 
elasticity of such concepts, but also the fluidity of the boundaries that such concepts 
create. Hence, while violence was a constitutive part of the Basque identity primarily 
because of the injustices of the Francoist regime towards them, it slowly eroded and the 
majority of the civil society, which supported ETA until well into the 1980s, began to 
distance itself from its use and has finally come to reject it in the most manifesting ways. 
Chapter Three examined the literature of terrorism with the aim of highlighting 
the elliptical understanding of terrorism offered by the orthodox theories of terrorism. It 
argued that the majority of these lacked a contextualisation of the examination of terrorist 
phenomena. Such contextualisation is necessary primarily because of the diverse nature 
of the groups that make use of terrorism,3 as well as the diverse nature of the States that 
they oppose. If in the Basque case, the Francoist State violence legitimised the Basque 
claims for self-defence and manifested their grievances,4 according to the theories, the 
                                                 
3 Brynjar Lia, and Katja Skjolberg, 2004. Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the 
Literature, Norway: Kjeller (FFI/Rapport-2004/04307) 
4 Martha Crenshaw, 1990. “The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice”, in 
Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, 
Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 7-24. Quote at p. 17. 
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transition to a liberal democratic regime and its concessions of autonomy should also 
signify the abandonment of violence from both parties and the transformation of the 
conflict into a non-violent political one. Yet, as seen, orthodox terrorism theories fail to 
account for the use and the meaning of cultural symbols in an ethno-terrorist conflict and 
the catalytic way in which they transform the perceptions of both the militants, as well as 
their surrounding environment. Furthermore, orthodox terrorism theories seem too 
focused on the Westphalian standards with regards to the state and, as such, overlook the 
basic assumptions about the anarchy of the international system. The monopoly of 
violence, the inviolability of borders and automatic legitimacy the Treaty of Westphalia 
conferred to states is an attempt to regulate an anarchical international system. Yet, it is 
the lack of a higher, normative authority that makes possible the emergence of terrorist 
organisations who wish to contest the legitimacy,5 as well as the violence, of the state. 
Finally, I have argued that the lack of a Grand Theory of terrorism6 is not necessarily as 
impeding as some scholars have argued. Instead, contextualising the study of terrorist 
phenomena should provide us with enough insights to allow us to build a case-by-case 
understanding of the mechanisms and the root causes of terrorism as they are projected 
by the diverse group that find refuge in its use. 
The examination of the literature concerned with conflict resolution in chapter 
Four highlighted the obstacles posed by the implementation of the Westphalian 
framework, and its exaltation of the nature and survival of the State, the legitimation and 
monopoly of violence within their borders and the inviolability of those. This chapter also 
highlighted how the study and practice of conflict resolution was incrementally 
transformed as the bi-polar order of the Cold War came to an end, which gave rise to the 
study of factors like culture, identity and the perceptions of security of the actors 
involved that are significant in identifying correctly the root causes of conflict and allow 
for an equally correct implementation of means and methods that can be conducive to the 
transformation and, ultimately, resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, the identification 
of human needs7 and its adoption as the new paradigm for a more effective way of the 
                                                 
5 Richmond, 2003, op.cit., p. 301.  
6 Paul Wilkinson, 15 October 2003. Inaugural Lecture of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and 
Political Violence, University of St Andrews. 
7 John Burton (ed.), 1990a. Conflict: Human Needs Theory, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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ways in which conflict resolution approaches can be more successful was catalytic in the 
understanding of the violent dimension of the Basque conflict as well as the explanation 
of the civil society’s total rejection of extremist and State violence.  
In chapter Five I have analysed my framework of analysis on which I based my 
thesis, and which brought together a comprehensive understanding of all three schools of 
study in order to explain the Basque conflict. Using the ethno-symbolic model I have 
argued that there can be no normative description of nationalisms as either good or bad. 
Instead, and drawing from the analysis of the Basque case, I argued that the nationalist 
discourse is reflected circumstantially and as such it can alter its basic structures and 
orientation from a predominantly ethnic or cultural one into a civic, or political, nature. 
The transformation of the Basque civil society’s perceptions with regards to the 
utilisation of ethno-terrorist violence, as well as the meaning it confers to their ethnic 
identity and the highlighting of their difference towards the Spanish identity, shows just 
that. Therefore, if the basic ingredients of a particular manifestation of nationalism can 
change, as happened in the Basque case, then it is obvious that conflict resolution 
techniques can capitalise on this precondition and, with a contextualisation and correct 
identification of the motives behind the use of ethno-terrorism in ethno-nationalist 
conflicts,  it is possible to isolate such discourses and underline the stalemate which they 
are conducive to with the detrimental effects to the conflictive parties, as well as the 
society in general. My argument is based on the perceptive change that took place in the 
Basque local society with regards to the conflict, and it is the identification of that very 
society’s attitude that elevated it to the role of the conflict transformator, precisely 
because the discourse of both the Basque militants as well as the Spanish central 
authorities were locked in a war of attrition that contributed to the perpetuation of 
conflict. The examination of both discourses made evident that, were the State to 
examine some of the Basque demands for alleviation of grievances (for instance, the 
issue of prisoners) without examining them under the prism of its own nationalist 
discourse, and, more importantly, show in practical terms to the Basques that it respects 
their difference and has all the necessary resources that a pluralist liberal democratic state 
has to provide remedies to their grievances, perhaps the change in the attitude of the 
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society would have come sooner. This, in turn, implies that the society and its perceptions 
do have a role to play when it comes to the perpetuation of violent discourses and actions. 
Chapter Six examined the emergence of Basque violence as a constitutive part of 
Basque nationalism and attributed it to the pragmatic injustices carried by the Francoist 
regime towards the Basque society. In fact, not only was it attributed, but it was also 
perceived by the vast majority of the Spanish population that ETA and its members were 
the only group capable of opposing the dictatorship. As it was highlighted, however, it is 
important to remember that from the point of view of ETA and the Basques in general, 
the attacks did not just aim to end the dictatorship but to lead to a decision where the 
Basques would be recognised as something different from the Spanish population. That is 
not only evident by the continuation of violence and the persistence of ETA, which by 
now has acquired a life of its own and has become a legend of the Basque people,8 but 
also by the mass reinsertion of ETA(pm) militants in 1982 and their establishment of a 
political party that had exactly the same goal as the militants, only it accepted the new 
rules of the game. All nationalisms rest on the assumption that the present is inadequate 
and that, if the nation is to walk towards a glorious future, it must find inspiration in its 
glorious past.9 The Basque case is not an exception to the case. Invariably among 
nationalisms, the glorious past consists of legends, myths and heroes who fought for the 
nation’s recognition and establishment. When violence becomes perceived as something 
virtually genetic (“we always fought for our freedom”), it becomes accepted and exalted 
by society. The emergence of ETA was a result of the nationalist readings its pioneer 
members occupied themselves with, and the unjust regime against which it stood only 
reinforced the nationalistic symbols of martyrs and heroes. It is precisely this point which 
verifies that terrorism is only a method used by the Basque nationalist movement to 
achieve its higher aims. Unlike orthodox theories of terrorism I have argued that, in the 
Basque case, terrorism cannot be isolated from the study of the nationalist discourse, 
precisely because the perception of the local population – at least during the dictatorship 
and the transition to democracy – consisted of the belief that violence was the only choice 
                                                 
8 William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, 1990, “On the interpretation of terrorist violence: ETA and the 
Basque political process”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol.32, No.2, p.254. 
9 Matthew Levinger & Paula Franklin Lyttle, 2001. “Myth and Mobilisation: the triadic structure of 
nationalist rhetoric”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol.7, No.2, pp. 175-194. 
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that could guarantee the avoidance of succumbing to the violent assimilation the State 
was leading them to.  
Terrorism, as explained in chapters Five and Six, can be viewed as the 
continuation of politics by other means. Ethno-terrorism, I argued, is a form of political 
communication and the level of violence, that is, the intensity of the communication, can 
vary. In the Basque case, the identification of many Spanish citizens with ETA against 
the regime certainly underlines the overall will of the citizenry to wage a war against 
their very government – a verification of Pankhurst’s introductory quote. From the 
moment the transition is complete and the establishment and operational merit of 
democracy is fully functional, one would expect the violence to end because one can see 
the peaceful alternatives. Yet, as it was explained, neither the transition nor the 
establishment of democracy brought any alleviation to the Basques. In the first case, it 
was because the security forces in the Basque country remained manned by the same 
people that served in them during the dictatorship. In the second case, the scandal of the 
GAL threw some of the popular support behind ETA, despite later disclosing and 
punishing those responsible for its conception and materialisation.  
When one intends to wage war, one is prepared to suffer losses and cause 
damages. The fact that, up until the end of the Cold War, war was only a mostly inter-
state phenomenon should not forbid us from highlighting the intention behind the desire. 
The asymmetry of the conflict, in other words, does not deny the terrorist opportunities in 
which to start a war with the state. Quite the opposite, in fact, since deadlier and more 
spectacular attacks are taking place to counterbalance that asymmetry and dispute the 
state’s legitimacy.10 In the Basque case, as this thesis has shown, the intention to wage 
war against the state was justified, to a certain extent, by the majority of the population 
and when that subsided, violent fractions of Basque nationalism still enjoyed rigorous 
support from the few remaining networks of support.  
The examination of both sides of the conflict, that is, the central authorities vis-à-
vis the militant nationalists, was necessary in order to reveal the third actor in this 
conflict, the local society. Chapter Seven analysed the strategic choices made by the two 
principal actors and highlighted the political and operational stalemate that emerged as a 
                                                 
10 Oliver Richmond, 2003. op.cit. 
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result of spoiler tactics employed by both sides at different times.11 It showed how the 
emergence of a civil society that positioned itself against terrorism but in favour of 
nationalism was a direct consequence of that stalemate. The identification of a local 
“culture of violence” as a further spoiler to the process12 makes the transformation of 
societal attitudes even more significant and relevant because it manifests a change in the 
core value that violence is useful in promoting the Basque claims as well as defending 
their ethnic difference. The peculiarity of the Basque society’s stand is that it 
automatically disqualifies the aforementioned sides’ argument that they act in the name 
of ‘the people’. On the one hand, the central authorities’ claim that any political problem 
has been solved with the Statue of Autonomy; on the other, the extremists’ allegations 
that the only political problem is the Basque country’s lack of independence. The 
formation of a civil society that rejects violence but not any nationalist aspirations is a 
reply to the former that independence is still very much a cause affecting many Basque 
citizens, and at the same time it constitutes a warning to the latter that their violent 
behaviour undermines the society’s efforts to promote the same cause with the 
constitutional means available.  
The political games played by both the local as well as the state-wide political 
parties are a direct cause for the emancipation of the local society with regards to its 
involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, it can also be understood as the society’s 
defensive reflex that was generated by the fact that in the last 15 years ETA’s targets 
involve more and more Basque citizens of any profession. In other words, ETA reached 
the point described by Wilkinson where a petty minority imposed its tyranny on the 
majority.13 The number of people affected by the 40 year conflict is too large for such a 
small region, to the extent where virtually everyone has some relative with experiences of 
violence either from the part of the state – that includes not only deaths and injuries but 
also the vital matter of the allocation of Basque prisoners in prisons outside the Basque 
country – as well as from the part of militant nationalist organisations. It is in this light 
that the Basque civil society emerged as the only active resolution generator and 
                                                 
11 Conversi, 2006, op.cit. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Paul Wilkinson, 1990. “Some observations on the relationship between terrorism and freedom” in Martin 
Warner & Roger Crisp (eds.), Terrorism, Protest and Power, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 44-53. 
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promoter in this conflict. Indeed, it was the only actor that ceased to constitute a “spoiler” 
for the resolution of the conflict.  
It is on these findings this thesis was founded to show that an end to ethno-
terrorist practices is possible if the circumstances of its emergence are clearly and 
objectively analysed, free from political discourses and biases. For the part of the State 
this can be made possible by examining the role and importance of the local discourses as 
they are expressed, rather than as the State authorities interpret them. The key practices 
that can allow for the isolation of the terrorists from the communities they claim to 
represent is for the State to provide assurances to those communities, through practical 
application of liberal pluralist models of government, that a) it recognises it is the most 
important actor in the alleviation of their grievances, and b) that it is working for said 
alleviation in a way that instils the confidence in the population that a non-violent, 
political process is preferable, as a strategy, for the political bargaining entailed in the 
demands for further autonomical concessions.  
Clearly, one of the criticisms for this study is that, even though States have 
conceded to demands of secession in the past, it is mostly very hard for them to accept it 
immediately and unconditionally, not least because of the predominance of the 
Westphalian traditions. However, it is not this thesis’ aim to prescribe a normative 
framework of secession. Rather, it is to claim that a more organised political planning 
could have eliminated the violence in the Basque country much earlier. Lack of political 
guidance and will by the primary nationalist parties in the early stages of the democracy 
allowed violence to continue being considered as the most viable alternative. The central 
authorities, on the other hand, and their security forces, behaved as if the violent 
organisation were nothing but obtrusive insects, thus, deluding themselves that violence 
is the only dimension of this conflict. While this thesis does not claim to be providing a 
framework that can explain every terrorist conflict that surfaces, nonetheless it sets the 
parameters under which the emergence of terrorist activity can be contextualised and 
understood beyond moral judgements and predicaments.  
By focusing on a critical analysis of the theories of nationalism, terrorism and 
conflict resolution, my thesis identifies a section that permits all three to be used 
conjointly in order to explain the ethno-terrorist nature of a nationalist conflict and the 
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possibilities for its termination. While all three fields have existed and have been 
analysed separately, the critical frameworks that have been brought forward in the recent 
years and which I have analysed, have showed me that a correct identification and 
analysis of the dynamics and practices of all three allows for a better contextualisation of 
ethno-nationalist conflicts and, crucially, brings to the fore the possibilities that such 
conflicts might be only circumstantially protracted. That is, the until recently lack of a 
comprehensive understanding of how nationalist ideology operates and the instances in 
which its cultural elements attract and incorporate violent practices, which in turn recycle 
those cultural traits, made almost impossible the identification of those elements in the 
conflict that could be identified as the key-mechanisms that should have attracted the 
attention of conflict resolution scholars.  
What my argument makes clear in theoretical terms is that conflict resolution can 
constitute a tool of intervention in the process in which Nationalism gives rise to ethno-
Terrorism. As the Basque case has shown, the circumstances under which ethno-terrorist 
practices become tautological with the broader ethno-nationalist discourse can be 
disrupted if conflict resolution identifies effectively the cultural and symbolic 
implications that legitimise the use of violence for the sake of the nationalist objective, 
that is, independence. For that to be achieved, conflict resolution must be directed 
towards a) the minority, which perceives both the nationalist as well as the violent 
dimensions to be legitimate, and b) the State, which, ultimately, has a vested interest in 
assuring the minority that, not only does it possess the capacity and resources to alleviate 
possible grievances but, crucially, that it is willing to adopt or extend any political 
mechanisms that allow the minority to differentiate itself politically from the central 
structures without finding refuge to violence, which is in turn perpetuated by discourses 
that take advantage of the cultural structures that are the basis for said differentiation. In 
order for that process to be successful, the State must co-operate with any local actors, 
such as NGOs, civil society initiative groups or moderate nationalist platforms that 
oppose violence. Besides rejecting any temptations to radicalise its anti-terrorist practices 
that may mistakenly expand to target non-violent nationalist circles, the implementation 
of the typical tools offered by conflict resolution, such as workshops or informal dialogue 
can contribute to the clarification of both perceptions and objectives of both sides. Such 
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practices will also be beneficial because they will help persuade the civil society of the 
State’s willingness to attend to their demands and, as a result, will make the utilisation of 
violence seem a rather ‘suicidal’ option. I use the term ‘suicidal’ because, as is evident in 
the Basque case, where concessions have been made and there exists the political will to 
further the political cooperation and elaboration of a possible resolution, any violent 
manifestations may lead the State to back down or reject further concessions. This was 
the case in Spain during the centre-right government of José Maria Aznar of the second 
half of the 1990s, the main difference being, of course, that said government 
miscalculated the support it received from both the local as well as the national society 
with regards to its anti-terrorist objectives, as explained in chapter Seven. 
Having said that, it is the persistence of the Basque civil society during the same 
period to continue rejecting any manifestations of nationalist violence, despite the 
radicalisation of the State-wide government to radicalise its anti-terrorist discourse and 
strategies, that helps my thesis bring forward a new ontological, methodological and 
epistemological analysis and understanding of ethno-terrorism in ethno-nationalist 
conflicts. If political violence is an umbrella notion14 that incorporates many a different 
ways for a group to manifest its rejection of State policies, and to set an agenda of their 
grievances and/or disapproval of such policies,15 then it becomes evident that freedom-
fighting is not necessarily synonymous to terrorism and should not be compelled towards 
the escalation of political violence into the use of ethno-terrorism,  especially in cases 
where the freedom sought is from a liberal democratic state that has become oppressive 
towards the minority, precisely because the latter is a ‘permanent’ minority in a 
framework that favours the decisions made by the majority. On the contrary, my thesis 
speculates that alternative actions, for example mass protests, industrial mobilisations, or 
civil disobedience of the strongest form, can constitute means by which the minority can 
make its case in very strong terms, thereby exerting pressure on the State in order to 
initiate or, at least, participate in a process where the demands of said minority will be 
taken into account and acted upon. This, of course, rests on the idea that the notion of 
terrorism in the case under examination is properly understood by being correctly and 
                                                 
14 Paul Wilkinson, 1983. Terrorism and the Liberal State, Basingstoke; London: MacMillan, pp. 32-33. 
15 Crenshaw, 1990, op.cit., p.17. 
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accurately contextualised through an explanation of discourses that are critically 
analysed, precisely because, after the beginning of the War on Terror, states have been 
seen to succumb to the temptation to brand virtually any non-institutional opposition as 
‘terrorists’.  
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